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The Gender of War and Peace:
Rhetoric in the West German Peace Movement of the Early 1980s

The bombs won’t wait—the power-militarism, which Haig-Reagan-Weinberger-Apel-Schmidt consistently defend, which will cost more than one billion dollars in the next three years for defense, wound women, children, men, every day! In the speeches of politicians, of generals, we emerge as mothers, as victims, whether in the West or the East. We must strive for non-violent opposition, for resistance against this. [We must] mobilize against the Third World War, including in the fight for human rights, for social and liberation movements, and also in everyday life, here and now.1

This 1981 call to action, while eminently unambiguous, at the same time reflects some of the tensions, gendered and otherwise, buried in discussions surrounding war, peace, militarism, and activism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, tensions among activists of varied political leanings, but also within the rhetoric of individuals and groups. Here, “women, children, men” are all threatened, yet named distinctly. This group is parallel to “mothers” and “victims,” identities that in turn seem both imposed upon individuals and embraced by the latter, and contrasted with politicians and generals. “Mothers” are victims of “power-militarism,” at the level of both high politics and “everyday life,” but possess the strength to fight back against this threat—without violence and “power.” Reagan and Schmidt are identified in a single, elided identity, yet are far from one another in this list. The peace movement of early 1980s West Germany was, like its counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the largest protest movement in the history of that country, impressive not only in terms of sheer numbers, but also in having drawn in populations never before politically active, and bringing together groups heretofore disindined toward or even inimical to one another.2 Precisely this fact became a self-fulfilling prophecy: that is, many felt comfortable joining in peace protest because such varied segments of society seemed to support the movement, across gender as well as other perceived divides, from class and level of education to urban/rural and confessional splits, and across age differences and the broadest political spectrum. This was an extraordinary achievement, including particularly in bringing together men and women, into a movement historically dominated by men, and yet which had heretofore always been marginalized as concerning a “feminized” set of issues. At the same time, the associated “feminized” rheto-

ric within many parts of the movement revealed a paradoxical (if understandable) relation between self-empowerment and victimization that both threatened to diminish the efficacy of activists and supported a politically problematic self-identity.

To understand both this extraordinary achievement and the attendant more difficult aspects, this paper will look first at the rhetorical links between peace and gender in discussions beginning in the mid-1970s, particularly at self-identified feminist and other activist women’s views of militarism, peace activism, and the prospect of war. These discussions were vital in situating feminists as willing participants in and even leaders of the peace movement that was soon to emerge. Moreover, if Petra Kelly and others claimed that the importance of women’s equal rights paled in comparison with the pursuit of weapons reductions, many activists asserted that the peace movement united feminists in a way that even the protest against §218 couldn’t achieve. Further still, vast new populations constituted themselves as “feminists”—if often in contradiction with one another—and the term took on a far more generally positive affect from that point forward. In the context finally of this perceived positive “feminization” of society, the Green party first achieved national stature, promoting inter alia both disarmament and feminism, as linked issues. Yet, if Lawrence Wittner considers the international movement to have been essential in preventing the use of nuclear weapons, and if in turn this movement helped inspire the largest worldwide single-day demonstration, on February 15, 2003, against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, vital at the very least in cementing the German government’s anti-war position, we might note at the same time that the West German and other European protestors in the 1980s were not able to dissuade politicians from deployment of intermediate-range missiles. Though it may be suggested that peace activists could hardly have done more, we might examine the rhetoric of the activists to consider what strategies seem to have been more and less efficacious. Alongside recognition of this remarkably salutary outcome of a population struck by a fear of total destruction, we must also consider some of the difficult discursive tactics that marked the movement’s rhetoric—remarkably consistent across many populations—and its sometimes potentially self-defeating aspects. While some of these discourses may be observed in other national contexts, others appear specific to the West German case.


4 Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, who it is believed won re-election in 2002 on an anti-war platform, was active in the peace movement of the early 1980s, as recent articles in the German press have noted. Compare too Cooper, p. 157.
Military Service as a Source of Women’s Empowerment?

