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# Connecting with the First or the Third World?: Two Paths Toward the Transnational Network Building in the Japanese Global Sixties

## ABSTRACT

This paper is a sociological and historical investigation of the transnational alliances in the Japanese sixties movement. From the mid-1960s to 1970s, some Japanese New Left movements had prevailed by taking part in transnational activism. Yet, these movements had then bifurcated into two directions; those that were linked primarily with the western First World on the one hand and movements that were connected to the Third World revolutionary movements on the other hand. This paper explores the reasons for such bridging and division of transnational ties. By looking specifically at the civic anti-Vietnam War movement of Beheiren and the clandestine movement of the Japanese Red Army, the paper argues that it was the culture that had both bridged and created holes between the network clusters. Through investigation of the culture (ideology, beliefs, taste, etc.) and biographical backgrounds (class consciousness, generation, and memory) of each group member, the paper suggests that the activists' culture and imaginative linkage with the outside world was the crucial factor in bridging the structural hole between movements that were remotely apart and embedded in different national settings. Yet, it also shows that different cultural and biographical backgrounds of the members of these two movements had created a cultural hole between the transnational networks that they have developed. Thus, in general, the paper shows how the duality of culture—bridging and diverging aspects—operates in the process of transnational network building.

*Keywords: transnational alliance, global sixties, Japanese social movements, network, cultural hole, duality of culture, First World/Third World*

## Introduction

The sixties movement was a global event, where massive social movements had simultaneously emerged across various parts of the world. This was also transnational on both the mediated and face-to-face level from the creation of new linkages between the movements from a distance that are without much previously shared interests. Japan was also not an exception. Despite its considerably isolated geographical location as an archipelago within the 'Far East' that is remote from Western Europe and North America where the movements were most vibrant, Japan had also taken an active part in the 'global sixties'. From the mid-1960s, Japanese movements have begun to imagine that they were partaking in the same event along with other allies across the world. At the same time, they have also started to protest on international issues, including the Vietnam War, immigration law, Japan's neo-colonialism in Asia, etc. Within this transition, some Japanese movements had embarked on transnational activism and developed ties with foreign movements by overcoming transnational immobility and cultural differences.

This paper explores this transnational activism of the Japanese sixties while elucidating a specific aspect of it—the transnational solidarity and alliance building between the Japanese and foreign movements. However, the main objective here is not to depict and map out the transnational network itself. Rather, the aim is to further explore the reason for the linkage; Why did the Japanese sixties movements connect with certain foreign movements but not with the others? The paper attempts to answer this rather broad question through two specific inquiries. Firstly, since transnational activism is a connection between movements that are from significantly different political, economic and cultural context, what had led the Japanese movements to be united with foreign movements without many pre-existing ties? Next, the paper will then investigate the division of the transnational networks developed by the Japanese movements. In theory, Japanese movements had a wide choice to be linked to various movements from around the world during the sixties. Yet, in reality, social movements would only be connected with certain foreign movements and not others. So, why were the transnational networks divided? The paper then explores these questions through two Japanese New Left movements that were most vibrant in transnational activism, the civic Anti-Vietnam War movement of Beheiren (Peace in Vietnam! Committee) and the clandestine movement of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and their transnational networks. The former had primarily developed ties with the First World, particularly the American New Left movement and the latter generated solidarity with the Third World, especially with the Palestinian liberation movements.

Empirically speaking, this paper is part of the so-called 'global sixties research'. This is an interdisciplinary branch of scholarship that examines political, social and cultural upheavals and consequential changes that took place globally in the 'long sixties' from

the late 1950s to the mid-1970s.<sup>1</sup> There are generally two connotations for the term ‘global’ used in this scholarship. First, some emphasize the *simultaneity* of the sixties that considers similar social movements that occurred concurrently in various parts of the world during the 1960s and 70s.<sup>2</sup> Second, there is a group of scholarships, mostly by those historians who explore the *transnational* connection of the information and activists that emerged during this period. In broad terms, this paper fits within the latter category of transnational sixties research that examines the ways in which sixties movements from across the world linked cross-nationally and mutually influenced each other. The paper is one of the early contributions based on Japanese empirical cases. However, at the same time, this paper focuses on somewhat different aspects of transnationality from those which historians usually explore; rather than depicting a narrative of how movements were linked, it analyses the manner and reasons why transnational networks evolved in the way they did—especially reasons for bridging and divergence in transnational network building. Thus, to introduce such a new perspective on the transnational sixties research, this paper incorporates approaches from sociology and social movement studies. On the other hand, despite the increasing interest in global activism in social movement studies after the 2000s, their focus is mostly on contemporary movements and the historical case of the sixties is surprisingly underexplored. Thus, the social scientific inquiry into transnational dimensions of the sixties remains a missing piece, regarding which this paper can contribute to both theoretically and empirically to promote global social movement research.

In this academic context of exploring the connection and division of transnational networks of the Japanese sixties movement, this paper takes a relational approach and employs comparative and historical methods of sociology. Through use of primary materials that include memoirs and articles written by members of the movements, letters exchanged between the Japanese and foreign activists as well as some interviews, it explores various characteristics of the background of each Japanese social movement and that of their members’ backgrounds and what role these characteristics played in generating these transnational networks.<sup>3</sup> The paper argues it was the *duality of culture* that bridged and diverged transnational networks. In other words, it was the culture in a broad sense, including the ideology, practices, and taste of the actors as well as actors’

- 1 For periodization of the sixties, see Fredric Jameson: Periodizing the 60s, in: *Social Text* 9/10 (1984), pp. 178–209.
- 2 For a most notable example of this line of inquiry, see Giovanni Arrighi/Terence Hopkins/Immanuel Wallerstein: *Antisystemic Movements*, New York 1989.
- 3 For letters exchanged between Beheiren and foreign activists, I am greatly indebted to the Beheiren archives at the Research Center for Cooperative Civil Societies at Rikkyo University in Tokyo and Howard Zinn Paper at Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive at New York University. For materials on the JRA activists, I would like to thank the Takazawa Collection at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

identification within the larger society that, on the one hand, had *bridged* movements that were geographically apart and without prior ties with each other. Yet, on the other hand, culture was also a crucial factor for *diverging* transnational networks that were generated by the two Japanese movements. In what follows, this paper will first begin with the theoretical discussion of the relational approach, particularly the structural and cultural hole concepts in network analysis. This is followed by an introduction of the Japanese sixties with an overview of Beheiren and the JRA's transnational networks. Then, as the main body of this paper, I will compare Beheiren and the JRA and show their distinct political culture from multiple perspectives. In the final section, I situate their political culture within a macro structural context of the Japanese society and explain why two Japanese movements generated two different transnational networks.

## Duality of Culture: Cultural Holes in Social Movement Networks

Network formation for mobilization and organizational coalition has long been an interest among the social movement scholars. Those analyses were more or less structural—the existence and absence of pre-existing ties, exploration of multi-organizational fields and organizational coalitions were the topics that were explored largely in this field. However, there is an emerging interest in understanding the mechanism of why and how activists and movements from different cultural backgrounds come together and collaborate.<sup>4</sup> In such a context, incorporating the cultural dimension has become pivotal. Among the recently growing research in this field, Ann Mische has explored the role of brokers with multiple organizational affiliations for network coalition building. She discovered that the activists' strategy to actively suppress "situationally potent identities" was vital for success in building coalitions with other organizations.<sup>5</sup> Thus, her finding suggests that for activists coming from diverse backgrounds and having multiple organizational affiliation to form publics, they are required to skilfully manage their identity in a way that promotes alliances. While Mische's focus was on domestic movements, Nicole Doerr explores movements in the transnational sphere—the multi-lingual communication within the European Social Forum. She

4 Nella Van Dyke: Social Movement Coalitions Formation, Longevity and Success, in: *Sociology Compass* 11 (2017), pp. 1–17.

