Augusta Dimou

Diverging Paths to Modernity: Socialism as an Intellectual Movement in the Nineteenth Century. A Comparative Approach

Introduction

Socialist theory was born in the Western context both as a result of and as a reaction to the exigencies of the Industrial Revolution and the maturation of the capitalistic process. It reflected and wished to address changes in the social, economic and political structure of the Western part of the old continent, envisioning their radical transformation. Socialism, an offspring of the legacy of the Enlightenment, followed up on the inadequacies of liberal politics and questioned anew a whole set of issues like the relationship between man and society, the creation and distribution of wealth, the configuration between capital and labour, the extension of political and social rights. Socialist theory as the most incisive answer to the challenges of the modern age was soon transported to other parts of the world, to societies on the verge of modernity, characterized by very dissimilar traditions and social structures than the initial Western matrix. In these societies sui generis and due to the structural discrepancies characteristic of the cleavage between centre and periphery, socialism was not and could not be introduced as a critique of industrial society, which remained rather the desideratum than a fait accompli. Instead, the discrepancy in contextual preconditions provided for the fact that socialism received its validity as a theoretical alternative in a reversed correlation, that is, not as a theory of modernity, but foremost as a recipe for modernization.

Context, Ideologies, Adaptation

Socialism thus entered the geographical space of the Balkans in the first place as part of a discursive modernity,[1] informing the imaginary of change – "progress" according to the terminology of the nineteenth century – both in social and political terms, before major changes in the social and economic structure would allow for the creation, either objective or subjective,

1 Modernity is elaborated here as a "break in the discourses on human beings and society" that occurred approximately two centuries ago. "This discursive rupture brought about the establishment of modern ideas as *new imaginary significations* for both individuals and society and, as such, it instituted new kinds of social and political issues and conflicts." [emphasis AD], Peter Wagner: A Sociology of Modernity, Liberty and Discipline, London/New York 1994, p. 4. For a more "conventional" discussion of modernity and its effects on the world periphery see: S. N. Eisenstadt: Patterns of Modernity, Vol. I/II, London 1987.

of socialism's actual subject of liberation, the working class. Socialism functioned foremost as a vehicle for social criticism[2] and as an alternative to unfulfilled aspirations of political emancipation, before it could and would become an ideology associated with the labour movement. It should be mentioned, at this point, that the "discrepancy" or "displacement" in the function of transported ideologies is not reserved only for socialism, but could be viewed as a broader predicament of the process of "transportation." Whereas liberalism in Europe was the outcome of a lengthy process of economic and social change, liberalism in the Balkans was to function as a lever in order to effectuate socio-economic change. Nor was liberalism in the Balkans the expression of articulate bourgeoisies, but rather a model for political state-building. If liberalism in the Western context signified the emancipation of bourgeois society from the state, on the contrary, the state was to function as the more developed institution in Balkan societies[3] and became de facto the privileged domain for the creation of elites. While nationalism in geographically consolidated states like France and Spain, for example, was to function as a state-cementing ideology, nationalism transported eastwards signified the discovery of "the people" both in social and ethnic terms and functioned as a state-creating ideology. It should be emphasized at this point that ideologies are not transported to the periphery with a great discrepancy in time. Rather, it is the different context into which theories or ideologies are transplanted that provides for disparities in the function or for idiosyncratic adaptations.[4] Noteworthy in this respect are the reflections of the Romanian socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, who emphasized the reverse correlation between structure and superstructure in the countries of the periphery. In his "Socialism in Backward Countries" Gherea argued that "the fact that the evolution of backward societies is influenced and even determined to a large extent by advanced societies gives rise to two fundamental peculiarities in the way in which backward countries evolve. The first concerns the time span of the evolution, which is shorter than in advanced countries. The second is that in backward societies, political, social, juridical and other forms [the superstructure] are transformed before the socio-economic basis is developed, a basis which in advanced countries gave birth to this superstructure."[5] Whereas in industrial capitalist countries social forms followed from the eco-

2 See: Georges Haupt: Naissance du Socialisme par la Critique: La Roumanie, in: Le Movement Social, 59, (April–June 1967), pp. 30–48.

3 Pointedly argued by Gale Stokes: "In the Balkans, however, introduction of a state on the European model occurred in a social situation that was almost completely unprepared for it. The state, being the most developed institution in Balkan society, became also the dominant element, but whereas it operated using the same forms as its models in the West, the actual content of political activity was more consistent with traditional status societies than with the more legalistic societies from which the state forms were copied." Gale Stokes: The Social Origins of East European Politics, in: Daniel Chirot (ed.): The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe, Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century, Berkeley 1989, p. 245.

4 When I refer to differences I am not implying deviations from a normative model of development. Consequently, I am not discussing difference in terms of "Sonderwege" in historical development, but rather in terms of differences (variations) in historical experience.

5 Quoted in: Georges Haupt: Model Party: the Role and Influence of German Social Democracy in South-East Europe, in: Georges Haupt (ed.): Aspects of International Socialism 1871–1914, Cam-

nomic base, in peripheral societies the process was reversed. In contrast to the Western experience, the creation of independent nation-states and the establishment of institutions and procedures of mass political participation and representation took place in a period where industrialization was literally non-existent.

As already mentioned, ideologies are not transported necessarily with a time lag. On the contrary, due to intensified mobility and communications, asymmetries in socio-economic structures between various regions of the world are often supplemented or compensated synchronically in the transportation of ideas and models. Time factors indeed almost determined the overlapping of ideologies in the Balkans. Characteristically, neither in Serbia nor in Bulgaria was socialism the outcome of a reaction to mature and consolidated, preceding liberal politics. On the contrary, socialism was rather a response to unfulfilled rudimentary expectations from the liberal "revolution," and, to the degree that socialism could assert itself as an alternative, it was predominantly for reasons of political exigency and less due to the dynamics of social polarization. Liberalism and socialism contended almost synchronically for political recognition. In Serbia, liberal politics preceded only by a decade (1860s) the introduction of socialist, that is, radical critique (1870s), while in Bulgaria, liberalism and socialism made almost an equal head start (1870s). Nor was socialism in the nineteenth century a reaction to a rampant, native industrial capitalism. The capitalism to which the Balkan socialists were reacting was more of the nature of the encroachment of commercial capitalism on the well-established social texture of the Ottoman past. Moreover, it was a capitalism which lacked an indigenous dynamic, destroying faster the customary "habitus" of older forms of social existence than creating and consolidating new ones. For most Balkan countries, industrialization proper only set in as late as the second decade of the twentieth century.

The various Balkan states that emerged in different points in time during the nineteenth century carried more or less the generic imprint of the Ottoman legacy. Summarized to the point by M. Todorova,[6] this translated in the realm of the political into the absence of political elites, since local notables were normally integrated at the lowest level of the Ottoman bureaucracy; the lack of a landed nobility (with exceptions of course such as Romania and Bosnia), since the Ottoman system discouraged the tendency to form a landowning class; the existence of a relatively free peasantry, since the small peasant holding was and remained the basic unit of production (with exceptions of course such as Romania, Bosnia, part of Macedonia etc.); and an urban setting characterized by small social differentiation, since the Balkan city functioned rather as a feudal category subordinate to the state, failing to develop either an autonomous role or a strong independent commercial and industrial class. Finally, the Pax Ottomanica left an enduring legacy in the demographic realm as a result of population movements and the interpenetration of various population groups. It signified the lack of clearly demarcated ethnic boundaries, or better stated, the absence of congruence between ethnic and geographic boundaries. To the above, we could add tentatively also the absence of

bridge 1986, p. 57.