Coming out of the experience of 1960s “APO” (extraparliamentary organization) activism—which constituted itself in some respects against the pacifist “Easter marchers” and other contemporary peace activists, although the concept originated with the Easter marchers themselves—some early feminists adopted a rather negative view of contemporary pacifist organizations. In this context, Alice Schwarzer’s 1978 column in Emma advocating requisite military service for women as well as men, taking seriously suggestions of the contemporary minister of defense Hans Apel, represented an understandable response against assumptions concerning peace as a “women’s issue.” Simultaneously, however, in the course of the 1970s, the eco- and anti-nuclear power (AKW) movements began to remove a perceived gender stigma as well as other impediments to focusing on the growing threat to peace. A “feminised” image of the activist, encompassing men as well as women, drew increasing feminist women’s support for and indeed leadership of the emergent peace movement of the late 1970s, connected as well to a broad vision of the links between “everyday violence” (domestic abuse, rape, and gendered power relations more generally) and war, beginning already in the early and mid-1970s. Thus, the firestorm of disapproval that greeted Schwarzer’s column from many feminist quarters—far more heated than to one expressing similar sentiments just a few years earlier—reflected evolving thinking concerning women’s relation to war, peace, violence, the German state, and geopolitics.

If “APOler” on the whole eschewed explicit peace activism in the 1960s and early ’70s, the new peace movement drew on a long if uneven postwar trajectory, as later peace activists were at pains to point out; this pattern continues even now, as Karlheinz Lipp’s useful recent work demonstrates. Even as the Struggle for Democracy and Disarmament (Kampf für Demokratie und Abrüstung, KfDA) experienced isolation from the well-publicized German politics associated with the Social Democratic Students Organization (SDS), 1969 marked the beginning of peace research (Friedensforschung) in the BRD and, more generally, the “mainstreaming” of the peace question. Closely related to Ostpolitik (policy toward East Germany and the Eastern bloc) and new enthusiasm for blunting the edges of the Cold War, as well as to new attention to Nazism and World War II, as reflected in Willy Brandt’s famous “fall to the knees,” peace research in its myriad manifestations brought the “peace question” to an unprecedented centrality in the Federal Republic by the early 1970s—if still within a somewhat narrow demographic. Not long after Helmut Schmidt’s assumption of the chancellorship in 1974, however, West German alongside West European foreign policy took an explicit turn away from this broader intellectual endeavor, along with a step back from the path of arms reduction as the best single strategy to preserve European safety, from the “White Book” on medium-range missiles and the 1977 “Neutron Bomb Affair,” to

6 See particularly Dieter Senghaas: Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedenslosigkeit, Frankfurt 1969. The activities of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (DGFK) and other “peace institutes” were broad and prolific.
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Schmidt’s London speech of the same year calling on U.S. President Carter to agree to missiles on West German soil. Peace researchers responded with redoubled effort, producing an endless proliferation of pacifist publications and engendering public discussion, drawing together issues of means to peace maintenance, deterrence strategies, images of the “enemy” (Feindbilder), everyday violence, and conditions in the Third World. For his part, Schmidt demonstrated little regard at this point for the rising public concern, or for that of his own party colleagues, pushing ahead within NATO for a rearmament (Nachrüstung) alongside disarmament. In the minds of many, this was linked with Defense Minister Apel’s announcement of a prospective policy requiring women’s military service, thereby fulfilling a more or less dormant clause in the 1968 “emergency laws.” While the latter foray did not go far in the end, and while Schmidt came to distance himself to some degree, publicly at least, from his earlier enthusiasm for “rearmament” (Nachrüstung), in December 1979 efforts concerning new build-up came to fruition, with NATO announcement of a “double-track” policy, combining arms reduction with “deterrence” in the form of medium-range missiles to counter new Soviet SS–20s, on West European and specifically West German territory.

It was this announcement that most immediately precipitated the remarkable spate of protest throughout much of western Europe; in West Germany groups as diverse and cross-cutting as the Evangelical church, the anti-AKW and eco-movements, the German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP), and the broader feminist movement collectively took the lead in organizing sustained mass protest in the next few years. For many new peace activists, this seemed of a piece with the bellicose rhetoric of the new American president, Ronald Reagan, beginning already in early 1981. Some six thousand local initiatives sprouted, representing intense and, in principle, strictly antihierarchical political or-

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ganization, sponsoring thousands of actions tiny and enormous; these actions reflected the collective lessons of the citizens’ initiative movement and other New Social Movements that had developed in the course of the 1970s, but boasted a sense of mass support beyond what these movements had ever before enjoyed. Following on two years of “monster demonstrations,” bringing in over half a million at a time including in October 1981 and October 1982, the “people’s rally” of October 1983, held simultaneously in four cities, brought together one million West German participants; related events in the subsequent week brought in two to four million more. This was the zenith of the movement’s strength, however: with the Bundestag’s approval of missile deployment despite the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) official party line, the movement lost its energy, and became again associated with more marginal protest. This resounding political defeat seemed to realize many activists’ worst fears concerning power relations, precisely those with which the activists had tried to grapple.