5 Ann Mische: *Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks*, Princeton 2009; Ann Mische: *Partisan Performance: The Relational Construction of Brazilian Youth Activists Publics*, in: Federico M. Rossi/Marisa von Bülow (eds.): *Social Movement Dynamics: New Perspectives on Theory and Research from Latin America*, New York 2016, pp. 43–71.

begins with various challenges in deliberative democracy while activists from a different cultural context come together and propose ‘political translation’ to surmount such hurdles and thereby make the communicative space more equal and inclusive.<sup>6</sup> In a similar vein, Cristina Fominaya explores the Global Justice Movement in Europe, where activists across Europe assemble and engage in political discussion and coalition building. Yet, she strongly emphasizes the downside of culture. Through applying Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Fominaya argues that culture, in fact, functions as a barrier for coalition-building rather than promoting it.<sup>7</sup>

These works explore the micro communicative aspect in publics and therefore differ from the focus of this paper to some degree; Instead of exploring the role culture plays in the communication for solidarity building, this paper is interested in investigating implicit and explicit reasons that make activists form solidarity with foreign activists in the remote distance, to whom they had no prior connections. Nevertheless, these existing works suggest an important hypothesis, namely that culture is conducive to network building, but it also impedes it. It is certainly this dual function of culture that this paper attempts to examine.

To theoretically capture the *duality of culture* in the transnational network building process in social movements, I consider the relational approach useful. Particularly, the concepts of structural and cultural holes will help understand how exactly bridging and bifurcation of transnational networks occur. The structural analysis of social ties has been an influential paradigm in network analysis since its inauguration. Ronald Burt has made a significant contribution in this context through his eminent concept of structural holes to comprehend the absence of ties between different clusters of the network. While his emphasis is on the inequality of social capital among individuals in a network setting and the role of the broker and entrepreneur who bridges those holes that are disconnected, the structural hole concept has provided a useful vantage point for understanding the structural factors (institutions, regions, etc.) that divide the network clusters.<sup>8</sup> However, after the cultural turn of network analysis from the 2000s, relational sociologists have begun to refine the hitherto overly structuralist perspective of the network approach and attempted to incorporate the cultural aspects into it.<sup>9</sup> In this regard, along with their focus on the meaning of

6 Nicole Doerr: Language and Democracy “in Movement”: Multilingualism and the Case of the European Social Forum Process, in: *Social Movement Studies* 8 (2009), pp. 149–165.

7 Christina Flesher Fominaya: Cultural Barriers to Activist Networking: Habitus (In)action in Three European Transnational Encounters, in: *Antipode* 48 (2015), pp. 151–171.

8 Ronald S. Burt: *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*, Cambridge 1995.

9 In fact, conventional structuralist analysis of network analysis has bypassed cultural elements without serious analysis of its role in changing the structure. (c.f. Harrison White/Scott A. Boorman/Ronald L. Breiger: *Social Structure from Multiple Networks. I. Blockmodels of Roles and Positions*, in: *American Journal of Sociology* 81: 4 (1976), pp. 730–780).

ties and actors' identities in the network, cultural taste and cultural homophily of networks have also become the focus of attention. For instance, whereas in structural analysis it is understood that the actors' cultural tastes are created by the different network structures into which individuals are embedded. In short, structuralists consider that one's cultural orientation heavily depends on the characteristics of the networks that they belong to. Yet, on the other hand, the cultural-relational approach has instead suggested that the direction can also be reversed—meaning that individuals' culture and taste create the network structure. As Omar Lizardo has examined, people with similar cultural tastes (e. g. music genres) are likely to be linked and thus create a network cluster based on cultural homophily.<sup>10</sup> As such, culturalists tend to emphasise the role of agency in culture that creates network structure.

Such a perspective regarding the relationship of structure and culture in networks has also altered the understanding of the structural hole theory. Pachucki and Breiger proposed a concept of cultural hole and argued the significance of culture in bridging and creating holes between networks. The cultural hole was defined as “contingencies of meaning, practice, and discourse that enable social structure” and suggest that on the one hand, similar cultural taste can bridge people embedded in different structural network settings.<sup>11</sup> For instance, as Eiko Ikegami has shown in her work on the aesthetic network in Edo Japan, it was the cultural practices (e. g. tea ceremony, *haikai* poetry networks, etc.) that connected people from distinct hierarchical social classes who were not linked otherwise.<sup>12</sup> But on the other hand, culture also has the opposite function, as Breiger indicated, “a tie that spans a cultural hole may simultaneously create a new hole”.<sup>13</sup> This means that network clusters created based on cultural homophily could create holes between other clusters formed around different cultural tastes and practices. In a simple sense, there would be a boundary between network clusters, for instance, that favour the tea ceremony and those in favour of *haikai* poetry. In these respects, the cultural hole concept enables us to capture the duality—the bridging and dividing effect—of culture.

In practice, the primary goal of this paper is to seize how the cultural hole was bridged between the Japanese movements and those overseas and at the same time

- 10 Omar Lizardo: How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks, in: *American Sociological Review* 71 (2006), pp. 778–807; Miller McPherson/Lynn Smith-Lovin/James Cook: Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001), pp. 415–444.
- 11 Mark A. Pachucki/Ronald L. Breiger: Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and Culture, in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010), pp. 205–224, p. 215.
- 12 Eiko Ikegami: *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture*, Cambridge 2005.
- 13 Ronald L. Breiger: Dualities of Culture and Structure: Seeing Through Cultural Holes, in: Jan Fuhse/Sophie Mützel (eds.): *Relationale Soziologie*, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 37–47, p. 40.

how the cultural hole has also emerged between the two transnational networks generated. Hence, the primary task is to compare the political culture of two Japanese social movement groups, leading to bridging and creating cultural holes. The meaning of culture used in this paper is rather broad; it encompasses the diverse spectrum and depth of factors ranging from a groups' ideology to individual activists' cultural capital, tastes, identity and memory. More specifically, it explores first their political ideology as well as different cultural practices of violence as a means of protest. Starting from these most evident elements that describe the political culture of groups, this paper goes a step further to examine the less visible, yet important, orientations of the individual group members—their sense of nationalism, religious backgrounds as well as their attitudes against the U.S. and toward ethnic minorities. However, we consider that the political ideology and orientations of groups are not isolated from the constituent members' personal cultural orientations and backgrounds. Activists' class identity and consciousness, cultural capital, memory of war, as well as their perceptions stemming from generational differences, also require thorough investigation. Overall, the paper explores these three strata of culture with the most visible, official and conscious on the first layer and the more invisible, rooted and unconsciously embedded culture at the last. Moreover, these three strata of culture are not isolated from each other but closely interrelated. Thus, I argue that all three strata of culture combined would form a distinct political culture of the groups as a whole. Based on comparisons of these elements, at the end, the paper shows how those distinct political cultures have led each group to possessing a different worldview (*Weltanschauung*) that would bridge the structural hole between the Japanese and foreign movements, but that at the same time also disrupts the transnational ties with the Japanese and the liberal and non-violent First World movements network on the one hand and the Japanese and the radical and violent Third World movements network on the other.

