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Introduction: How do Right-Wing Populists come to Terms with Gender Today?

The 65th volume of the journal *Moving the Social* is a special edition dedicated to exploring gender stereotypes used by the far-right in public debates against migration and gender equality. More specifically, it gathers comparative insights into the relationships between gender perspectives, particularly gender equality and stereotyped gender images, and antimigration discourses of populist radical right parties in Europe and the Americas. It gives specific reference to the expressions of masculinity in discourses against (often Muslim) migrants and to the strategies of argumentation through which populist radical right camps justify masculinist views. As such, the volume collects four articles written at the intersection of contemporary history, politics, populism studies and gender studies.

This thematically focused main part of the issue is supplemented by two further articles. One on “Framing in a Multicultural Social Movement: The Defence of the San Pedro Mezquital River”, the other titled “Beyond Egalitarianism: Statistical Knowledge and Social Inequality in the German Democratic Republic”. This is followed by an obituary on Alf Lüdtke. A review article of “Recent Publications on the History of Environmentalism” concludes the issue.

It is a commonplace argument that regardless of their ideologies, populist movements largely choose to forge their propaganda through the standpoint of ‘the people’. Either defined as a strategy, a discourse, or even as a logic of anti-capitalist mobilisation, the emphasis on ‘the people’ always remains at the centre of populist arguments.¹ From

- 1 Tanja Wolf: *Rechtsextreme und rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa: Typologisierung und Vergleich*, Wiesbaden 2019, pp. 108f.; Ghita Ionescu/Ernest Gellner: Introduction, in: Ghita Ionescu/Ernest Gellner (eds.): *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, New York 1969, pp. 1–8, pp. 3f. For three known definitions of populisms connected to strategy, discourse and emancipation logic, see Kurt Weyland: Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, in: *Comparative Politics* 34:1 (2001), pp. 1–22; Ruth Wodak: *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, London 2015; Chantal Mouffe: *For a Left Populism*, London Verso 2018; Carlos de la Torre: Is Left Populism the Radical Democratic Answer?, in: *Irish Journal of Sociology* 27:1 (2019), pp. 64–71.

this focus on people, the perhaps most frequently used definition of populism builds on a “thin-centred ideology”, which draws binaries between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elites”, with whom the former is dissatisfied.² In order to justify these concepts and the tensions in between, populist camps mostly need moral assumptions, as well as nativist and authoritarian ideologies.³ After the emphasis on the people, the second relevant element of populism thus emerges to be the need of constructing moral distinctions between people and their others.⁴ The difference between right-wing populism and other ideological variants of populism emerges with the representations of an enemy *vis a vis* the people.⁵ Contrary to the left-wing populism that did not marginalise migrants but political and economic systems based on capitalism, right-wing populism primarily constructs moral binaries between the people and migrants.⁶

Gender perspectives then come to the fore, as they have so far given the populist camps leverage to further contextualise their moral justifications between the people and their ‘antitheses’. Gender, defined as social constructs based on social structures, norms and institutions⁷, has so far been mainly relevant for the populist radical right in two cases: defining the autochthonous or native gender images and the others. In regard to defining the native gender images, for a long time, radical right parties advocated patriarchal family structures and traditional family roles and remained uncompromisingly opposed to gender equality. For a long time, the far-right camps in Germany and Austria called gender awareness a ‘madness’, an ideology of dismantling the so-called ‘natural’ family values and dictating rules that were contrary to creation.⁸

- 2 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2017, p. 6.
- 3 Jan-Werner Müller: *What is Populism?*, Philadelphia 2016, pp. 24f.; Cas Mudde: *The Populist Zeitgeist*, in: *Government and Opposition* 39:4 (2004), pp. 541–563, p. 543.
- 4 Daniele Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell: *Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre*, in: Daniele Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell (eds.): *Twenty-First Century Populism*, New York 2008, pp. 1–14, pp. 10f.
- 5 Tanja Wolf: *Rechtsextreme und rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa*, pp. 111–115.
- 6 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: *Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America*, in: *Government and Opposition* 48:2 (2013), pp. 147–174.
- 7 Lynn Hunt: *Introduction: History, Culture, and Text*, in: Lynn Hunt (ed.): *The New Cultural History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1989, pp. 1–22; Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly: *Introduction*, in: Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly (eds.): *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance*, Ann Arbor 1995, pp. 1–9, pp. 5f.
- 8 Juliane Lang/Ulrich Peters: *Antifeminismus in Deutschland. Einführung und Einordnung des Phänomens*, in: Idem. (eds.): *Antifeminismus in Bewegung: Aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht und sexuelle Vielfalt*, Hamburg 2018, pp. 13–36; Marion Löffler: *Maskulinität: Der ganz normale ‚Gender-Wahnsinn‘*, in: Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): *Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien*, Frankfurt 2017, pp. 185–194.