To understand both these successes and failures, we may look inter alia to the origins of the West German feminist movement. Discussions among early activists reveal tensions concerning essential gender characteristics. Among the movement’s initial spurs were concerns about the lack of child care, a typical “women’s issue,” but one that emerged at least in part from the experience that lack of good child care alternatives kept women from political and other public activity, the latter a challenge to existing gender roles. The organization of women as such reflected a difference of experience at least based on gender, but feminists differed in their view of how mutable this difference was, and whether, in an ideal world, the need for separate women’s organization might be transcended, indeed precisely in part by such organizations’ work. Resistance to the idea that women were intrinsically more interested than men in “peace work” undoubtedly contributed throughout the 1970s to most feminists’ disinterest in the West German Women’s Peace Movement (WFFB). Women coming out of the New Left demonstrated still less interest than their male counterparts in the pacifist “Easter marcher” movement—here perhaps as much effect as cause of that movement’s overwhelmingly male composition, though the APO was initially hardly less so. “Peace” was perceived then as a narrow issue, despite the Fight for Disarmament’s (KfA) addition of “Democracy” to its goals and name in 1968. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, New Left activists debated violence and politics at every level, but certainly there was no strong commitment dividing along lines of gender against violence as a means of politics.

8 How organizing as women might help ultimately transcend the need to organize as women or rather further instantiate its necessity is an issue of longstanding debate; compare Joan Scott: Only Paradoxes to Offer. French Feminists and the Rights of Man, Cambridge, Mass. 1996.
9 Gisela Notz has identified this as a generational shift; I emphasize here some of the sources of this shift. Compare Notz: Klara Maria Fassbinder (1890–1974) and Women’s Peace Activities in the 1950s and 1960s, in: Journal of Women’s History 13, 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 98–123; compare also Irene Stöhr: Phalanx der Frauen? Wiederausrüstung und Weiblichkeit in Westdeutschland 1950–1957, in: Christine Eißler/Ruth Seifert (eds.): Soziale Konstruktion. Militär und Geschlechterverhältnisse, Münster 1999, pp. 87–204. This concern clearly continued; compare e.g. Nein, nein, nein!, in: Frauen auf die Barrikaden, 1 (1982), pp. 41–43, as well as other pieces in this issue.
For many women activists, this discussion included both refuting any notion that women were less subject than men to violent police action during public political expression, and eschewing the idea that women were qua women opposed to carrying out violence themselves. The numbers of female violent activists, and the proportionally still greater uproar over female terrorists in the media and in public discussion, speaks to questions among activists and more broadly concerning the relation of women and political and other violence throughout the 1970s. For these former reasons among others, female New Left activists showed themselves on the whole little drawn to explicitly pacifist movements—despite their clear investment in protest against the Viet Nam war, as well as against police brutality at home. Here they were joined by their male counterparts, who also seemed little interested in emphasizing their support for “peace” per se, in part for precisely the same gendered reasons, i.e., that support for peace as such was perceived as part of some kind of immature, ineffectual, and feminized political vision. At the same time, German representation of the Vietnamese victim of American aggression was (as elsewhere, including in the U.S.) almost universally portrayed as a civilian peasant woman with child, emphasizing through the gendered imagery vulnerability, “victimizability,” and powerlessness that required West Germans to protest on her behalf.

It was inter alia concern for the self-perpetuating effects of such a portrayal of women, as hapless, helpless victims only, that seemed to spur Alice Schwarzer’s June 1978 column in Emma, suggesting that, if men were required to serve in the Bundeswehr, far from serving some distinct women’s service, women must absolutely do the same. The desire to commu-