6 Maria Todorova: The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans, in: Leon Carl Brown (ed.): Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, New York 1997, pp. 45–77.

consolidated middle strata, at least for the nineteenth century. The Balkan societies remained well into the twentieth century predominantly agrarian societies. In 1910, the agricultural population constituted 81,6% in Serbia, 80,9% in Bulgaria, 80% in Greece and 80,8% in Romania.[7] A "mini" industrial spurt in the first decade of the twentieth century lacked dynamic, however, while a more "apt" form of industrialization took place only in the second half of the 1920s.[8] In the absence of objective conditions for the reception of socialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, one can not but agree with F. Ahmad[9] that the dissemination of socialism could only be accomplished through the efforts of sympathizing intellectuals.

Intellectuals

Intellectuals functioned as the basic transportation vehicle for most intellectual currents to enter the Balkan space from Enlightenment thought to liberalism and socialism alike and were the principal links connecting the Balkan lands with the broader currents of European thought. If previous to the establishment of the nation-states education had been the prerogative of the slowly ascending social strata or had been exclusively connected to the educational activities of the church, with the creation of the nation-states the weightiest criterion for promotion to the educated segment of society was not so much class adherence, but rather access to education.[10] Educational possibilities multiplied as the state challenged the prerogative of the church over instruction, while educated and specialized personnel became indispensable in order to man and run the ex-nihilo created and constantly expanding state administrations. Education therefore became a most crucial asset for ascendance to the state class. Although it would be an exaggeration to claim that every educated person was a potential civil servant, such a claim would not be far from the truth. State service and the educational sector were the most liable employment opportunities for educated and (over)specialized cadres in societies where the public sphere was essentially confined and where the state remained the most resourceful and liable employer. States like Serbia and Bulgaria would consciously attempt to engineer their educated personnel by providing state scholarships for studies abroad. Moreover, education was quickly subordinated to the service of national expansion and homogenisation, becoming the most powerful and effective ally of nationalism. The sudden horizontal diffusion of education, despite the persistently high rate of

7 Rumen Daskalov/Holm Sundhaussen: Modernisierungsansätze, in: Magarditsch Hatschikjan/Stefan Troebst (eds.): Südosteuropa: Ein Handbuch. Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, München 1999, p. 117.

8 Ibid., pp. 122–123.

9 Feroz Ahmad: Some Thoughts on the Role of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in the Genesis and Development of the Socialist Movement in Turkey (1876–1923), in: Mete Tunçay/Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.): Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1923, London/New York 1994, pp. 14–15.

10 The accuracy of this statement could well be contested in the case of Romania, where the existence of a native boyar class naturally created a different nexus between elites and education.

analphabetism, was a crucial factor for the creation, and in a certain sense, for the overproduction of educated personnel.[11] Notwithstanding the impact of ideational factors on the ideological choices of intellectuals, prevalent cultural and educational influences (East/West), options of professional integration, the nature of the political system within which they had to operate, ideal types (models) of intellectual activity determined as well the pro- or anti-systemic attitude of educated men (women are unfortunately underrepresented).

The Russian Connection and the Geography of Revolution

If the itineraries via which ideas of the Enlightenment entered the Balkans encompassed a broad geographical space, predominantly Western and Central Europe and to a far lesser extent Eastern Europe, the itineraries of early socialism signalled a reversal of this geographical configuration. For the central-northern part of the Balkans (Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania) Russia was to become the major revolution-exporting country. Exposure to Russian influences was instrumental in the adaptation of early socialist theory (1870s–1880s). This does not mean that variants of Western socialism did not exercise an influence in these countries, they were however proportionately of subordinate significance. Moreover, elements of Western socialist thought infiltrated the Balkans in a roundabout way, that is, often mediated through Russian channels. Almost ironically, Western ideas like Marxism were reinterpreted within the Russian context and adapted to Russian traditions and needs.[12] Such an encounter of Russia with Western Marxism was the birth of Russian Populism, which found its way into Serbia in the 1870s.[13] Serbian Radicalism, as an adaptation of an eastern variant of socialism, was in turn to compete within the Serbian context with more direct Western influences such as liberalism. The case of Serbian Radicalism is illustrative of the entangled itineraries in the circulation of ideas and their geographical distribution within the European peripheries.

Indisputably, Russian populism in its multiple variants constituted the initial and most authoritative socialist paradigm in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania before it was slowly substituted by (Western) Marxism, a process that started around the mid–1880s and made real headway in the 1890s. Generally, the early influence of Russian populism in the central-northern Balkans has been underrated and deserves a thorough re-evaluation.[14] While in Ser-

11 Daskalov/Sundhaussen: "Modernisierungsansätze", pp. 114–117.

12 E. Cyril Black: Russia and the Modernization of the Balkans, in: Charles Jelavich/Barbara Jelavich (eds.): The Balkans in Transition. Essays in the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century, Berkeley 1963, p. 147.

13 For an extensive and exhaustive treatment of early Serbian Radicalism see: Latinka Perović: Srpski Socijalisti 19. Veka. Prilog Istoriji Socijalističke Misli, Vol. 1–2, Belgrade 1985; and Latinka Perović: Srpski Socijalisti, Vol. 3, Belgrade 1995; Gale Stokes: Politics as Development. The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia, Durham 1990; Diana Miškova: Prisposobjavane na Svobodata, Modernost-Legitimnost v Sărbija i Rumănija prez XIX Vek, Sofia 2001.

14 In their eagerness to stress the Marxist character of their socialist movements, both the Bulgarian and Romanian communist historiographies have purposely downplayed, in fact ignored, the early populist

bia Russian populism developed into a powerful political movement and was eventually institutionalised also as a political party, in Bulgaria and Romania it furnished the initial hotbed for the reception of Marxism and Social Democracy. In Bulgaria, it formed a common reference point between socialists and the early agrarians, before agrarianism was codified theoretically by A. Stamboliski.[15] The above picture does not apply for the most southern part of the Balkans, that is Greece, which remained entirely out of the orbit of Russian populism and Russian socialist influences until approximately the time of the Third International. Greek socialist intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth century received their theoretical influences exclusively via Western channels[16] (with the exception of G. Skleros, who represents a solitary case). For the greatest part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Greek socialist intellectuals remained completely isolated from the principal centres and the principal paradigma of their times. This led in the first place to eclectic adaptations of peripheral movements of lesser theoretical vigour like British Fabianism (P. Drakoulis) and French Ouvrierism (N. Giannios), and in the second place to poor domestic theorizing that did not reach international standards until World War I.