## The Japanese Global Sixties in Context

The basic premises about Japan's long sixties is that social movements and political discourses had shifted from national issues to global issues since the mid-1960s. In the background, there was a large transformation that took place during the 1960s in terms of globalization of society. Various technological developments related to transnational mobility from aircrafts, satellites to telecommunication were seen from the late 1950s to 1960s. Global mega-events such as the Tokyo Olympics and international exposition in Osaka took place during the long sixties. Despite the 'global turn' that the Japanese began to experience during this period, however, not all social movements had suddenly and drastically changed their direction toward transnational activism in this specific period. Various remaining hurdles and challenges had hindered the movements from taking actual transnational actions. Particularly for the

Japanese sixties movement, political and economic constraints for transnational mobility were among the outstanding factors that made transnational activism difficult, even compared to other sixties movements in the First World.<sup>14</sup> It was only in 1964 that the foreign travel ban on Japanese citizens, which was a continuity from the wartime period, was lifted. And even then, the weak Japanese Yen and fixed currency legislation limited foreign travel for ordinary citizens living in Japan throughout the 1960s.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, unlike European countries, where national borders are connected by land, Japan's geographical location as islands in the Far East made it even more challenging to be united with foreign activists. Thus, in general, Japanese people in the 1960s were considerably immobile transnationally and comparably isolated. This structural position was one of the major reasons why transnational activism was even more challenging for the Japanese social movements. In other words, we can consider that there was a structural hole between the Japanese movements outside of the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) influence and the movements overseas.

While the opportunity for actual transnational activism was limited, there was still a substantial connection through the media and information. In fact, one of the most significant characteristics of the global sixties movement, particularly in Japan, was the large gap between the excessive amount of information on global social movements and the limited opportunity for actual transnational activism. In other words, the aspiration for global activism was generated among Japanese activists at a cognitive level, yet the various restrictions that I have mentioned here impeded them from taking actual tangible actions. Nonetheless, the diffusion of information regarding overseas social movements was a critical source for mobilisation of social movements in Japan, especially for transnational activism. Japanese activists strengthened their eagerness to conduct transnational actions and to overcome various obstacles that restricted their opportunities for reading articles and watching news about social movements that were occurring concurrently in the outside world. Thus, such an increase of global awareness was the very first cultural aspect that bridged the structural hole between movements situated in a geographically remote area. Among many movements which emerged in the long sixties, Beheiren and the Japanese Red Army were movements that put their global imagination into actions.

14 In Western Europe, for example, in 1961, the council of Europe agreed to relax passport controls for anyone under the age of twenty-one as a way to facilitate travel by young people between the countries of Western Europe and this was the basis for the vigorous transnational activism in the European Sixties (Richard Ivan Jobs: *Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968*, in: *The American Historical Review* 114: 2 (2009), pp. 376–404, p. 379; Richard Ivan Jobs: *Backpack Ambassadors: How Youth Travel Integrated Europe*, Chicago 2017).

15 It has changed from a fixed to a floating exchange rate in 1973 and starting from around this time, Japanese citizens' foreign travel has increased.



In addition to the structural immobility of the Japanese sixties, there was another notable context regarding the possible options for transnational network building at that time. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a certain political meaning attached to choosing which country's social movements to develop transnational ties with. Overall, there were three options; countries from the First, Second or the Third World. Back then, dividing the world into three large worlds was prevalent both within the academic discourse and in the political debate. The idea of the three-worlds-configurations originated in the early 1950s and emerged as part of the social science discourse in the Western world.<sup>16</sup> The First World was generally constituted of developed capitalist countries, mainly from the western regions in North America, Western Europe, and Oceania. The Second World consisted of countries from the communist regimes under the influence of the Soviet Union. While these two categories had strong identities based on different ideological regimes, the Third World falls into a residual category, which some scholars would describe as "a dumping ground for all that did not qualify as capitalist or socialist".<sup>17</sup> From the 1960s on, after Franz Fanon's canonical *The Wretched of the Earth*, this residual category gradually acquired a substantial political identity as regions in which post-colonial movements against former western colonialization were taking place.<sup>18</sup> The politicization of the Third World concept had fuelled radicalization and transnationalisation of movements across the globe.

In the case of the Japanese sixties, the clearest link was between the Japanese Communist Party and their international ties with the Second World of the Soviet bloc.<sup>19</sup> However, for the New Left movements which this paper focuses on, things were more complicated. Since the New Left emerged in Japan from the late 1950s on, as a rejection of the Soviet and JCP forms of communism, in general, forming ties with the Second World was not an option.<sup>20</sup> They were seeking an alternative liberal and leftist ideology that differed from Stalinism. In this respect, New Lefts in the First World

- 16 Christoph Kalter: *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, C. 1950–1976*, Cambridge/New York 2016.
- 17 Arif Dirlik: *Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the Three Worlds*, in: *Third World Quarterly* 25: 1 (2004): pp. 131–148, p. 136.
- 18 Franz Fanon: *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York 2004.
- 19 Yet, the relationship between the JCP and the Second World was also complex in the 1960s. Until around 1964, JCP was a strong influence under Soviet Communism. However, in part due to excessive interference from the Soviet government, JCP started to keep a distance from the Soviet Union. The JCP briefly developed an alliance with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but because of the Cultural Revolution, the JCP confronted the CCP. Then JCP took an independent position that will not be subordinated to any Communist parties from other countries.
- 20 Exceptions were the Japanese New Left's sympathy toward the democratization movements that emerged within the Second World (e.g. Prague Spring in 1968). Another exception was the Yodogo group of the Red Army Faction (*Sekingunha*) who hijacked an airplane and

and the radical activism in the Third World were considered as two alternative options in establishing new routes for leftist politics. However, in the post-war era, the transnational ties between the Japanese social movements and the movements in the First and the Third World were limited. In other words, outside of USSR influence, there was a structural hole between the Japanese activist networks and those overseas. Beheiren and the JRA were part of the overall New Left movement that emerged in Japan as an opposition against the 'Old Left' of the JCP and the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> They formed considerably distinct transnational alliances with foreign social movements and their dauntless engagement in transnational activism overall spans the holes between the Japanese and the overseas social movement networks.

## Transnational Networks of Beheiren and the Japanese Red Army

Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam! Committee) was a civic anti-Vietnam War movement established in 1965 in Tokyo by public intellectuals, scholars, writers, former Japanese Communist Party activists, artists, students, lawyers, and many others of diverse occupations. This movement, which continued until 1974, was one of the earliest movements in Japan to reject the hierarchical organizational structure of the partisan and sectarian movements of the Old Left, and it employed a relatively horizontal network structure without applying strict membership. The openness of the movement enabled it to mobilize a large number of citizens to protest against the Vietnam War, and through demonstrations and teach-ins, Beheiren contributed significantly to the fostering of anti-Vietnam War sentiment among Japanese citizens.<sup>22</sup> Beheiren is also known for its innovative transnational actions from the beginning of the movement in 1965. These included a collaborative demonstration with the Vietnam Day Committee in the United States, placing anti-war advertisements in major American newspapers, inviting American activists Howard Zinn and Ralph Featherstone to conduct public lectures across Japan, holding international conferences, and sending medical supplies to people in Vietnam, among many other measures.

landed in North Korea in 1970. However, they initially consider North Korea as a transit point to go to the planned final destination Cuba.

- 21 While JRA came out of the group of *Shinsayoku* (literally meaning 'new left' in Japanese), Beheiren has different roots in the civic movement. However, in a larger context, Beheiren opposed the JCP and even having members who were ousted by the party, this group can be considered as part of a New Left movement at large.
- 22 Thomas R. H. Havens: *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975*, Princeton 1987.