Fidesz in Hungary, since its taking office in 2010, sought to end gender awareness through, among other things, the closure of gender departments at Hungarian universities. The Freedom Party of Austria, one of the oldest far-right parties in Europe after the Second World War, increased the number of women assuming party positions in the last decades, but still remained the sworn defender of the traditional Austrian family, rejected abortion and same-sex marriages, and regarded gender equality and feminism as threats to Austrian society.⁹ Overall, the populist radical right changed little concerning the given gender roles and patriarchal family structure.

The past two decades, however, also witnessed various radical right parties employing limited gender-sensitive vocabulary and masking their known stands against gender equality in an attempt to attract moderate voters and enlarge electoral bases. The National Rally from France, formerly known as the National Front, officially describes itself as a mass party essentially based on gender equality. Since she assumed chairpersonship of the party from her father in 2011, Marine Le Pen has begun a process called 'de-demonisation', aiming to deconstruct its previously masculine and patriarchal party image.¹⁰ Although the National Rally had officially condemned abortion in 2011, the following year, it showcased a more tolerant attitude towards gender groups and even acknowledged same-sex marriage, provided couples were not allowed child adoption.¹¹ The party drastically increased its voter support through this de-demonisation process, but each time failed to gain victory, as the moderate voters united to

- 9 Carina Klammer/Judith Goetz: *Between German Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Racism: Representations of Gender in the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)*, in: Michaela Köftig/Reneta Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): *Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe*, Cham 2017, pp. 79–93; Natascha Strobl/Julian Bruns: *Preparing for (Intellectual) Civil War: The New Right in Austria and Germany*, in: Maik Fielitz/Laura Lotte Laloire (eds.): *Trouble on the Far Right: Contemporary Right-Wing Strategies and Practices*, Bielefeld 2016, pp. 105–110; Marion Löffler: *Maskulinismus*, pp. 187–189; Carina Klammer: *Imaginationen des Untergangs: Zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ*, Münster 2013.
- 10 Jean-Yves Camus/Nicolas Lebourg: *Far-Right Politics in Europe* (translated by Jane Marie Todd), Cambridge and Massachusetts 2017, pp. 200f.; Gilles Ivaldi: *A new Course for the French Radical Right? The Front National and 'de-demonisation'*, in: Tjitske Akkerman/Sarah L. de Lange/Matthijs Rooduijn (eds.): *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?*, London 2016, pp. 225–246; Annie Benveniste/Etienne Pingaud: *Far-Right Movements in France: The Principal Role of Front National and the Rise of Islamophobia*, in: Gabriella Lazaridis/Giovanna Campani/Annie Benveniste (eds.): *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe Populist Shifts and 'Othering'*, Basingstoke 2016, pp. 55–79.
- 11 Tjitske Akkerman: *Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas*, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 49:1–2 (2015), pp. 37–60, pp. 46f.; Francesca Scrinzi: *A 'New' National Front? Gender, Religion, Secularism and the French Populist Radical Right*, in: Michaela Köftig/Reneta Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): *Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe*, Basingstoke 2017, pp. 127–140, pp. 130f.

support the concurrent candidates in the second electoral rounds. Next to Marine Le Pen's leadership image appealing to female voters, some of the right-wing populist parties led by the Alternative for Germany, the Progress Party in Norway, the Danish People's Party, the Law and Justice Party in Poland and the Brothers of Italy, also chose to be represented by women, supposedly for electoral reasons. Contrary to these examples, the Party for Freedom from the Netherlands had presented itself as inherently gender-protective from the beginning. Since its foundation in 2006, the party's official programmes have arguably promoted various aspects of gender equality, including same-sex marriages and LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) rights.¹²