Summing up, the linguistic border dividing the central-northern Slavic-speaking Balkans from the most southern part demarcates and coincides with the boundary of the influence of Eastern socialism in the nineteenth century. While the case of romance-speaking Romania could raise an obvious objection, it was Romania's geographical proximity to Russia that advanced to the most decisive criterion. Romania was a crucial junction and a gateway in the flow of illegal literature and revolutionaries from East to West and vice versa. Moreover, the first generation of socialists/populists in Romania was in its majority not of Romanian ethnic origin. For the central-northern Balkans, the shift in paradigm (from populism to Marxism) meant a renewed shift in geographical emphasis from East to West.

Until the final prevalence of Marxism, which signalled a reorientation of emphasis towards Western Europe, a consistent alignment with Western social democracy, particularly in its German variant (SPD)[17] and affiliation of course with the Second International, the

influences in their respective socialist movements. Totally different is the historiographic situation in Serbia, where the institutionalization of the populist movement into the Radical Party has received abundant attention and has, moreover, led to the creation of different historical schools. A comparative endeavor is presented by Ellen Claire Hadidian: A Comparison of the Thought of Early Bulgarian and Serbian Radicals, 1867–1876, unpublished PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.

15 On the populist influences in the early Bulgarian agrarian movement see: D. John Bell: Peasants in Power, Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union 1899–1923, Princeton 1977, pp. 18–20; D. John Bell: The Genesis of Agrarianism in Bulgaria, in: Balkan Studies, 15 (1975),pp. 73–92, p. 76. The fact that the BANU was initially conceived as a non-political, rather as an "educational-economic" organization testifies further to the influence of populist ideas.

16 For an overview of the history of socialism in Greece from the standpoint of intellectual history, presented in the breadth of an encyclopedic approach, see: Panagiotis Noutsos: He Sosialistike Skepse sten Hellada apo to 1875–1974, Vol. I., Vol. II.A., Vol. II.B., Vol. III, Athens 1995[2], 1991, 1992, 1993.

17 Haupt: Model Party. The German influence was twofold. While the SPD served as the raw model for a successful, mass socialist party, the German industrial "miracle" functioned as a raw model for a quick and successful industrialization.

Russian connection remained for the central-northern part of the Balkans a most authoritative source. The long period of transition from one paradigm to another (1880–1890) was characterized, moreover, by a mixed and eclectic coexistence of both Eastern and Western socialist literature. Russia, as already mentioned, served as an important channel for the dissemination of Western socialist literature of both French and German provenance. One of the path-breaking exponents of Bulgarian Marxism, D. Blagoev, acquainted himself with Marx's "Capital" in its Russian translation, the first foreign language translation to appear already in 1872. The perseverance of Marxism in Bulgaria went largely via Russian Marxism, that is, via the influence of Plekhanov and the "Liberation of Labour" group located in Switzerland.[18] The infiltration of Marxism in Serbia went largely through German-speaking channels (Austria, Germany). In Romania, the transition from populism to Marxism lasted over a decade (1881–1893) and was the result of concurrent Russian (Plekhanov) and French (POF) influences. It was a short-lived victory however, as the Romanian social democrats would face anew the challenge of neo-populism in the face of Constantine Stere.[19] The change of the socialist paradigm that slowly took place at the end of the nineteenth century signified also a transformation in the pretensions of socialism, away from a movement promoted on the voluntaristic grounds of a conscious intelligentsia aimed at the generic welfare of the people to the creation of social democratic parties with the mandate to function as agents of specific class interests. The construction of new social identities and "prefabricated" social categories corresponding to the prescriptions and the taxonomies proposed by the Marxist master narrative proved to be a troublesome and thankless task for most Balkan social democrats.

The Russian influence was not limited to the transmission of literature or simply the adaptation of theoretical populism. The Russian revolutionary movement furnished also the model of appropriate intellectual activity. Despite the fact that neither the Serbs nor the Bulgarians would ever come close to anything like an intelligentsia in the Russian sense of the term, that is, forming a distinct social stratum,[20] they adopted the outlook and the consciousness of their Russian colleagues and fashioned themselves according to the Russian arche-

18 On the intellectual development of the Bulgarian socialists in Geneva and their interaction with the home socialists in Bulgaria, see: Dimitar Genchev: Profili ot Kafene "Landolt", Sofia 1990.

19 On the intellectual formation of the Romanian socialists see: Jochen Schmidt: Populismus oder Marxismus. Zur Ideengeschichte der radikalen Intelligenz Rumäniens, Tübingen 1992.

20 The uniqueness of the Eastern intelligentsia resided in the fact that "while all other classes and strata of Eastern Europe have had their equivalents in the West, the intelligentsia, strictly speaking, did not." The emergence of the intelligentsia as a distinct social stratum in Russia and Poland during the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was due to specific historical processes, on the one hand, the deterioration of the feudal system in Russia and, on the other, the discrimination and pauperization of the nobility in partitioned Poland. It consisted of the better educated segments of society, however, distinct from the educated people of the upper and middle classes, united "by a specific combination of psychological characteristics, manners, style of life, social status and, above all, value system." Although it produced leaders for diverse social movements, its most exemplary representatives were to be found principally "in the service of social progress, revolution and national independence." See: Aleksander Gella: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Intelligentsia, in: Aleksander Gella (ed.): The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study, London 1976, pp. 13–15.

type.[21] The rich Russian legacy of social and literary criticism (Belinsky, Dobroljubov, Herzen etc.), but also the more programmatic visions of the intellectual revolutionary, furnished the blueprint for socialist activity: Chernyshevsky's "New People" as a novel category of engaged human beings imbued with absolute social consciousness,[22] Lavrov's dictum of the "moral duty" of the "critically thinking individuals" to repay their debt to humanity by becoming the harbingers of modernity,[23] just to mention some of the principal and most popular models. The concept of intelligentsia envisaged political activity as a professional revolutionary vocation, instilling a psychological disposition akin to religiosity, often reflected in the promulgation of new theories as a "new faith."[24] Central to populism was the belief that the intelligentsia had the duty to raise the intellectual and moral standards of the common people through enlightenment and education. What served as a common denominator for the self-understanding of the Russian intelligentsia was a voluntaristic attitude towards history, where the philosopher-intellectual-revolutionary was capable of intervening and determining the course of events, and consequently also the course of history. As emphasized by Billington, it

> "was [a] passion for philosophic totality, a sense of unity in the common search for truth, which makes it essential to distinguish from the beginning the Russian term *intelligent*

21 Characteristic is the following passage drawn from Pera Todorović's (prominent Serbian Radical intellectual) reminiscences of his student days in Switzerland: "In any case, the live example of the Russian nihilists influenced us more than anything else. Faith is contagious – and when we saw how our Russian friends believed unconditionally in socialism, we believed too. In our eyes, the truthfulness of socialism was fully proven by the fact that it was young men and women – and what kind of men and women! – who were willing to perish at the gallows or spend their best years in Russian mines for this socialism [...] We read a lot [...] and yet again practical work meant a lot more to us than theory. Our Russian friends told us: Study above all through life and struggle, this way you will first of all learn what you have to do. Indubitably, life is hard, you will be chased, exposed to temptation, and experience disappointments, but if you are imbued with the right faith, it will stand firm against difficulties and, on the contrary, it will be strengthened." Quoted in: Slobodan Jovanović: "Pera Todorović," in: Političke i Pravne Rasprave, Sabrana Dela, Vol. 2, Belgrade 1990, pp. 218–219. A very obvious case of Russian influence in Bulgaria is Nikola Gabrovski's programmatic text *Nravstvennata Zadacha na Inteligentsiiata* [The Moral Duty of the Intelligentsia], published in 1889. The text was extremely influential for several generations of socialist intellectuals in Bulgaria. It is needless to emphasize that already the title alludes to the influence of Lavrov. According to Gabrovski, "anybody who reckons himself a human being and wants to live like a human being with a purpose in life is forced to decide the moral principles of his existence. This is even more mandatory for the intelligentsia – the social force, which stands at the head of society and shows the way to cultural development and general happiness." See also a very good summary of the profile and the tasks of the intelligentsia by the Russian exile populist P. Deborov: Intelligencijata v Bălgaria [The Intelligentsia in Bulgaria], in: Bălgarska Sbirka, 9 (1895), pp. 877–894.