While Beheiren members did begin to generate ties with the Third World activists in East and Southeast Asia during the very final phase of their movement in the early 1970s, their networks were predominantly tied to social movements in the First World, especially the U.S., which accounts for more than half of its entire network.<sup>23</sup> Beheiren's American networks were very broad, including liberal public intellectuals and student activists from Student for Democratic Society (SDS) to the members of the student civil rights group of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In the later phase of the movement, they also cultivated ties with activists from more radical groups such as the Black Panther Party (BPP). Furthermore, Beheiren's transnational networks had expanded globally and were incorporated into what I shall call the 'transnational network of the pacifist New Left'. They became a member of the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP)—an umbrella organization created by groups from America, Europe, and Oceania. This organization was established as a result of a confrontation with the World Peace Council initiated by the Soviet Union. Beheiren was one of the very few, if not the only movement, that took part in ICDP from the non-western region.

Nevertheless, among the various foreign activists to whom Beheiren was connected, their most intimate and central ties were with the white American activists who were concurrently engaged in intellectual activities, usually as writers or scholars. The ties that they developed with these American activists occasionally went beyond strategic alliance for the sake of the movement's success to form strong bonds and trust. For example, Howard Zinn, who was one of the American activists closest to Beheiren members, has expressed his surprise about his relationship with Beheiren as follows:

It was difficult for me to find people who have the attitude and behaviour that I like, which is aggressive and humanistic, even among the liberals and radicals in my generation in America. So, I was very surprised to find people in Japan who are like those that are called New Left in the U.S. [Beheiren members] were completely different from those old types of Japanese whom I had heard a lot about before I came to Japan.<sup>24</sup> [translated by the author]

Howard Zinn's comment signifies that despite the geographical and cultural differences between the two countries, the newly emerged lefts in Japan and the U.S. had

23 Beheiren members' extensive relationship with non-western activists began immediately after the dissolution of the movement in 1974, which requires further investigation.

24 Published in Japanese and translated by the author. Shunsuke Tsurumi/Howard Zinn/Ichiyo Muto/Ralph Featherstone/Takeshi Kaiko/Momo Iida/Yoshiyuki Tsurumi: *Betonamu hansenundo no kōryū: Nihon rettō jyūdan kōen ryokō wo oete* (Interchange Between the Anti-Vietnam War Movements: After the Nationwide Lecture Tour in Japan), in: *Sekai 8* (1966), pp. 233–247, pp. 236–237.

an affinity in their political culture. The success in building such ties with American intellectual activists in the early phase of their movements was a crucial factor for Beheiren in conducting various transnational actions throughout their movement.

Another Japanese movement that generated far flung transnational networks during the long sixties was the Japanese Red Army. Although their forms of transnationalism differed. Whereas Beheiren conducted various transnational actions while based in Japan, the JRA instead stationed overseas—mostly in the Middle East—and engaged in transnational activism by moving from one place to the other. The JRA began when their eventual leader, Fusako Shigenobu, and her partner, Tsuyoshi Okudaira, flew to Beirut in February 1971 from Tokyo.<sup>25</sup> The group was formed by connections between three different underground networks in the Japanese sixties: Sekigun-ha, the Kyoto Partisan Group, and the underground cinema scene. While the official number of its members was not disclosed, primary sources show that there were at least thirty to forty activists who can be considered members or who were closely tied to the group.

In general, the movement is known for its fierce tactics of hijacking and kidnaping in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Throughout the 1970s, when the group was most actively engaged in guerrilla tactics, the JRA was identified by the Japanese authorities as being involved at least in seven incidents in collaboration with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1967, which was one of the largest groups that formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The best-known of their actions was their first operation at Lod airport in Israel, where twenty-six people were killed in 1972.<sup>26</sup>

On the one hand, they are arguably the most renowned international terrorist organization led by Japanese activists, but evaluating it from another perspective, the group can also be considered one of the very few examples of Japanese participation of the voluntary army in foreign countries. They devoted their lives to various perilous actions in supporting the Palestinians and gradually formed networks of trust with Arab revolutionaries. As a matter of fact, until the group's dissolution in 2001, about a year after Shigenobu had been captured by the Japanese authorities, they created far-reaching networks with radical activists across the world. During the 1970s, Beirut was one of the important hubs where radical activists and intellectuals from

25 While it was only in 1974 that the group officially named itself the Japanese Red Army, the network that became the JRA was formed in 1971.

26 Other operations include, the hijacking of Japan Airlines in July 1973; attacks on oil tankers near Singapore and then the Japanese embassy in Kuwait in January and February of 1974; the occupation of the French Embassy in the Hague, Netherlands in September 1974; a hostage crisis in August 1975 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and the hijacking of an aircraft in September 1977, when the JRA obtained the release of six activists imprisoned in Japan and six million U.S.-Dollars in exchange for the release of 156 hostages.

all over the world would gather and connect. Hence, the struggle of Beirut and the Palestinians functioned as a broker that bridged the structural hole between radical activists, who emerged across the world but were not connected substantially. This included organizations from the Middle East, such as the clandestine New Left groups from Europe, like the Red Army Faction from West Germany and activists from the Third World movement in Asia, Africa, and South America. While all of them shared the same goal of liberating the Palestinians, the volunteers' reasons for participating in the struggle varied. In many cases, 'culture' functioned as a pivotal factor for bridging the differences. Firstly, some were fugitives such as the Western European New Leftists who came to the Middle East to escape policing in their home countries.<sup>27</sup> Thus, during the 1970s, Beirut was a temporary haven for Western radicals, who used it to rebuild their movements. Another example was the migrant network that included volunteer soldiers from Bangladesh. Although the primary reason for their involvement was their religious solidarity as Muslims, at the same time they also came as 'migrant workers' in order to send stipends back to their families while being in the army.<sup>28</sup> There were also transnational aesthetic networks made up of musicians, painters, filmmakers, and writers, who visited Beirut to support and receive inspiration from the Palestinian struggle. While Shigenobu was working as a volunteer in the PFLP's international department, she also interacted with a British film-making group that was sympathetic to the Irish Republican Army and an Italian *Il Manifesto* group that was also making documentary films. The JRA member and film director Masao Adachi also encountered the prominent French writer Jean Genet at the Palestinian refugee camp.<sup>29</sup> While JRA was successful in partaking actively in the Third World revolutionary networks in the Arab world, the highlight and most important ties created were with the Palestinian liberation organizations, especially with the PFLP.

As mentioned, both Beheiren and the JRA successfully developed transnational networks with the sixties movements overseas. Nevertheless, their primary ties were considerably different—Beheiren was connected to American New Lefts and the JRA to Palestinian radicals—and their overall networks seldomly overlapped. In the fol-

27 Masao Adachi: *Eiga/Kakumei (Film/Revolution)*, Tokyo 2003, p. 480.

28 Fusako Shigenobu: *Beirūto 1982 nen natsu (The Beirut Summer of 1982)*. Tokyo 1984, p. 39.

29 However, according to Adachi, because of their historically complicated relationship with Jewish people, European artists and intellectuals were ambivalent about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, those celebrities who actually visited the Middle East to support the struggle were limited to a few including Genet, film director Jean-Luc Godard, and British actress Vanessa Redgrave (Masao Adachi/Masa'aki Hiraoka/Inuhiko Yomota: *Sensō ga chikadsuite kita kara rakugo no hanashi wo shiyō (Since the War is Approaching, Let's Talk about Rakugo)*, in: *Jyōkyō* 6 (2003), pp. 88–89).

lowing, the paper analyses the cultural and biographical characteristics of these two movements and their members that generated the cultural hole between the transnational networks created by these two groups.