The actions and propaganda of radical right parties restrict their credibility in their gender-sensitive arguments. Today, it is commonly observed in Europe that the radical right parties still refuse to discuss the lack of gender equality in their respective countries and present it as a problem only seen in migrant communities.¹³ In other words, these parties largely assume that gender equality is already achieved in European countries and manipulate gender issues to ground their assertions about Muslims' so-called 'noncongruence' with European values.¹⁴ That is why populist radical right parties, in the end, face criticism from feminists and gender activists, the support of whom these parties aim to achieve. For example, the representatives of the feminist movement at the European level, the European Women's Lobby, rejected coming to terms with the radical right parties on the grounds that their ostensibly gender-sensitive positions served a xenophobic rationale.¹⁵

The manipulation of gender equality issues in oppositions to Muslim migrants is not a new state of affairs, but is strongly linked to the transformation of the political agenda in the West concerning debates about Muslim migrants. In Western Europe, breaking away from the ideological constraints of the Cold War, party politics converged on economic and political liberalism, and ideological conflicts were replaced by cultural issues, such as European integration, international migration, and diversity of migrants.¹⁶ Globalising economic activities and communication also resulted in

- 12 Ulrike M. Vieten/Scott Poynting: Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe, in: *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37:6 (2016), pp. 533–540, p. 536; Tjitske Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe.
- 13 Mieke Verloo: Gender Knowledge, and Opposition to the Feminist Project: Extreme-Right Populist Parties in the Netherlands, in: *Politics and Governance* 6:3 (2018), pp. 20–30, pp. 27f.
- 14 Cornelia Möser: Sexual Politics as a Tool to 'Un-Demonize' Right-Wing Discourses in France, in: Gabriela Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): *Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives and Beyond*, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 117–134, pp. 123f.
- 15 Pauline Cullen: From Neglect to Threat: Feminist Responses to Right Wing Populism in the European Union, *European Politics and Society* (2020), pp. 2–19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1801183>.
- 16 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism, pp. 147–174.

the internationalisation of norms and institutions concerning migration, which ultimately added to this transition.¹⁷ Additionally, the 9/11 attacks in the United States and its aftermath in Europe directed the emphases of migration politics towards migrants from Muslim countries. European nation states began to stipulate integration criteria for Muslim migrants, in which gender equality was used as a yardstick of measuring how ‘integrated’ migrant communities are.¹⁸ The debates over Islamic attire of women, commonly referred to as the veil, and its limitation in the public sphere dramatically exemplify the culturalisation of migration politics against Muslim migrants. One of the critical conclusions drawn by the EU-funded Veil Project conducted between 2006 and 2009 was that “regulating religious apparel for Muslim women relates to specific developments regarding the renegotiation of the self-definition of nation-states, in particular at a time when European nation-states are becoming increasingly heterogeneous in their ethnic, religious and cultural makeup”.¹⁹ Indeed, France and Germany, in the process of rebuilding national identity after the Cold War, attributed gender inequality to Muslim women’s veil and came to restrict Islamic attire in the public sphere.²⁰ In other countries of Western Europe, the mainstream media and politics also increasingly discussed the concepts of migration, integration, and diversity through the prism of gender equality.

In response to party politics centred on cultural debates, the populist radical right parties of Western Europe attempted to reformulate their opposition to migration by stigmatising it as a phenomenon between receiving liberal democracies and illiberal migrant communities.²¹ For many studies, a key event of this transition was the 9/11 attacks in the United States, after which populist radical right parties securitised migration on secular grounds and presented Islam as a threat to western nations.²² The common propaganda emerged that Islamic values, and therefore migrants from Muslim countries, were inherently at odds with liberal democratic values, such as the

- 17 Hanspeter Kriesi/Edgar Grande/Romain Lachat/Martin Dolezal/Simon Bornschieer/Timotheos Frey: *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Cambridge 2008, p. 6; Randall Hansen: *Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe*, in: *Comparative Political Studies* 35:3 (2002), pp. 259–283.
- 18 Petra Rostock/Sabine Berghahn: *The Ambivalent Role of Gender in Redefining the German Nation: Between Universalism and Rejection of the ‘Other’*, in: *Ethnicities* 83:3 (2008), pp. 345–384, p. 358.
- 19 University of Vienna: *Final Report Summary – VEIL (Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies. Debates about Female Muslim Headscarves in Europe)* 028555, *CORDIS Community Research and Development Information Service*, at: https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/results/28/28555/124376731-6_en.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2021).
- 20 Birgit Sauer: *Headscarf Regimes in Europe: Diversity Policies at the Intersection of Gender, Culture and Religion*, in: *Comparative European Politics* 7:1 (2009), pp. 75–94.
- 21 Cas Mudde: *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, New York 2007, p. 84.
- 22 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: *Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism*, p. 24.