22 Nikolai Cherhyshevsky: What is to be Done?, Moscow 1983. Chernyshevsky coined in his novel the term "New People" that quickly got established in the literature of the time, designating a novel prototype of the new composite positive hero. The emphasis on consciousness, will and self-education were some of the ingredients that made the new heroes particularly appealing to the youth. The novel induced the youth to self-emancipation and encouraged the practice of proselytization for the socialist cause.

23 Peter Lavrov: Historical Letters, Berkeley 1967.

24 Perović: Srpski Socijalisti, Vol. III., p. 29ff.

> from 'intellectual', in the specialized, somewhat pedantic sense in which the term is often understood in the West. Belinsky confessed in the Forties that 'for me, to think, feel, understand and suffer are one and the same thing.' For the Russian *intelligent*, thought was inextricable from the totality of human existence. The problems 'thinkers' should deal with could not be anything less than the total problems of meaning and purpose. Many of the distinctive characteristics of the intelligentsia – hatred of Tsarist bureaucracy, repudiation of *meshchanstvo* (bourgeois philistinism), hostility in pure form in art, and opposition to the *posredstvennost* (mediocrity) that enshrouds lives unmoved by great questions – are merely corollaries to this belief that their quest was for ultimates. The intelligentsia was inspired not only by a thirst for truth, but by a passion for social justice."[25]

It could be argued tentatively, that from the various currents of Russian populist revolutionary thought represented by intellectuals in Serbia and Bulgaria, the more legalistic, evolutionary options were to prevail over the narrowly conspiratorial or Blanquist alternatives. This predilection appears sensible in the light of the fact that intellectuals in the Balkans were not faced with the same exigencies as their Russian colleagues. They had to partially confront peremptory political systems, but certainly not the extremities of the Tsarist autocracy. Nor did they have to operate in countries still burdened by the institution of serfdom. On the contrary, they lived in countries where the small yeoman and his property were more or less guaranteed (with already mentioned exceptions). The absence of firm and articulate anti-etatist and anti-clerical attitudes provides for an additional contrast to the Russian case. Here again, it was the diverging historical experience that accounts for the difference. In the Balkans the institution of the state was a recent acquisition; moreover, it came about as the "result" of revolutionary, politically emancipatory movements. The establishment of states – with all the concomitant exaggerations and catastrophic effects that accompanied the state-building process in the Balkans – was considered, by the standards of the nineteenth century, the most manifest proof of modernity in the region. Even more remarkable are the quasi-generic absence of anti-clerical tones in the Balkan socialist discourses. Here again we have an additional contrast not only to the Russian, but also to the experiences made in southern Italy and Spain, where socialism and anarchism were directed among other things also against the institution of the church. This fact raises some interesting questions about the general status of religion as part of the Ottoman legacy and its more general socio-cultural function in the Balkans.

Russian influences in the Balkans were the result of a two-way stream. On the one hand, they were the result of the exodus of Russian revolutionaries, who found refuge in the Balkans or extended their revolutionary activity there. The impulses for the early Romanian socialist/populist movement came from Russian *narodniki* fleeing from Bessarabia, who found refuge in Romania as a result of the unsuccessful "go to the people" movement of 1873/1874. Almost the entire first generation of socialist intellectuals active in Romania (N.P. Zubcu-Codreanu, N.K. Zudzilovskij-Russel, C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Z.C. Arbore-Ralli, P.

25 James H. Billington: Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, Oxford 1958, p. 9.

Alexandrov) were experienced populist revolutionaries, some among them having already achieved prominence in the Russian revolutionary scene. It is characteristic that the majority were not of Romanian ethnic origin. They functioned as intermediaries between leaders of the Russian movement who had fled abroad and their followers still active in Russia. As already mentioned, Romania was the major passage in the flow of revolutionaries and literature between East and West. Prominent figures like Nečaev, Plekhanov and Akselrod found their first refuge in Romania. Russian populists immigrated also to Bulgaria, notably Vladimir K. Debogori-Mokrievich and Boris Mintses. Despite the fact that the role they played in Bulgaria was not as influential as in neighbouring Romania, nor were they instrumental in the foundation of the Bulgarian socialist party, which was exclusively the result of Bulgarian intellectuals, they formed part of the broader revolutionary network of exiles operative outside Russia. The Russian populists residing in Bulgaria were among the first and most perspicacious critics of the Bulgarian Marxists, and several of their points of criticism were to resurface in the theoretical dissent of the Broad socialists at the turn of the nineteenth century. Russian revolutionaries participated in the Bosnian Uprising of 1875, just to mention a few examples.

The reverse stream saw the emigration of students with the purpose of receiving a higher education in Russia. Russian educational institutions were a prominent locus among Bulgarian students. It is estimated that approximately five hundred Bulgarians received their education in Russia between 1856 and 1878, not to mention the members of the substantial Bulgarian colony in Odessa.[26] Linguistic affiliation facilitated the Russian connection, particularly for the Serbs and Bulgarians. Affiliation to Russia was cultivated and consciously sponsored by the Russian government and the various Slav committees such as the Moscow Slavic Philanthropic Committee, which was in direct contact with the Asiatic department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Similar Pan-Slavic committees sprang up eventually in several Russian cities as part of a broader scheme to win over the Balkan Slavs for the purpose of state-sponsored Pan-Slavism. S. Marković, the founder of the Serbian radical movement, received such a scholarship in order to study at the Institute of Roads and Communications in St. Petersburg. The University of Petersburg was also an institution visited by D. Blagoev, a leading figure of the Bulgarian socialist movement. Both men formed their revolutionary worldviews as members of student communes, which functioned not only as prominent self-help, but also as incubation institutions for socialist revolutionaries.[27] The fact that educa-

26 Black: Modernization, p. 155.

27 Marković participated in the "Smorgon Academy" formed in 1867. Its members lived communally and earned their living through teaching and writing. Women were granted full membership. The teachings of Chernyshevsky had a great impact on the circle. See: Woodford D. McClellan: Svetozar Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism, Princeton 1964, pp. 55–63. Dimităr Blagoev describes his experience in the Russian communes as the most formative period in his life. "They helped also with respect to intellectual [issues] to find that sense in life that I had in vain searched for as an adolescent in Bulgaria, for thanks to those groups I could properly ask the question with which I had plagued my elder colleagues and myself at the Gabrovo gymnasium namely: Why is it valuable to know, to read? Now it was transformed into a more principled and more profound question, which was: What is the

tion in Russia always ended with the acquisition of a diploma but also with a thorough training in revolutionary ideas belongs to the one of the fascinating aspects of these academic "pilgrimages."