## Ideology, Goal, and Tactics

To begin with, one of the clearest differences between Beheiren and the JRA was the ideology and goal of the movements. For Beheiren, members' ideology was diverse. Some members were former members of JCP and searching for an alternative socialism that differed from Stalinism. While the other members were closer to anarchism and showed strong antagonism against the modern state system. Many of them were liberals who promoted liberal democracy, although they were not necessary socialist, but were anti-anti-communist. However, individual members' ideology remained personal. This means that Beheiren as a group has never declared any clear ideological position to encompass the entire movement. The only comprehensive idea that they employed was the 'openness' towards anyone who opposed the Vietnam War.

Contrary to their ideological diversity, they only had a single clear goal, which was to stop the war in Vietnam. Their three main slogans were simple, "Peace in Vietnam", "Bring Back Vietnam to the people in Vietnam" and the "Japanese government should not be involved in the Vietnam War". Unlike many other Marxist New Left sects in Japan (known as *Shinsayoku*), their primary and ultimate goal was stopping the war in Vietnam, and it was not a method to achieve the socialist revolution. Thus, members who were enthusiastic about engaging in larger and radical societal change were required to form other groups separately and to distinguish their activities from the Beheiren movement.<sup>30</sup>

In terms of their movement tactics Beheiren was a fervent proposer and practitioner of non-violent tactics. However, this does not mean that their actions were either soft or moderate. Rather, they occasionally applied radical tactics too, for example, sit-ins in front of the American Embassy and supporting U.S. deserters in escaping from Japan to European countries.<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, during the later phase of the movement, when Beheiren members began to learn about Third Worldism from the early 1970s, they maintained their basic tactics of non-violent direct action and kept their distance from violence, although it was a key tactic for many of the Third World movements at that time. Overall, their ideologies, goal, and tactics were the first factor

30 Some of the former JCP members who maintained a socialist position formed another group called 'Kyōrōtō' and were trying to achieve larger social change through this channel.

31 For Beheiren's deserter support movement, see Kei Takata: Escaping through the Networks of Trust: The U.S. Deserter Support Movement in the Japanese Global Sixties, in: *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture* 10:2 (2017), pp. 165–181.

that united Beheiren with western pacifist movements. Especially, its characteristics were significantly close to those non-violent New Left activists in the U.S. for whom communist ideology was comparatively weak.

The characteristics of the JRA, on the other hand, showed more resemblance with the movements in the Third World. Compared to Beheiren, they had a coherent and strong ideology as a group and their goal was to change the entire world order through the socialist revolution. This ideology was based upon one of their parent organizations the Sekigun-ha's idea of 'World Revolution'.<sup>32</sup> At the beginning of 1968, Takaya Shiomi, a leader of Sekigun-ha wrote an article, which was a direct response to Che Guevara's renowned article *Create two, three ... many Vietnams*. He argued that the various struggles emerging simultaneously across the world were a sign that the late 1960s was a period of transition from capitalism to socialism on a global scale.<sup>33</sup> Thus, to achieve simultaneous socialist revolutions across the globe, he believed it was essential to establish a 'world political party (*sekaitō*)'. From 1969 on, Shiomi began advocating an approach to bring about the revolution. He believed a revolution was possible through simultaneous revolts across the three worlds: class struggle in the First World, anti-bureaucratic movements in the Second World, and ethnic liberation in the Third World.<sup>34</sup>

Shiomi was later arrested for his unlawful activity and thus he did not become a member of the JRA. But later, a member of Sekigun-ha, Fusako Shigenobu, succeeded and brought Shiomi's idea into action. This theory also justified Shigenobu's decision to choose the Middle East as a destination. She considered the Palestinian issue to be a representation of the contradictions of the world, which could not be resolved without world revolution.<sup>35</sup> Thus, in other words, she was convinced that the Pales-

- 32 Sekigun-ha (the Red Army Faction), was one of the earliest militant New Left group in Japan founded in 1969. One member, Shigenobu, later formed the Japanese Red Army and other members who remained in Japan established the Rengō-sekigun (the United Red Army) after allying with Kakumei-saha (the Revolutionary Left). For the development of Sekigun groups, see Patricia G. Steinhoff: *Shi e no ideologī: Nihon sekigun-ha (Deadly Ideology: The Japanese Red Army Faction)*, Tokyo 2003; Yoshikuni Igarashi: *Dead Bodies and Living Guns: The United Red Army and Its Deadly Pursuit of Revolution, 1971–1972*, in: *Japanese Studies*, 27:2 (2007), pp. 119–137.
- 33 Takaya Shiomi: *Arabu no seikatsu bunka ha ishitsu na mono nimo atatakai (The Arabic Culture has a High Tolerance for Differences)*, in: Kuhachiro Koarashi/Nihon Sekigun (eds.): *Sekai wo shissō shita gunzō (The Japanese Red Army: The Group that Careered through the World)*, Tokyo 2010, pp. 167–227; Shigeki Yamahira: *Rengōsekigun monogatari kōen (Story of Rengōsekigun, Kōen)*, Tokyo 2011.
- 34 *Kyōsanshugisha dōmei sekigun-ha: Sekaikakumei sensō eno hishō (Flight Toward Global Revolutionary War)*, Tokyo 1971.
- 35 Ryoko Yui: *Shigenobu Fusako ga ita jidai (When Fusako Shigenobu was There)*, Tokyo 2011, p. 154.

tinian struggle could be at the forefront of achieving global revolution. Furthermore, the JRA's clear official ideology of Marxism and their militant tactics linked to PFLP also employ similar ideology and tactics. Thus, by the time the JRA members landed in Beirut, they shared common characteristics with the Third World movement in the Middle East. The JRA member Masao Adachi later reminisced that the "'international base' and 'world revolution front'" that they were imagining in their minds (before coming to Beirut), had already begun in Palestine.<sup>36</sup>

## Nationalism and Religion

A common ideology, goals, and tactics are certainly crucial factors for linking social movement groups with other groups. However, these official characteristics of the movement are insufficient in providing us with the complete picture of why and how social movements are influenced by or linked with social movements overseas. I consider the characteristics of the participants of the movement to be the more critical factor in forming the movement's base reason in adopting a certain ideology, goals, and tactics. Thus, the exploration of the deeper aspects of culture among the members is indispensable to understanding the cultural hole that emerged between the two movements' transnational networks.

Evidently, the JRA was a communist organization, at least in the beginning. However, taking further insights into their ideological background reveals that there was one noticeable characteristic among some members; which is the linkage or affinity to nationalistic sentiment. For instance, the leader Shigenobu's father was involved in an ultra-nationalist movement that was close to a right-wing terrorist group that attempted to assassinate political and business leaders to bring about radical change. What is known as 'Ketsumeidan Jiken' or the Blood-Pledges Corps incident took place in 1932.<sup>37</sup> She had been influenced greatly by her father, although her political orientation differed from his and was leaning more towards the left instead of the right. Also, a core JRA member Masao Adachi was considered a person sympathetic to the right-wing sentiment based on his thoughts. When drinking with some of his friends and colleagues, he occasionally started to grumble about the grass-roots right-wing thoughts originating from his hometown in Fukuoka located in the southern part of Japan.<sup>38</sup> Considering that Third World movements, including the Palestinian struggle, were strongly nationalistic, particularly the ethnic nationalist sentiment at-

36 Masao Adachi: *Eiga/Kakumei (Film/Revolution)*, p. 441.

37 Sue'o Shigenobu: *Shigenobu Fusako no chichi to shite (As a Father of Fusako Shigenobu)*, in: *Bungeishunjū* 8 (1972), pp. 194–200.