autonomy of the individual, democracy, emancipation of women, gender equality, LGBTI rights, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state.²³ Far-right parties in Western Europe, which were already notorious for their racist and xenophobic communication in the past, came to devise suggestive election campaigns depicting all these negative images of Muslim migrants in order to cause public dismay. Owing to these propaganda the National Rally in France increased its voter support and the Northern League in Italy and the Freedom Party of Austria participated in coalitionary governments during the 2000s and 2010s.

In Eastern Europe, a different course of events influenced the migration policies of far-right parties.²⁴ Except in Serbia and Russia, populist radical right parties in Eastern Europe could not gain noteworthy success in the 1990s. A far-right victory became possible from the next decade onwards, not least because mainstream political parties, most prominently Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland, began to resort to radical populism and achieved electoral success through their propaganda targeting the European Union's liberal policies as well as ethnic minorities, especially Roma people.²⁵ With the rising refugee movements to Europe and the collapse of the EU's refugee regime in 2015, populist radical right movements in Eastern Europe also brought into focus Muslim migrants in party politics and propaganda, which represented women as the agents of reproduction.²⁶ As an example of these stereotypes, Fidesz and Law and Justice began to portray Muslim women as threats to the demographic future of Hungary and Poland and called on native-born women to bear children to counter Muslim migration.²⁷ Thus, Viktor Orbán, through tax exemptions, recently

- 23 Tjitske Akkerman: *Anti-Immigration Parties and the Defence of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn*, in: *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10:3 (2005), pp. 337–354; Hans-Georg Betz: *Against the 'Green Totalitarianism': Anti-Islamic Nativism in Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, in: Christina Schori Liang (ed.): *Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, Aldershot 2007, pp. 33–54; Hans-Georg Betz/Susi Meret: *Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization against Islam in Contemporary Western Europe*, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 43:3–4 (2009), pp. 313–334.
- 24 Cas Mudde: *In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe*, in: *East European Politics and Societies* 14:2 (2000), pp. 33–53.
- 25 Ben Stanley: *Populism in Central and Eastern Europe*, in: Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser/Paul A. Taggart/Paulina Ochoa Espejo/Pierre Ostiguy (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford 2017, pp. 140–160.
- 26 Lenka Buštiková: *The Radical Right in Eastern Europe*, in: Jens Rydgren (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, New York 2018, pp. 565–581.
- 27 Elżbieta M. Goździak/Péter Marton: *Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland*, in: *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 7:2 (2018), pp. 125–151.

sought to encourage Hungarian women to have at least four children, in an attempt to strengthen the country's ethnic homogeneity against Roma and Muslim migrants.²⁸

The stereotyped gender images thus partly originated from Islamophobia and constituted the arsenal with which populist radical right movements devised their visual and written propaganda against Muslim migrants. Publications hence address the moral differences constructed in these materials between the native and the migrant gender identity groups.²⁹ The common images of migrant women portray them as victims of Islamic subordination: in written and visual propaganda, Muslim women remain motionless figures whose distress is always visible. They are almost always covered by veils, which symbolise inferior migrant mentality disfavouring gender equality. Muslim men remained criminals and even sexual molesters harassing the autochthonous women in receiving countries. Propaganda drawing on gender stereotypes about Muslim migrants also attributes traditional images to the women of the receiving country. The native women in turn are the representatives of national pride, keen subjects of patriarchal family lives, or agents encumbered with reproduction to ensure survival of the nation.³⁰ In other words, as also noted in this volume, the populist radical opposition drawing on gender stereotypes evinces a paradigm in which Muslim migrants are essentially against gender equality and thus culturally inferior to western and European values. At the same time, it still propagates traditional and patriarchal gender roles that contrast with gender equality.