The Russian connection was extended to the heart of Europe with the creation of Russian student and émigrés colonies in Switzerland. Propitious conditions like the liberal atmosphere and the admission of women made Swiss universities (mainly Zurich and Geneva) particularly attractive to Russian students.[28] The Swiss connection was instrumental for the group of Serbian students who studied there in the 1860s and 1870s and who also formed the generation that transported the ideas of Russian populism back to Serbia.[29] The most prominent figures of the radical movement (S. Marković, P. Todorović, N. Pašić etc.) developed their worldview in close biotic and intellectual contact with the Russian émigrés community in Zurich.[30] The seclusion of Russian students from Swiss society, partially as a result of poverty but also as part of a specific frame of mind, contributed to a large extent to the communal isolation and the group identity characteristic of the Russian student community in the 1870s. Already during his sojourn in Switzerland, S. Marković had rallied around him the faithful group of adherents that were to work with him as his closest associates in the Radical movement upon their return to Serbia. Switzerland was prominent among Bulgarian students as well. N. Gabrovski, K. Rakovski, S. Balabanov, S. Nokov, G. Bakalov, D. Bakărdžiev, just to mention a few, received their university training there. For the generation of Bulgarian students studying in Geneva in the late 1880s and early 1890s, close connection to the Russian Marxist group around Akselrod/Zasulich/Plekhanov and timely association with the Second International provided the Bulgarians with the unique opportunity to follow closely developments in the international socialist arena and clarify rather early their ideological stance.

By the early 1890s the Bulgarian socialists accomplished the passage from populism to Marxism, a circumstance testified by the early founding of the socialist party (1891) and the adaptation of the Erfurt program already by 1892. For the Serbian socialists, the passage to Marxism was to be more complicated, since the local tradition of radicalism functioned as an "attraction pole" that in a certain way "diluted" and partially "delayed" the imperative of a party with a social profile. Despite the presence of intellectuals with leanings to Marxism, the

sense of life, or why is it worth that a man live for? It seemed like the history of the Russian revolutionary movement could provide me with an answer to this question." Dimităr Blagoev: Kratki Beležki iz Moja Život [Small Notes from my Life], Sofia 1971, p. 57. Blagoev not only formed his revolutionary ethos among the Russian student communes. His own political group in Petersburg grew literally out of such a commune.

28 On the Russian student colony in Zurich see: J. M. Meijer: Knowledge and Revolution. The Russian Colony in Zurich (1870–1873), Amsterdam 1956.

29 Ljubinka Trgovčević: Influenze esterne sulla 'Inteligencija' serba nel XIX secolo, in: Rivista Storica Italiana, 2 (1998), pp. 642–653, p. 647.

30 Sofija Skoric: The Populism of Nikola Pašić: The Zürich Period, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. XIV, 4 (1980), pp. 469–485; Andrej Šemjakin: Nikola Pašić i Russkie Socialisti v Cjurihe (1868–1872) [Nikola Pašić and the Russian Socialists in Zurich (1868–1872)], in: Tokovi Istorije, 1–2 (1997), pp. 5–40.

Social Democratic Party was founded in 1903. The differences in the passage from populism to Marxism in Bulgaria and Serbia provide for an interesting contrast. In both countries the crucial decades were the 1880s–1890s, characterized as already mentioned by theoretical fluidity and eclecticism. In Serbia, the institutionalisation of populism into the Radical Party and the incorporation later by the radicals of Marxist argumentation frustrated a clear break in the change of paradigm. Until the founding of the Social Democratic Party, some of the intellectuals concerned with social issues showed a tendency to seek integration into the Radical Party, while the borders between radicals and social democrats remained fluid. The change of paradigm was accomplished by different generations within the span of more than twenty years.[31] In Bulgaria, due to temporal reasons – first of all, the belated creation of Bulgaria as a state [1878], and secondly, the fact that the Bulgarian socialists came together in a period where in the international scene a change of paradigm was taking place [1880s–1890s] – the break with populism was accomplished by the same generation of intellectuals, that is, a generation that was schooled early in populism, but then quasi holistically turned to Marxism. The early schooling in populism, however, left a substratum of non-negligible influence, testified in the early Bulgarian socialists' dexterity for popular propaganda, a capacity to use populist language and themes, and a sense for political immediacy and pragmatism. Socialists like N. Gabrovski made use of the earlier populist clichés in the 1890s, particularly when it came to addressing the countryside. The socialists resorted to such agitation willingly but also constrained by the social structure of the country.[32]

Entirely different were the political ramifications that these Broad socialist pools were to experience in Serbia and Bulgaria. In Serbia, the radicals managed to choke and frustrate the creation of an authentic peasant party (a group of peasant tribunes around Adam Bogosavljević, mid–1870s), absorb their legacy and present themselves as the mouthpiece of the peasantry. The radicals were no peasant party, of course, but a populist peasantist party with pretensions to speak in the name of the peasantry. The success of the radicals lay rather in their capacity to tap the patriarchal pulse of the peasants, adjust their discourse to the anti-etatist predilection of the Serbian peasantry, and manipulate them with their patriarchal egalitarian rural values by equating nativist ideals with the authentic Serbian nation. Furthermore, they managed to organize the peasant constituency in a most stringent and efficient way. Attempts to found a purely agrarian party, which were frustrated at the turn of the century (as the unsuccessful history of the Srpska Narodna Seljačka Sloga [The Serbian National Peasant Accord] (1903) demonstrates) illustrate the powerful grip of the radicals over the peasantry. The later offshoots from the generic radical pool, such as the Independent Radicals[33] or the new

31 Mira Bogdanović: Srpska Socijaldemokratska Partija i seljaštvo 1903–1914 [The Social Democratic Party and the Peasantry 1903–1914], in: Tokovi Istorije, 1–2 (1994), p. 111ff.

32 On the precarious relationship between populism and Marxism in the Bulgarian social democratic party see: Augusta Dimou: The 'Wheel of History', the 'Dark Mass' and the Antinomies of Modernity in the Semiperiphery: The 1903 Split in the Bulgarian Social Democracy, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas, 3 (2001), pp. 79–105.

33 See: Olga Popović-Obradović: O ideološkom profilu radikala u Srbiji 1903–1914, in: Tokovi Istorije, 1–2 (1994), pp. 59–76.

socialist contenders such as the social democrats, would orient themselves progressively from the rural towards the urban element. Precisely the opposite was to be the case in Bulgaria. The social democrats' self-fashioning as a proletarian, alias urban party, and their half-hearted commitment to the peasants' cause had a double effect. In the first place, it alienated intellectuals who were initially trained as socialists, but then turned into agrarians (case Tserkovski). In the second place, the early agrarian movement constituted itself ideologically partially in theoretical opposition to the extremes of the Marxist developmental scenario (the abolition of private property, land concentration, etc). In fact, the issue of private property remained a bedrock of disagreement between the agrarians and the socialists, particularly the Narrows. The Bulgarian Agrarian Union (BANU), was naturally also the creation of intellectuals. In contrast to the Radical Party, however, it was the outgrowth of a genuine grass roots movement and was carried by an intelligentsia in direct professional relationship to the countryside. The BANU's mature ideological profile – again in contrast to the radicals who constructed their ideological profile by codifying peasant patriarchalism – was explicitly modern. Mature agrarianism as developed by Stamboliski was a conglomerate of various thinkers from Eduard Bernstein, Darwin, Louis Henry Morgan, Eduard David, Ernest Renan to Theodor Mommsen. Bulgarian agrarianism had a distinct leftist profile, not least for its corporatist social vision.