10 Compare Marion Schreiber: Die Frauen in der RAF, in: Spiegel (11 May 1981); “Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort”. Sympathisanten und sogenannte Sympathisanten III. Die Hochschulen, in: Der Spiegel 43 (October 1977), pp. 203–236; and articles in leading organs from Stern to Die Welt to Bild. See also support for such figures as Ulrike Meinhof and Astrid Proll in the pages of Emma, Courage, and other women’s papers that did not on the whole support violent activism; writers and editors indeed presented mainstream journalists’ ascription of support for such violence by “women” and “feminists.” Compare Alice Schwarzer: Terroristinnen, in: Emma (October 1977), p. 5; Solidarität mit Astrid Proll, in: Hamburger Frauenzeitung (February 1979), pp. 24–72; and Frauen und Terrorismus, in: Frauen auf die Barrikaden, (June/July 1981), pp. 43–44. Women demonstrating demanding Proll’s release from solitary confinement held signs bearing “wer hat Angst vor Astrid Proll,” as had Schwarzer challenging men with the idea that they feared these strong women.

11 Compare author’s interview with anonymous interviewee #9, July 2002, who treats student and APO activists as quite distinct from “Easter marchers”; also author’s interview with Eva Quistorp, May 2003, in which Quistorp argued that, as an “Easter marcher” and peace activist, she felt shut out of APO circles and activities in the 1960s, although the idea of an extraparliamentary movement came originally from the Easter marchers.

12 Compare the unidentified photograph of an anguished-looking North Vietnamese mother with child that graced SDS and New Left newspapers in the late 1960s, along with reproductions of Nick Ut’s image of Kim Phuc, running naked alongside other children and women from a burning village; see likewise the hand-drawn American “Vietnam Summer 1967” poster, depicting a terrified Vietnamese woman running with her baby. Important exceptions include the iconic photograph by Eddie Adams of an American G.I. with a gun held to the head of a Vietcong soldier.

13 Alice Schwarzer: Frauen ins Militär, in: Emma (June 1978), p. 5; see also the follow-up column in Emma (October 1979), 5. The Bundeswehr’s call for female military service provoked widespread media and public debate on the subject, not covered here. Schwarzer herself wrote on the issue already in
nicate that women were not distinctly and essentially pacifist, moreover, was tied together with the longstanding concern that citizenship was perceived as tied to military service, and that those groups that did not participate in such service would never be fully counted as citizens. To be sure, Schwarzer hastened to add, “if she were a man, she would refuse to serve,” she would be a conscientious objector, and hoped other women would join her. But, she noted, “I have also learned that weapons are power, and how very closely the violence of weapons and masculine craziness (Männlichkeitswahn) are fused together.” “The men’s military,” she concluded, was the “most extreme expression of the division of labor between men and women,” and that “it must be the fundamental demand for women to have entry into all arenas of power…” In other words, she felt, this was an opportunity for feminists that trumped pacifists’ concerns, and, while women could certainly lead a peace movement as successfully as they could participate in military combat, this was for the moment at odds with the interests of feminism. Schwarzer elaborated these views still further in a column of the following year, even as discussion of potential new NATO weapons deployments continued apace.

The response to this column within and outside feminist communities was both immediate and extended, intense and conflicted, coming most vociferously and most voluminously from opponents of Schwarzer’s view. Thousands took part in political actions against Defense Minister Apel’s proposal and explicitly against Schwarzer’s column, calling out “We won’t fit under any helmet” and “Contergan, Seveso, AKW—we women say no way.” Negative responses continued apace well into the early 1980s, and demonstrate the degree to which Apel’s original comment, which he so happily watched Alice Schwarzer pick up, backfired beyond his worst nightmare. Much of the generally Social Democratic-allied media took Schwarzer to task, segments of it purporting explicitly or implicitly to write from “feminist” interests. (Christian Democrat- or CDU/CSU-associated media outlets had an even greater feeding frenzy with Schwarzer’s assertions.) Writing in Stern magazine, editor Ingrid Kolb claimed hostilely that Schwarzer had through her piece completely marginalized herself from true feminists by so badly representing their interests. In the pages of Der Spiegel, editor-in-chief Rudolf Augstein took Schwarzer to task in offensive terms in a dozen different

1974, though she was substantially ignored at that point. Women’s Service was a piece of the 1968 West German emergency laws, and, like the other aspects of those laws, was seen to lend itself all too well to a National Socialist world view. West Berlin of course had no military service requirement, for either women or men.