The main research themes used in the literature centred on Western European politics have largely been the victimisation of Muslim women, the criminalisation of Muslim men, and the objectification of native women.³¹ In contrast, studies focussing

- 28 Shaun Walker: Viktor Orbán: No Tax for Hungarian Women with Four or More Children, in: the Guardian, 10.02.2019, at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/10/viktor-orban-no-tax-for-hungarian-women-with-four-or-more-children> (accessed on 7 March 2021).
- 29 Floya Anthias: Transactional Mobilities, Migration Research and Intersectionality, in: *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 2:2 (2012), pp. 102–110; Carina Klammer: *Imaginationen des Untergangs: Zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ*, Münster 2013, pp. 91f.; Carina Klammer/Judith Goetz: *Between German Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Racism*, p. 79. See also, Peter Morey/Amina Yaqin: *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11*, Cambridge, MA 2011 and Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): *Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien*.
- 30 Tjitske Akkerman/Anniken Hagelund: 'Women and Children First!' Anti-Immigration Parties and Gender in Norway and the Netherlands, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 41:2 (2007), pp. 197–214; Hans-Georg Betz/Susi Meret: *Revisiting Lepanto*; José Pedro Zúquete: *The European Extreme-Right and Islam: New Directions?*, in: *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13: 3 (2008), pp. 321–344.
- 31 Ulrike M. Vieten: *Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalization of Gendered Anti-Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands*, in: *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37:6 (2016), pp. 621–636, pp. 621–625; Catherine Kinnvall: *Borders and Fear: Inse-*

on how far-right camps conceptualise native men in their antimigration discourses are limited.³² The present special edition, following the definition of masculinity as social construction of not only male dominance in gender hierarchy but also male hegemony over social relations³³, aims to address this gap. The articles in this special edition raise the following questions:

- In the face of the ostensibly gender-protective opposition against migration, what aspects of masculinity emerge in the populist right's antimigration discourse in contemporary politics?
- How do these aspects of masculinity structure gender hierarchies revealed by the populist radical right parties?
- How do positions voiced by political leaders, election campaigns and official party propaganda illustrate the stereotyped national and migrant gender images?

Dorothee Beck opens the discussion with her analyses of masculinist narratives of externalisations of violence and migration in the mainstream media of Germany. She draws on the findings of her research project entitled *'Genderism' in Media Debate. Thematic cycles from 2006 to 2016*. Beck suggestively demonstrates that the mainstream media and populist radical right camps in Germany meet on masculinity concepts when they refer to Muslim migrants. The conservative and liberal print media partially includes articles and commentaries with masculinist views, which were in fact shared and propagated by far-right parties. Beck demonstrates that the opinions voiced in her investigation construct violence as an external threat and connect it exclusively to the crimes reported in Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015. In doing so, the articles and commen-

curity, Gender and the Far Right in Europe, in: *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23:4 (2015), pp. 514–529; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, in: *History of the Present* 2:2 (2012), pp. 184–199; Liz Fekete: Enlightened Fundamentalism? Migration, Feminism and the Right, in: *Race and Class* 48:2 (2006), pp. 1–22; Stefanie Mayer/Edma Ajanovic/Birgit Sauer: Intersections and Inconsistencies. Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria, in: *NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 22:4 (2014), pp. 250–266; Tjitse Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 37–60; David Paternotte/Roman Kuhar: Disentangling and Locating the 'Global Right': Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe, in: *Politics and Governance* 6:3 (2018), pp. 6–19.

- 32 Alice Blum: Men in the Battle for the Brains: Constructions of Masculinity Within the 'Identitary Generation', in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): *Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe*, pp. 321f.
- 33 Jeff Hearn: From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men, in: *Feminist Theory* 5:1 (2004), pp. 49–72; Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly: On Governance, Leadership and Gender, in: Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly (eds.): *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance*, pp. 11–34, pp. 21–24.

taries present German men as guardians of the family and native women. The media partially defend the traditional values underpinning male hegemony in society and, thereby, connect to far-right arguments. In other words, masculinist arguments function as a bridge between mainstream media and radical-right propaganda and, thus, serve the normalisation of far-right politics.

In the following article, Julia Roth further explores the argumentative ways in which populist radical right leaders in the Americas manipulate gender to justify not only masculinist views, but also claims of occidental superiority over migrants. She discusses statements made by Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro and their use of a number of discursive patterns common in far-right discourse on gender. Furthermore, she also uses comparative examples from party elites of the Alternative for Germany. According to Roth, the given leaders reveal a modernisation paradigm, which positions the 'already emancipated' society *vis a vis* 'backward' Muslim migrants and gender groups. The criminalisation of male migrants mentioned in Beck's article concerning the German case also emerges in assertions made by the populist radical right in the Americas. This modernisation paradigm equally underpins traditional gender roles and a male-dominated gender hierarchy. To better understand the xenophobic, masculinist and racist aspects of the investigated far-right arguments, Roth refers to the intersectionality logic, which gives insight into the overlapping nationalist, class-based, and gender-related exclusions of national and migrant gender groups.