Concluding this section on theoretical influences and itineraries of revolution, it could be argued that the Russian and/or by extension the Swiss connection were instrumental for the initiation of the early Serbian, Bulgarian and in a different manner for the Romanian socialists. The majority – almost in absolute numbers – of the intellectuals in these countries that turned to socialism had received their education in one or the other "Mecca" of revolution.

Intellectuals and Political Systems

Models are conducive, but do not account for the total formative experience of intellectuals. The Russian model of the intelligentsia found application in some of the Balkan countries partially for similar structural reasons as in Russia, that is, the absence of solidified middle classes, the absence of a long-standing intellectual tradition and as an answer to the broader problematic of modernization. It was nurtured, however, also by local political dynamics, or stated differently, the political system within which these intellectuals had to operate induced them either to accept or discard their political environment and consequently determined their pro- or anti-systemic attitudes. In the case of Bulgaria, the early setback of liberal expectations naturally radicalised educated cadres. Increased suppression and the curtailment of liberal rights under Stambolov already by the 1890s, the complete derailment of the political system under the personal regime of King Ferdinand and the spectacular political mobilization of the peasantry by the turn of the century, challenged the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of intellectuals, who turned to ideologies of mass representation, particularly to the left. The imported Russian model was thus fortified by good local reasons, since political frustration and alienation led almost automatically to radicalisation. In what developed into a ritualised and unofficial political practice, the political elites in Bulgaria sought and attained

legitimacy principally from above and rarely from below. Political practice, perhaps more than in any other country, developed traits of a closed and exclusive political system, concurrently setting free the social forces at the base. The agrarian movement, all the complex socio-economic reasons contributing to its inception (bad harvests 1897–1899, drop in grain prices, reintroduction of the tithe, etc.) taken into consideration, is a good example of the process of the political alienation of the countryside. The socio-economic stimulus coincided with a cleavage of political non-representation.

In the case of Serbia, the establishment of constitutionalism was a long-lasting bartering process between alternating monarchs of the Obrenović family and the political parties, an exercise in confrontation and compromise resulting in the constitution of 1888, which was effectively put into practice only in 1903. The willingness of the Serbian liberals to compromise with the crown and accept a setback of liberal demands, an incomplete constitutional arrangement, the modernization schemes inspired by the West proposed by the king and the ascending group of the progressives, the unwillingness of the afore-mentioned political groups to share power with the radicals, the partial persecution of radical intellectuals, all the above-mentioned factors promoted the radicalisation of socialist intellectuals, who not only rejected the status quo, but saw themselves called upon to save Serbia from the menace of western, alias capitalistic modernization.

The political situation in Greece was quite different and presents an interesting contrast to the other two countries. In the Greek case, it is rather the absence of radicalisation of socialist intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth century that is of interest. A representative political system functioning since the 1860s deprived Greek socialist intellectuals of the major motivation for early socialist criticism as we encounter it in the Bulgarian and Serbian cases. Greek socialist intellectuals operated within an open and inclusive political system and thus had little incentive for a complete systemic break as did their Serbian or Bulgarian colleagues.[34] Precisely this lack of incentive induced Greek socialist intellectuals to seek their

34 Summarized by A. Liakos: "Despite violations, the parliamentary practice in the Kingdom of Greece absorbed and neutralized political tensions. Universal [male] suffrage was introduced as early as 1864; it functioned, needless to say, within a system of clientalism and patronage which in the end modified and differentiated the establishment considerably from its Western model; there were, however, individual freedoms and in comparison to other countries of Eastern Europa [there was no suppression of the opposition]. Modernization in this context did not signify a holistic subversion, that is, a revolutionary transition from one status to another. There was no need consequently to resolve to theoretical solutions, including Marxism, not even conceptualized as in the social democratic model of the succession of social systems. Moreover, there existed at least officially the possibility of political reform, amelioration and criticism. What was basically contested was the behaviour of the players, not the rules of the game. The lack of internal social tensions and concomitant polarization allowed Greek intellectuals to consider the social problem as something unrelated to Greek society. [...] Since the problem did not concern them, intellectuals could establish critical positions towards capitalism. However, the lack of motives deprived them of the possibility of delving or refuting [these positions], [with the end result of] defending the traditions and the ideological foundations of the establishment." Antonis Liakos: Oi Dynatotites Proslepses tou Marxismou sten Hellada, to 19o Aiona [The Possibilities to Conceptualize Marxism in Greece in the Nineteenth Century], in: G.V. Dertiles, K. Kostes (eds.): Themata Neoellenikes Historias [Topics of Modern Greek History], Athens 1991, p. 411.

integration in the status quo and the state mechanism. And it is precisely this reason and their very low theoretical qualifications that prevented Greek socialist intellectuals from perceiving their political unification as an imperative. The Greek socialist party was founded only in 1918, and moreover upon the initiative of the Thessaloniki-based Jewish labour organization, "Federation."

The geographic mobility of the Greek radical intellectuals shows also a distinct pattern from the Bulgarian and Serbian cases. Whereas intellectuals in the latter two countries showed a centripetal tendency, that is, after having completed their educational route they tended to return to their native country and thus showed a propensity for spatial concentration, in the case of Greece intellectuals demonstrated a centrifugal tendency, that is, they tended to seek their professional integration often outside of the Greek kingdom. Greek socialist intellectuals appear to continue the itineraries of the Greek Enlightenment, seeking their fortunes in the Diaspora communities, which in contrast to the other two countries tend to multiply in the course of the nineteenth century.

It was the predicament of socialism in conditions of "underdevelopment" that caused socialism to receive its initial entry ticket as an ideological alternative due to the priority of the political factor over the social. In the case of Greece, despite comparable socio-economic conditions, the "integrative" character of the political system made radical political alternatives appear somehow redundant. Of course, a functional political system was in place also in Romania, but it was rather the explosive agrarian situation in this country (big land ownership) that motivated directly or indirectly the early socialists/populists. Nineteenth-century Romania is perhaps the only case where we could make a strong argument for the priority of the social factor over the political, and here again not due to the urban, but rather the rural factor. Of course the Romanian socialists also made demands of a political nature, such as a more direct modus of electoral and political representation, but in Romania as in Greece basic political liberties were guaranteed and moreover in both countries their respective political elites (very different in social composition) managed to effectively neutralize in the course of the nineteenth century the political influence of the crown and "stabilize" the rules of the political game, in contrast to Serbia and Bulgaria.