16 Ingrid Kolb: zur Diskussion, in: Stern (16 November 1978), p. 272. German courts also had determined only weeks earlier that Schwarzer’s views did not represent those of “all women”, in her suit precisely against Stern magazine, for sexually objectifying representations of women.
columns—reflecting the ongoing conflicts over the issue within the SPD. Then-dissident Social Democrat Egon Bahr ran an election campaign ad (reproduced in Emma) arguing that peace was more important than equal rights—though not indicating whether it also was more important than all other political issues. Feminist responses were primarily of three types: first, those who disputed that women’s position as soldiers would render them as “equal” contributors to the nation, that it would ascribe women greater societal power, or that it would “feminize” the military itself in salutary fashion. Pointedly visible in letters to Emma from readers as well as in other feminist newspapers, these detractors argued pragmatically, often on the basis of experience with brothers, boyfriends, etc., against the idea that women’s entry into the military was a solution to their lack of power. Observers commented on the destructive effects of German military service, even outside of wartime, noting that at the bottom ranks soldiers were hardly accorded power, rather that they experienced abject objectification by their superiors, that the Bundeswehr was a hotbed of “racism,” “antisemitism,” and “fascism,” and that the experience rendered all too many male soldiers “kaputt.” Secondly and relatedly, feminists argued against the notion that women in the military would help in mitigating everyday violence, including in its exercise primarily against women, both as routinized physical violence and as the structural violence of patriarchy; these respondents argued rather that the attendant increased militarization of society would only exacerbate “everyday violence.”

17 See e.g. Der Spiegel 46 (1978). Whether or not warranted, personal attacks on Alice Schwarzer were regular fare in many segments of the German press. Compare also Winfried Maß: Der Männerschreck, oder: Wer hat Angst vor Alice Schwarzer?, in: Stern 37 (1975) (the title named after Schwarzer’s own “Diskussionsreise”); Wolfgang Röhl: Ausgeflippt!, in: ibidem (September 1975); Klaus Rainer Röhle: Warum Alice Schwarzer spinnt, in: das da; and the humorous cover of the Frankfurter Frauenblatt (November 1979).
18 Reproduced in Burmeister, p. 28.
19 Compare Pro und Contra. Frauen ins Militär?, in: Emma (August 1978), pp. 28–31; and Militär, in: Emma (November 1979), 63; see also readers’ letters in Courage (January 1979, p. 58, March 1979, p. 58; November 1979, pp. 66–67; December 1979, p. 59); Frauen zum Militär?, in: ibid (February 1979), 48; Frauen in der Bundeswehr, in: ibid (September 1979); Militär (II): “Zivile Dienst” and related pieces (October 1979), pp. 21–29, as well as discussions in dozens of other smaller women’s newspapers and newsletters, including Frauen ins Militär, in: Frankfurter Frauenblatt 2 (October 1978); Bewußt “arbeitslos” sein?, in: ibid; Offener Brief an die “Emma,” in: diskofo 30 (January 1979); Frauen zum Bund Nein Danke!, in: Hamburger Frauen-Zeitung (March 1979), p. 22—which suggests that women in the military was no strong step, but made women rather utterly submissive. Frauen auf die Barrikade particularly took Schwarzer to task, on this as well as other issues. See ongoing address of the question e.g. in Frauenzentrum Frankfurt-Bockenheim/Gruppe “Frauen zum Bund—Nein Danke”; Frauen in die Bundeswehr. Diskussion im Bockenheimzentrum, in: Frankfurter Frauenblatt (February 1980), p. 22; the exchange of letters to the Hamburger Frauen-Zeitung, 5 (Fall 1983); Nein, nein, nein!, p. 41; Press release, Frauen für den Frieden, 19 February 1982, concerning the upcoming peace march and the question of women’s military service, in: APO archive, File Friedensbewegung 1982; and other documents through the early 1980s, as well as contributions to Eva Quistorp (ed.): Frauen für den Frieden. Analysen, Dokumente und Aktionen aus der Frauenfriedensbewegung, Frankfurt/M. 1982, particularly Section III, Gleiches Recht zum Unrecht? Kriegsdienstverweigerung statt Kriegsdienst, pp. 81–95.
20 Pro und Contra, p. 28.
Finally, a broad range of self-described feminists and others argued against the notion that equal rights were more important than peace, or that feminism and peace were both served through women's entry into the Bundeswehr: rather they believed that both interests were thereby directly or indirectly compromised. The collective publishing "rival" feminist magazine Courage, who initially ignored Schwarzer's column, at least in the pages of that magazine, declared that women had no interest in subjecting themselves to the worst abuses of the "men's state" (Männerstaat), nor to acting on the agenda of that state in carrying out its violent vision against others. "Long live the consistent liberality of killing and getting killed!", the "Courage-women" drily noted.²¹ Writers for and to Courage claimed that war, the threat of war, and even the preparation for war was unequivocally bad for women, as adumbrated in a special issue of the magazine on women and World War II, as well as in successive pieces on women and nuclear power, military and "peaceful." Contributors to Courage—along with dozens of women's groups and the congress of "Women's Movements Against Nuclear Power and the Military"—began by the late 1970s to establish women's particular interest in pursuing "peace," including in the broadest sense: celebrating their unwillingness as a group to support politics by violence and overwhelming power plays represented by war and by "this stupid men's society" generally.²² Some feminists embraced the more essentialist view that women's innate "maternalism" informed this stance.²³ To be sure, "mothers of small children" as well as self-identified "housewives" had already played an important—and politically successful—role in anti-nuclear power protests in Markolsheim, Gorleben, and Wyhl, and self-described feminists increasingly adopted these populations as their own. Leading feminists such as Helke Sander had from the beginning espoused the view of women's special role as mothers; this view now contributed to the perceptions of many concerning women and the military. Throughout the 1970s, moreover, feminist outlets broadly emphasized women's particular experience of violence both in war situations and in the course of "everyday violence," from forced sex in marriage to violence perceived manifested every moment in language, an essentialism thereby forced onto them.²⁴ The range of feminist magazines and newsletters ran series on this question, while the Socialist Women's Federation held conferences and workshops throughout these years on the issue of the domination of women through sex. Dorothee Brockmann de-