38 Masao Adachi/Masa'aki Hiraoka/Inuhiko Yomota: *Sensō ga chikadsuite kita kara rakugo no hanashi wo shiyō (Since the War is Approaching, Let's Talk about Rakugo)*, p. 83.



tached to the movements in opposition to Western imperialism, they had a certain level of psychological connection with those JRA members who had nationalist backgrounds hidden underneath their Marxist ideology.

Contrary to the JRA, the influence of ethnic nationalism can hardly be found among Beheiren members. Instead what stood out was religion, especially members from Christian backgrounds. This was partly because of one of the members, Ichiyo Muto, was a son of a renowned pastor and through his actions, the Christian network was mobilized. In any case, given the extremely small percentage of the overall Christian population in Japan (approximately one per cent), Beheiren had a rather large proportion of members who were from a Christian background. Also, in practice, Christianity was one of the important elements of cultural capital for Beheiren in creating ties with Western activists. From their early stage of transnational activism, Beheiren was successful in establishing trust networks with pacifist Quaker activists. For instance, when Beheiren's leader Makoto Oda visited New York to cultivate transnational networks with American activists in 1966, he stayed at the Quakers' office. It was through this network that Oda developed ties with prominent anti-war activists, including Staughton Lynd, A. J. Muste, Dave Dellinger, among others. When Oda and Beheiren organized an international conference in Tokyo, these figures were in charge of coordinating with delegates from the U.S. side.

## America and Ethnic Minority

Another crucial element that should be taken note of is the differences in terms of their attitude towards America. On the surface, the majority of Japanese had a rather positive sentiment towards the U.S. as a new authority that replaced the pre-war military dictatorship. But this does not mean that anti-Americanism was completely absent. The experience of military defeat and occupation engendered antagonism against America among both the right and the left. Particularly for the left, it was strengthened further by the communist ideology of the Cold War. At the same time, the experience of occupation combined with economic devastation after the war had generated an ethnic nationalism not only among the right-wing nationalists, but also among the lefts, as a way of recovering Japanese dignity. Thus, during the immediate post-war era and until the 1960s, a sentiment resembling anti-colonial nationalism in the Third World remained within the Japanese left.<sup>39</sup> The combination of these two elements was expressed pri-

39 However, it should be noted that the anti-American sentiment on the left in post-war Japan cannot be seen simply as anti-colonial nationalism caused only by the post-war occupation. The other crucial element was the continuation of antagonism toward the U.S. as an enemy nation from the wartime period (Katsumi Umemoto/Noboru Sato/Masao Maruyama: *Gendai Nihon no kakushin shisō jyō* (Renovationist Thought in Contemporary Japan Vol-

marily through the slogan of ‘anti-American patriotism (*hanbei aikoku*)’, which was employed frequently by the JCP from the 1950s until the early 1960s.<sup>40</sup>

Because of this basic ideology against the U.S., in part, Japanese lefts hesitated in creating ties with the movements in the U.S., even among the labour movements. Thus, a cultural hole existed between the Japanese and the American leftist networks in the post-war era. Beheiren was arguably the first and a unique example of extensively engagement in network building with American activists in post-war Japan. To be sure, it is misleading to assert that the Beheiren members did not have any antagonism against America. Rather, many of the members have clearly stated that their experience and memory of suffering from the air raids by the American air force had strongly impacted the forming of their political thoughts. Besides, they were also fiercely opposed to the U.S. foreign policy against Indochina and that was the reason why they formed the movement immediately after the escalation of bombing of North Vietnam in 1965. Nevertheless, they were also aware of the other side of America or were at least eager to learn about it. Among the Beheiren members who were taking a pivotal role in the movement, especially in transnational activism, there were a few who had experience of living in the U.S. The leader Oda had spent time at Harvard University as a Fulbright fellow in 1959. An advocate of the Beheiren movement, Tsurumi Shunsuke, was a philosopher and graduated from Harvard as well. His sister Kazuko, who was also a member, obtained a B.A. at Vassar College and a Ph.D. from Princeton University. Their cousin Yoshiyuki Tsurumi, an anthropologist who took an active part in creating ties with American activists, was born in the U.S., while his father resided in the country on diplomatic duty.<sup>41</sup> Thus, their perspective toward the U.S. was more complex than that of the conventional Japanese leftists who simply adopted the anti-American slogan and refused to have any relationship with the U.S. Alternatively, Beheiren endeavoured to understand America and through interactions with activists, they tried to overcome the residual antagonism that was left behind. This is one of the critical factors for Beheiren in developing ties with the U.S. New Lefts.

The JRA members also acknowledged American radicals as their comrades, who were fighting for the same world revolution against imperialism. For example, before JRA members arrived in the Middle East, Sekigun-ha was even planning to create a base in the U.S., although this did not materialise. Yet, unlike Beheiren, the JRA members lacked profound personal experience or attachment to America other than as the country that defeated Japan and an imperialist power that was suppress-

ume 1), Tokyo [1966] 2002, p. 22). Thus, it is more accurate to consider it a mixture of both wartime and post-war elements.

40 Eiji Oguma: *Minshu to aikoku: Sengo nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei* (Minshu and Aikoku: Post-war Japanese Nationalism and the Public Sphere), Tokyo 2002.

41 Also, one of the founders of Beheiren, political scientist Michitoshi Takabatake, was a visiting scholar at Yale University during the early phase of the Beheiren movement.

ing people in the Third World. Thus, JRA members' attitude towards America in general remained within the conventional framework of the post-war Japanese left. Instead, what seems to be remarkable among the JRA members' biographical background was their interaction with the racial minorities in Japan, which is less obvious among Beheiren members.<sup>42</sup> While minority politics only became a political issue in the Japanese social movement arena around 1969, many JRA members have shown concern about the status of racial minorities considerably earlier than other activists at that time. For instance, through interactions with Koreans living in a village next to her neighbourhood, the leader Shigenobu started showing concern about minority issues and even wrote short novels about the lives of Koreans in Tokyo during her high school years.<sup>43</sup> Another member had also reminisced about his interaction with a Korean friend and also remembers learning about the Ainu, an indigenous people of northern Japan, as well as the severe working conditions of Chinese coal miners residing in Japan that became his early inspirational experience in minority politics.<sup>44</sup> These encounters did not immediately become politicized, but once they started to take part in the uprisings of the student movement in campuses and also learning about the Third World movement emerging overseas, for activists, their past experiences with racial minorities were linked to the Palestinian struggle through the concept of the 'World Revolution'.

## Class Consciousness, Cultural Capital and Generation

I have thus far shown that there were significant differences in terms of movement ideology, goals, and tactics between Beheiren and the JRA. Furthermore, the paper also discussed that these differences were related to their attitude toward nationalism, religion, the U.S. and racial minorities which in part originated from main members' biographical backgrounds. These disparate characteristics of the movements and their constitutive members were the source of a cultural hole between the network with the First World movement on the one hand and the Third World movement on the other. What remained unexplored, however, were the reasons for such divergence of political

- 42 Beheiren members did show concern about racial minorities in Japan and Japan's relationships with neighbouring Asian countries in the late phase of their movement. However, in general, it was after their encounter with minorities during the anti-Vietnam War movement.
- 43 Fusako Shigenobu: *Chōsen no ko* (A Korean Child), in: *Kōkōsei no seikatsu to shōgen dai 3 kan* (Life and Testimony of the High School Students), Tokyo 1968.
- 44 Takao Himori: *Suiheisen no mukō ni: 72.5.30 ridda obo'e gaki* (Beyond the Horizon: Memorandum of the Lydda Struggle on 30 May 1972), in: *Suiheisen no mukō ni kankō iinkai* (ed.): *Suiheisen no mukōni: Rūportāju Himori Takao* (Beyond the Horizon: Reports on Takao Himori), Tokyo 2005, p. 213.

culture between the two groups and their members. I will analyse this issue through the sociological lens of class consciousness, cultural capital, and generation.