As already mentioned, the majority of the first socialists/populists in Romania stemmed from the russified Bessarabian element. Neither the first leader of the Romanian socialist party, Dobrogeanu-Gherea (of Jewish descent from the province of Ekaterinesdorf), nor the second, Kristju Rakovski (of Bulgarian descent from the Dobrudja), were of Romanian origin. Apparently, border or contested regions to Romania seem to have produced more radical elements than Romania proper. In addition, a significant portion of the Romanian intellectuals with inclinations to radical ideologies were of Jewish background. This circumstance provides an interesting parallel to the situation in Greece, where regions like the Ionian Islands (incorporated in Greece 1863) were characterized by different intellectual, political and socio-economic traditions from those of mainland Greece, just as multi-ethnic areas such as Macedonia provided for more radical elements than Greece proper. In fact, it was a Jewish Labour organization in multi-ethnic Macedonia that was to facilitate the unification of the Greek socialist movement. The minority status of ethnic groups such

as the Jews and the Armenians explains to a great extent their inclination towards radical ideologies.

Social Descent and Professional Integration

Despite the fact that a proper quantification of socialist intellectuals according to their social background would require a rigorous statistical analysis, I would like, nevertheless, to attempt a provisional sketch, understood rather as an incentive for further research than as the final word on the issue. From the three countries under analysis (Se/Bg/Gr), the Serbian Radicals and the Bulgarian socialists appear to protrude out of a more egalitarian structure in the nineteenth century. The Radical intellectuals in Serbia, with minor exceptions such as Pera Todorović and Svetomir Nikolajević, were of predominantly modest social origin, not far removed from the social groups (peasants, artisans) they claimed to represent. The founder of Serbian radicalism, S. Marković, phrased it quite pointedly:

> "Fifty years ago in Serbia there were hardly any other classes than the peasantry. We are all sons or grandsons of peasants. The educated people (and I am thinking of the truly educated, not the bookish intellectuals) that have come from that background are the educated democrats in the true sense of the word. Most of them grew up on 'proja' [cornbread] and 'skrob' [starch] and obtained their higher education thanks to the very people who continued eating 'proja' and 'skrob', amongst whom were many of their closest relatives. (If any of the intellectuals, who made this same 'career', wish to forget this, we are not willing to do so)."[35]

Both S. Marković and N. Pašić, for example, were able to conduct their studies abroad by way of state-sponsored scholarships. Marković's criticism of official Serbian politics cost him his scholarship. Notwithstanding the fact that the radical intellectuals could be officially classified as of "urban" descent, the categorization would be misleading. Connections, either by means of family affiliation or lineage, to the state class or the leading political elite were negligible, practically non-existent. The radicals reversed this configuration upon their ascent to power in the 1890s and transformed themselves successfully into the bearers of the state class.

Generally speaking the picture in the Bulgarian setting appears to be similar. The case of K. Rakovski, who came from a wealthy landowning family in the Dobrudja, appears rather unique. The Bulgarian socialists stemmed from a petty merchant milieu with a tendency to a much more modest background. Intellectuals like D. Blagoev or K. Bozveliev could be properly classified as self-made men. Blagoev had gone through a small odyssey of extreme poverty in order to finance his studies in Russia, and Bozveliev had received training as an apprentice but had received no formal academic education whatsoever. Even an intellectual like N. Gabrovski, stemming from the petty merchant milieu, found himself in extreme financial

35 Quoted in Skoric, p. 483; see also Latinka Perović: Introduction to Pera Todorović, Krvava godina, Belgrade 1991, p. 31.

difficulties upon the death of his father, a circumstance that seriously endangered his studies in Switzerland. To my knowledge, none of the Bulgarian intellectuals who turned to socialism had belonged to the state-sponsored intelligentsia (i.e. were recipients of state scholarships). On the contrary, according to the testimony of St. Nokov, the Bulgarian state-sponsored students in Geneva showed an acquiescent attitude towards official politics – in this case, the regime of Stambolov.[36]

Finally, it is noteworthy to stress that socialist intellectuals in Bulgaria were integrated professionally almost exclusively in the teaching profession. S. Gulapchev, D. Blagoev, N. Gabrovski, J. Sakăzov, G. Bakalov, D. Dabev, St. Nokov, etc. all were high school teachers before some of them would rise to the rank of "professional" socialists. Bulgarian socialist intellectuals, therefore, found professional integration at the lowest level of the state mechanism, the educational sector, a circumstance that also provided them with a certain space to manoeuvre. Apparently, while the civil service sector was saturated around 1900, the shortage of teaching staff made school instruction a still open professional vocation for university graduates.[37] The teaching profession had been a traditional locus of integration for radically oriented intellectuals ever since the liberation period (1870s). The circumstance that the Bulgarian socialists got control of a basic vein in the reproduction of the state system can explain two significant facts: first, there is continuity in the recruitment of socialist cadres, a chain linking clearly teachers and pupils,[38] and second, it highlights the diffusion mechanisms of

36 Stojan Nokov: Studentski spomeni ot Ženeva 1889–1894 [Student Reminiscences from Geneva 1889–1894], in: Istoričeski Pregled, 11 (4), 1956, pp. 81–103.

37 Richard Crampton: Bulgaria 1878–1918, New York 1983, p. 214.

38 It is rather easy to follow the genealogy of the Bulgarian socialists by simply reconstructing consecutive generations of teachers and pupils. Eftim Dabev was the teacher of Kristju Rakovski, Slavi Balabanov, and Stojan Nokov in Gabrovo. N. Gabrovski was the teacher of Georgi Balabanov in Plovdiv. Spyro Gulapčev was the mentor of S. Balabanov, etc. Calculating the times these teachers were fired, forced to move or change educational institution (on the average two to three times each), the map of their geographical mobility covers more or less the whole of Bulgaria. Gulapčev taught in Tărnovo, Gabrovo and Ruse. Gabrovski in Sliven and Plovdiv, Blagoev in Šumen, Vidin and Plovdiv, where he was also director of the local gymnasium. He also sojourned a while jobless in Tărnovo. Săkazov taught in Šumen, Dabev in Sevlievo and Gabrovo, Nokov in Kotel and G. Bakalov in Sliven. Several of the socialists/intellectuals/teachers lost their employment periodically due to their political credo, while in periods of outright political repression like the Stambolovčina, short-term imprisonment or banishment were not uncommon. The participation of pupils supplements the picture from the other end. D. Blagoev launched his first periodical, the "Savremeni Pokazatel", with the help of his pupils in the Sofia gymnasium. In January 1888 the pupils of the Gabrovo gymnasium rebelled against new regulations prohibiting student associations and demanded that the school library be returned to their control. Eighty pupils were expelled. In February 1891 the Plovdiv gymnasium rebelled and was temporarily closed down. Slavi Balabanov and Kristju Rakovski were expelled two times from their respective gymnasiums. While the first time the penalty was mild, the second time they were deprived access to all schools in the Kingdom. Particularly the Gabrovo gymnasium was renowned for its progressive and radical orientation. A series of Russia-educated teachers left their mark there, such as Dabev and Gulapčev, but also Botev's friend, Smilov. St. Nokov remembers that the students read the works of Chernyshevsky, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Belinksi, Turgeniev, Gogol, Pushkin and Shelgunov. The lack of local textbooks, particularly in the natural sciences, was supplemented with teaching materials coming directly from Russia. Nokov: "Spomeni" p. 82. Student fund-raising enabled Dabev to bring the

socialism via the educational system. In fact, the educational sector remained a stronghold of radical thought in Bulgaria, not only on the secondary but also on the university level. The teaching profession was one of the strongholds of radicalism in Serbia as well. The "second-rank officers" of the Radical Party were largely high school teachers, particularly the ones of "local production."[39]