Within far-right discourses, masculinities indeed do not only structure written or spoken arguments but also stylistic and performative expressions. Feyda Sayan-Cengiz and Selin Akyüz further contextualise this assumption with two cases from different cultural and historical contexts; they analyse argumentative methods employed by Fidesz in Hungary and its leader Viktor Orbán on the one hand and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and its leader Geert Wilders on the other. The authors initially define 'political masculinities' and use this concept to approach the masculinist arguments and performances embedded in propaganda for 'the people'. Programmatic statements and leaders' statements, as well as Orbán's and Wilders' gestures and emotions revealed in speeches, accordingly serve one aim: creating the image of a 'brave bad boy' who protects the Hungarian and Dutch 'peoples' against outsiders. Here, one can remember a generalisation drawn elsewhere: in Eastern Europe nationalism structures gender perspectives, but in Northern and Western parts of Europe it is rather the civilizational rhetoric about a Western cultural cosmos and liberal values that underpins gender arguments.³⁴ Two cases discussed by Sayan-Cengiz indeed point to differences, in the sense that Orbán accentuates the nation and its survival in his

34 Roger Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective, in: *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40:8 (2017), pp. 1191–1226.

masculist opposition to migration, whereas Wilders uses references to the Western civilisation, Judeo-Christian and liberal values, and freedom. Orbán stands for traditional and patriarchal family values. In contrast, Wilders presents himself as the sworn apologist of gender rights, which he deems part of the Western-Dutch civilisation. The influences of geographical and cultural spheres on the masculine performances of far-right leaders should thus be further researched. In conclusion, as the authors agree, investigating the masculinity performances of populist elites helps us to better understand the affective capacities of populist movements to mobilise masses.

My article, drawing on the comparisons between the Freedom Party of Austria and Northern League in Italy, is the last addendum to the debate about gender representations by populist radical right movements against Muslim migrants. I address common assumptions in populism and gender literatures regarding the far right's discursive changes over the past two decades. To this end, my article investigates the election propaganda of both parties since the early 2000s and locates representations of Muslim gender groups in visual and textual data. It demonstrates that both parties oriented their antimigration propaganda towards the rejection of Muslim migrants, not only in secular and gender-sensitive but also in ethnic and class-oriented terms. Party propaganda drew up a differentiation of migrants into Muslim criminal men and their female victims, which corroborates the arguments raised by Beck, Roth, Sayan and Akyüz regarding the externalisation of violence and criminal allegations against migrant men. A relevant question raised in the literature comes to attention, however. Namely, whether the populist radical right camps use these images and integrate Muslim women into the economic sectors that require a cheap labour force, e.g. the care sector.³⁵ The two parties' official propaganda evince their concerns about Italian and Austrian women's roles in family and reproduction and show signs of some limited tolerance of female migrants in the care sector. Still, it does not seem possible to answer the question whether these parties actually began to tolerate Muslim female workers because their propaganda did not suggest any positive conceptions of Muslim women in national labour markets.

The articles in this collection address problematic concepts raised by populist radical right camps in Europe and the Americas, such as the people and migrants, 'male saviours' of the people, criminal migrant men and victimised women. They also scrutinise the argumentative strategies which populist camps use to justify these stereotypes. As such, they add to the comparisons of far-right discourses drawing on differ-

35 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'? Migrant Women in the Lega Nord Ideology and Politics, in: Jon Mulholland/Nicola Montagna/Erin Sanders-McDonagh (eds.): *Gendering Nationalism: Intersections of Nation, Gender and Sexuality in the 21st Century*, Cham 2018, pp. 241–257; Sara R. Farris: *Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women*, pp. 184–199; Sara R. Farris: *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism*, Durham 2018.

entiation between gender groups in the receiving country and migrant communities. Finally, the contributions underline the need for further comparative inquiries into the influences which local cultural and geographical factors exert on gender representations in populist radical right parties. They additionally call for studies exploring not only programmatic and rhetorical, but also performative and visual aspects of far-right discourses, since populist camps are more and more likely to rely on the latter facets.

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