Firstly, class consciousness differed between the JRA and Beheiren activists.<sup>45</sup> The majority of the JRA members were from the early baby boomer generation, who were born immediately after the war when the entire Japanese society was still experiencing devastation. Thus, what was often mentioned in JRA activists' memoirs as part of their childhood memory was the suffering and struggle of poverty. To be sure, the Japanese, in general, were in serious need of economic recovery at that time. Yet, JRA members tend to emphasize their past living conditions as even more severe compared to the average Japanese people. It was their experience of feeling embarrassed over the difficulty in paying their school lunch fees, as well as the distrust of society due to the bankruptcy of their fathers' employers, which they recalled when sharing memories of their early childhood.<sup>46</sup> There was also a member who experienced drastic class degradation, from being a wealthy landlord to being a member of an underprivileged household, caused by the post-war agrarian reform enforced by the U.S.-led Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).<sup>47</sup> Hence, in some cases, their memory of post-war poverty was directly linked to their antagonism against America.

Contrary to this, many of the Beheiren members were from privileged families. This is obvious from a look at the occupations of the core members' fathers, which include politicians, diplomats, scholars, judges, bankers, business owners, bureaucrats, and other elite professions. Among these, the most remarkable example would be Shunsuke and Kazuko Tsurumi, both Beheiren members, who were the son and daughter of Yusuke Tsurumi a member of the House of Representatives and grandchildren of Shinpei Goto, the acclaimed Mayor of Tokyo city during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Certainly, not every member of Beheiren was as privileged as Tsurumi but in general they were from the middle or upper-middle-class family and comparatively less affected by the immediate post-war economic devastation than the average Japanese people. Combined with the generational factor—the core Beheiren members were from the pre-war generation—their primary childhood memories were of the war, especially those great air raids by the U.S. Air Force stood out, while the post-war economic crisis and recovery were less emphasized.

45 I do not consider that it was their *objective* class position that was crucial but rather their *subjective* 'consciousness' and 'identity'—their imaginative status within the Japanese society that was important in generating the differences between Beheiren and the JRA members.

46 Fusako Shigenobu: *Jyūnen me no manazashi kara* (From the Eyes of the Next Decade), Tokyo 1983, p. 38; Haruo Wako: *Nihonsekigun to ha nan datta no ka: Sono sōsōki wo megutte* (What was the Japanese Red Army?: About its Early Period), Tokyo 2010, p. 130.

47 Osamu Maruoka: *Maruoka Osamu zishū: Moto Nihonsekigun gunji shikikan kokuhakuroku* (Autobiography of Osamu Maruoka: A Record of Confession by the Ex-Military Commander of the Japanese Red Army), Tokyo 2013, p. 436.

Related to their class consciousness, Beheiren members also had significantly higher cultural capital compared to the average Japanese population at the time. Many of the core members were from the University of Tokyo and, as I have mentioned earlier, they were working in parts of the elite intellectual industry such as academia and media. Given the fact that the university enrolment rate in 1960 was only 10.3 per cent, meaning at the time when many of the core Beheiren members were college students, these members from highly ranked universities were considered to be the most elite group in their generation in Japan. Furthermore, including those who have lived in the U.S., many were capable of speaking western languages, particularly English and French. From 1969 on, they started to publish an English-language periodical, *AMPO* which addressed a wide range of issues related to Japanese civil society and politics. Their academic knowledge and language skills were clearly an advantage in building networks with western activists. Conversely, their Eurocentric mindset unconsciously furthered a certain distance to other parts of the world, including the relationships with neighbouring East Asian countries, until the later phase of their activism.

Although many JRA members were enrolled in colleges and some were from prestigious universities, there were also considerable numbers of dropouts from college and mainstream labour markets. One reason for this was the exceedingly competitive college entrance examination during the late 1960s, which was caused by the drastic population increase of the baby boomer generation. Although Japan is known for its competitiveness in university admission today, it was even tougher for those who were born within a few years after the war. Many JRA members came from this generation and the group included members who had withdrawn from this fierce competition. Another critical factor is the anti-elitist sentiment generated among student activists in the late 1960s. Student activists involved in the campus struggle in the late 1960s did not only oppose universities' undemocratic system, but also the authoritarian culture of the academic field. Most notably, in 1969, when the University of Tokyo professor Masao Maruyama was fiercely denounced by student activists, it was not solely because of Maruyama's lack of sympathy and support for student activism, but also because of his 'elitist' taste, majoring in political philosophy and favouring Western classical music.<sup>48</sup> By the fall of 1969, campus struggles, along with anti-elitist sentiment, had diffused widely across high schools.<sup>49</sup> Thus, participation in student activism had blunted some of the students' enthusiasm for pursuing higher education in order to foster their careers. Tsuyoshi

48 There was a general tendency in Japan at that time to consider western philosophy and western classical music as high-culture which only the upper-class elite can enjoy. Thus, some anti-authoritarian student activists during the sixties perceived Maruyama's work and hobby as luxurious and elitist. Masao Maruyama: *Jikonai taiwa: Sansatsu no nōto kara* (Self-dialogue: From the Three Notebooks), Tokyo 1998.

49 Tetsuo Kobayashi: *Kōkō funsō 1969–1970: 'Tōsō' no rekishi to shōgen* (The High School Campus Struggles 1969–1970: History and Testimony of the 'Conflict'), Tokyo 2012.

Okudaira, who was one of three members who attacked the Lod airport in Tel Aviv in 1972, for example, was an elite student at Kyoto University, who dropped out while being involved in campus struggles and settlement movements. His engagement in these activities generated deep sympathy toward the unprivileged class and hostility against the prosperous class.<sup>50</sup> Also, unlike Beheiren activists, the majority of JRA members did not have prior experiences of travel abroad. They were neither skilled in speaking foreign languages. Thus, when they first landed in the Middle East, they were not only incapable of speaking the Arabic language, but they also had difficulty in carrying out basic English conversation with local activists.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, they had developed trust networks with the Arab revolutionaries through their enthusiasm for revolution and for the numerous perilous actions which they dedicated their lives to for the Palestinian struggle.

Lastly, I consider that generational disparity between Beheiren and the JRA members was also crucial. To reiterate, many core Beheiren members were born in the early 1930s and thus they tended to be more than ten years older than the JRA members. This age difference certainly had an influence on the creation of disparity in terms of childhood memories and cultural capital among the members of the two groups. Moreover, it was also crucial in the choices of a repertoire of actions and, generally speaking, for forming the political culture of two movements. For many Beheiren members, the anti-Vietnam War movement was not their first involvement in activism; many had been involved in a nationwide protest against the military treaty between the U.S. and Japan (i.e. the 1960 Anpo movement), and there were also members, who had been engaged in student movements in the 1950s, usually as a member of the Japanese Communist Party.<sup>52</sup> The 1950s was a period of turmoil for the JCP movement and they even adopted radical and violent guerrilla tactics to forcibly overthrow the government and intense internal conflict between the activists occurred incessantly. Those former JCP activists in Beheiren, who had had prior involvement in a movement, were naturally cautious about the use of violence and sceptical towards its supposed positive effect. By contrast, except for a few seniors, most of the JRA members had begun their activism in high school or college in the late 1960s, when student activism became intense and brutal. They lacked prior experience to reflect and deliberate on the violent and radical orientation that the 1968 movement was moving toward.