A somewhat different picture emerges in the case of Greece. Intellectuals with inclinations to socialism appear to rise from the socially ascending strata associated with the liberal professions, commercial activities and the state apparatus. In numerous cases family connections to sources of authority and the state class are apparent. Greek socialist intellectuals of the nineteenth and early twentieth century did not seek professional integration in the educational sector, but rather showed preference for the liberal professions, free-lance journalism or engagement in purely literary activities. Greek socialist intellectuals demonstrated features of a greater degree of urbanization and ideological "bourgeoisation" and sought professional integration either at higher levels of the state apparatus or in traditional power networks. The above social picture, in conjunction with the lack of incentives for political radicalisation sealed more or less the fortunes of socialism in Greece as a movement of intellectuals until about the second decade of the twentieth century.

A final word with respect to the educational vocation of socialist intellectuals in the three countries under examination during the nineteenth century. The Serbian and Bulgarian socialist intellectuals demonstrated a somewhat greater inclination for disciplines of practical orientation than their colleagues in Greece. Their choices (Se/Bg) show greater variation and include law, featuring prominently in most Balkan countries, but also engineering, the natural sciences, and medicine. In Greece the configuration is reversed. There is an overwhelming emphasis on law and letters and a much smaller predilection for practical/liberal professions. Completely absent are hard core sciences. This rather general picture corresponds also to the broader trends of the institutionalised educational systems in the three countries. Vocational training was neglected in all Balkan countries, which laid a far greater emphasis on academic training as a means of reproducing their elites. Apparently, vocational training was institutionalised earlier in Serbia and Bulgaria than in Greece, where a classically oriented education was deemed best suited to represent the antique legacy of the country. In Serbia vocational training was institutionalised around the second half of the nineteenth century with the creation of a commercial school (1845), an engineering school (1846), an artillery school (1850) and an agrarian school (1853), institutions that despite their slight impact started bearing fruit around the 1870s.[40] Bulgaria institutionalised schools of professional training rather early. By the end of the nineteenth century, the country had an industrial training school in Knjaževo, a model agricultural school in Sadovo, a state viticultural institute, etc. In Bulgaria

first Marxist book ever printed in Bulgaria – Engels' "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" – to the printing press. As pupils Balabanov and Rakovski translated Malatesta's "Discourse between two Paupers," while Balabanov and Bakalov did a first rudimentary printing of Kropotkin's "To the Youth."

39 Slobodan Jovanović: Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića I., Sabrana Dela, Vol. 6, Belgrade 1990, p. 107.

40 Trgovčević: Influenze Esterne, p. 642.

schools of practical orientation were created in the first twenty years of the country's existence. That vocational training should not be underestimated is testified by the fact that the majority of the leaders of the Bulgarian agrarian movement came from the Bulgarian agrarian academies.

The situation in Greece was quite different. Here schools of higher education with a practical orientation were institutionalised rather late. A polytechnic school was founded in 1887 and bore fruit around 1914. A school of commercial and industrial studies was founded in 1894, while the first agrarian academy was founded in 1920.[41] It was only after the creation of an agrarian academy that the country witnessed the rise of a generation of agronomists with a greater political engagement for the fortunes of the countryside.

Finally, again in contrast to Greece, the Serbian and the Bulgarian state inaugurated in the nineteenth century the institution of state scholarships for studies abroad, obviously with the purpose of "engineering" a certain quota of specialized personnel. Progressively also in those countries the scale shifted more towards private sponsoring. State scholarships for studies abroad were not available in Greece until well into the twentieth century.

Legacies

Legacies form part of the *longue durée* in history. This article started with a reassessment of the Ottoman legacy as the formative context for a discussion of modernity in the Balkans. I would like to conclude by addressing once more the issue of legacies, that is, certain aspects that constitute long-lasting, and "resilient" traditions in time and space.

Salient in the presentation on intellectuals, paradigma and theoretical influences is the circumstance that there was barely a cross-Balkan fertilization in the adaptation of the various socialist paradigms. In general, none of the Balkan countries adopted its socialism from its surrounding neighbours, no matter how advanced theoretically they might have been (for example, the Bulgarians were in much better command of foreign literature and socialist theory, and the Romanians, particularly Dobrogeanu-Gherea, advanced some interesting theoretical positions.) No doubt, influences on a petty scale did exist, but they did not go beyond singular cases and individuals, while even this kind of influence was of a limited nature. It never involved the proper adaptation of paradigms. Linguistic barriers could serve as a possible explanation. It seems, however, to be more a predicament of small countries of the periphery and perhaps a further testimony to the psychological disposition of dependency that the principal and primary connection is always sought and found in the authoritative theoretical centre outside the Balkans, while inter-Balkan communication re-

41 Konstantinos Tsoukalas: Exartese kai Anaparagoge, O Rolos ton Ekpaideutikon Mechanismon sten Hellada (1830–1922) [Dependence and Reproduction, The Social Role of Educational Mechanisms in Greece], Athens 1977, p. 442.

mained essentially low.[42] Intellectual fertilization across the various Balkan boundaries is low even today.

Finally, when evaluating the broader impact of the leftist legacy in the Balkans, it could be argued that the socialists (I use the term socialists as a holistic denomination, referring to the whole spectrum of leftist ideological variants like anarchism, Marxism, communism, etc.) could and should be considered the proper heirs of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. Despite enormous shortcomings and beyond simplistic idealizations, the socialists represented, persistently and diachronically, perhaps the only ideological option that continued to treat the region as an organic, indivisible whole, that retained a vision of a broad living space where the category of nationality was of subordinate significance, and that remained conscious of the rich variety of ways of life and traditions on the peninsula. This assortment is not meant as an apologetic simplification of the extremely complicated, at times hierarchical and contradictory, relationships within the Balkan left. Nor does the legacy of the Balkan left consist simply of a "happy" story of "pure idealists" and "uncontaminated internationalists." Quite the contrary, the Balkan socialists were often in conflict and discord as much within their own national party formations, as in their inter-Balkan relationships. Power conflicts, democratic deficits, ideological oscillations, physical exterminations, etc., form part of the legacy as well. But with reference to the specific Balkan space, the socialists should be given credit for perpetrating a vision of social and ethnic justice, as no other ideology in the same space ever has done. If nowadays in our globalised world the principle of multi-culturalism appears as natural and self-evident as ever, if studying and providing space for minorities has become a respectable topic, if now we retrospectively condemn the extremes of the various Balkan nationalisms, this was not the prevalent frame of mind in the "Age of Empire" and the "Age of Extremes". For daring to think otherwise in an age that thought and acted otherwise is what the Balkan socialists should be given credit for.

42 My argument addresses principally intellectual cooperation, in the sense of an exchange of know-how, expertise, experience, paradigms. It does not refer to attempts at political cooperation between the Balkan socialists, as was the case during the Balkan Wars and World War I.