50 Okudaira Tsuyoshi ikō henshū iinkai: *Ten yo, ware ni shigoto wo ata'e yo* (God, Provide Duty for Me), Tokyo 1978, p. 350.

51 Fusako Shigenobu: *Jyūnen me no manazashi kara* (From the Eyes of the Next Decade), p. 24.

52 'Anpo' or 'Am-po' is an abbreviation of *Anzenhoshōjōyaku*, literally meaning security treaty. 1960 was the year when the 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan' was signed and it ignited nationwide protest in Japan. For the 1960 Anpo movement see, Wesley Sasaki-Uemura: *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu 2001.

## Conclusion: Identifying with the First World or the Third World?

The main concern of this paper was to explore why and how transnational activism bifurcated between civic activism that united with the First World movement and clandestine movements that were influenced by and linked to the Third World. More generally, the paper aimed to show how the *duality of culture*—creating and bridging boundaries in networks—were operated in the transnational activism of the Japanese sixties movements. I have thus far shown differences in the ways in which class consciousness, cultural capital and generational characteristics affected the shaping of different ideologies and political cultures in the two groups. As I have mentioned earlier in this paper, I consider that different strata of culture are interrelated and as a whole, they create a groups' distinct political culture. Such cultural comparisons provide answers to why the transnational networks diverged between the two groups and how similar culture between the Japanese movements and foreign movements became the base for transnational network building.

However, there still remains an issue that is unexplored; which is the question of how similar cultures were being imagined between movements in a very different social and cultural context. In fact, there were practically very limited or entirely non-existent prior relationships between the two Japanese social movement groups and their foreign partners before they began their transnational activism. Nonetheless, they established transnational alliances, although they knew only very little about each other and their respective countries. To be sure, activists were able to learn about social movements overseas through the media. Yet, mediated information about foreign movements usually came in the form of scattered reporting on certain aspects of fast changing movements emerging in very different social and political contexts. Thus, what is important is the activists' fundamental worldview that serves as a connecting factor in light of this mediated information. As Karl Mannheim has argued, the world is not given to us simply through our senses, but instead, people would interpret it through lenses based on cultural elements. And those 'worldviews' (*Weltanschauungen*) are embedded within the larger social world.<sup>53</sup> In short, one's worldview and the macro-structure are most certainly interlinked. Thus, I argue that activists' macro-structural position and their identification within Japanese society is crucial in exploring how activists generated imaginative ties with movements overseas. In the case of the

53 Karl Mannheim: On the Interpretation of 'Weltanschauung', in: *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London [1921/2] 1952, pp. 33–83; Karl Mannheim: *Ideology and Utopia*, London [1929] 1998.

Japanese sixties, the First World and Third World divide was one element of a crucial macro context that structured the activists' worldview.

The sixties movement occurred during a period of drastic transition in post-war Japan. For example, in 1955, Japan was invited to participate in the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, the first international conference held by post-colonial countries after the war. Subsequently, less than a decade later, in 1964, Japan joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international organization consisting of economically developed countries mainly from the west, to discuss issues related to the global economy. Furthermore, in 1968, when the Japanese sixties movement reached its peak, Japan ranked second in the world in gross national product (GNP). Although Japan has been generally categorized as part of the First World from the late 1960s, it was still a time of great transition from post-war devastation to global economic power.

The division between the First and the Third World is not based solely on political (capitalist regimes vs. non-aligned, alternative socialism) and economical (developed vs. underdeveloped) factors, but also includes regional and cultural elements, as well. Japan was in a unique position in this respect, presumably among the very few countries located in the non-western region to be considered as the First World at that time. Furthermore, the historical experience of colonialism was also a critical dividing factor of these two worlds—the coloniser of the First World and the colonised of the Third World. Japan had taken the route of being colonialist against her Asian neighbours, but at the same time had also experienced occupation by the U.S. immediately after the war ended. Given the above, politically Japan was aligned with the capitalist regime of the First World, but economically, geo-culturally and historically, Japan also contained some 'Third World' elements within its society.

Furthermore, since Japan at that time was neither a 'typical' First World nor Third World country, their identity within the three-worlds-configuration was rather fluid. People could be more sympathetic either toward the First World or the Third World, depending on their position and identity within the Japanese society. At the same time, the three-worlds-configuration that was first introduced to analyse the entire world, was also applied to Japan itself to emphasize various inequalities within the country. The phrase 'Third World inside of Japan' was used in the Japanese radical public sphere from the late 1960s to describe the area and people who were exploited and suppressed by the 'First World' in Japan. Those places included the Okinawa islands occupied by the U.S. until they were returned to Japan in 1972 or the lower-class neighbourhoods known as *Yoseba*, where day labourers gather and seek temporary jobs. Social movements and activists were also embedded in this macro condition of the Japanese society during the 1960s and 1970s. From this aspect, we can construe that Beheiren embodied the former and JRA the latter.

In the case of Beheiren members, although they were not blind followers, western modernist ideas were generally the backbone of their political thoughts. Certainly,



they were against American foreign policy in Indochina. However, they did not entirely reject the democratic idea and practices brought over from the U.S. during the post-war occupation. Instead, they protested the war in Vietnam by actually putting post-war democracy into practice. In short, Beheiren represents the western 'First World' aspects of Japanese society at that time. Thus, while conducting transnational activism, this position inevitably led to the forming of alliances with foreign activists from those western movements who were also against the war but believed in western democracy. The most significant examples were the American New Left intellectuals, whom Beheiren had developed closest ties with.

Suffice it to say that JRA, on the other hand, could be analysed as a movement that embodied the 'Third World' element of the Japanese society. Certainly, post-war economic recovery followed by rapid economic growth had significantly changed the life of Japanese people and by the 1960s, people were relishing affluent consumer culture. But for the JRA members, the memory of their childhood poverty, when Japan was still amid restoration from the devastation of war, has remained strong. At the same time, they were more or less incredulous about the democratic reform brought over from the U.S.<sup>54</sup> Instead, some even showed emotional sympathy toward ethnic nationalism, which resonates with the nationalism of the Third World activists in general and Palestinian activists in particular. Furthermore, their precarious social status of withdrawing from college and workplace, and their involvement in violent and occasionally illegal actions, had led them to imagine themselves as being part of the 'Third World' in Japanese society, even though ethnically, they belonged to the majority among the Japanese people. In fact, JRA members showed great concern over these suppressed areas and strived to assimilate themselves to the 'Third World in Japan' by engaging in volunteer activities and mobilizing protests. In brief, although it does not mean that JRA was identical with movements in the Third World, their relative position within the Japanese society had prompted them to *identify* with the Third World.

The abstraction of dividing the world and society into three worlds had enabled people to link and identify themselves with people in other countries that live in significantly different political, economic and cultural contexts. Beheiren members, who resided in Japan, were supposedly living under very different conditions from the western activists whom they have developed ties with. The gap may be even larger between JRA members and the Arab revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the macro and abstract worldview of the three-worlds-configuration invalidated various differences of the complex world and people's imagination by uniting people.

54 Criticism of Japan's post-war democracy (*Sengo Minshushugi*) was not unique to the JRA members but was widely shared among student activists at that time.

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