²² This expression from Renate Umlandt, letter in: Pro und Contra, p. 29.
manded a “conscientious objection” to this “everyday war.”

By the late 1970s, feminists began to relate this phenomenon directly to “men’s” violence in pursuing war. It was in this changing environment, alongside burgeoning non-violent coalitions across a range of perceived related issues, that small numbers of former peace activists found success in advancing their concerns as an explicitly feminist cause.

Emma did not any more than other feminist organs shy away from identifying women as a group as being on the receiving end of violence perpetrated by men. Indeed some of its publications on the topic prefigured the rhetorical strategies of some of the peace activists. From Schwarzer’s perspective, acknowledgement of this everyday violence was not in conflict with her column, but rather completely consistent with her point: that women’s role as soldiers, as potential or actual perpetrators of violence, would render them as a whole less subject to such violence because appearing less vulnerable and powerless. Yet, one might argue, the rhetoric concerning women’s victimization in the pages of Emma as elsewhere may have simultaneously reinforced this “victim” status, in a fashion both potentially politically ineffectual and otherwise problematic. Emma ran a three-part series on rape, for example, drawing on Susan Brownmiller’s text from Against our Will, looking at the act as both an accepted part of war and part of women’s everyday experience. The text was embellished with photographic images not out of the original source. These images were not random: they included in one segment a photograph of a Vietnamese woman abused by American soldiers; one of Jewish women attacked by Nazi storm troopers; and one of German women raped by the Red Army at the end of World War II. However intended, it is worth noting that the drawing of equivalences between these three populations worked potentially to play on many Germans’ views of themselves as the victims of National Socialism, a view so powerful in the early postwar period, in a fashion that got reproduced with surprising regularity in the late 1960s, as protestors compared themselves to Jews subjected to beatings, persecution, concentration camps, and pogroms. From our present perspective, these parallels can be discomfiting. There is no question that German women’s experience of mass rape after World War II formed a heinous and significant example of violence against women. But, at the time—and at least into the 1960s and 1970s—the experience also formed the basis for those not directly attacked as well to adopt a rhetoric of “total victimization.” It was in this period that many feminists claimed that, just as one should trust no one over thirty because s/he was potentially a Nazi, so women should trust no man because all men were potential rapists.26 Paradoxically the experience of German women in the initial postwar also became a means by which Germans, men and women alike, identified themselves with the German woman, precisely through this

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“feminization” as the embodiment of this national victimization. This, it seems, was at odds with the intended sense of Schwarzer’s column concerning military service. Thus, Schwarzer and her feminist detractors alike became caught in a conundrum about women’s perceived weakness and potential strength, and what each quality seemed, sometimes paradoxically, to offer.

However precisely related to this rhetoric of victimization, once more in the period of the late 1970s and 1980s, great numbers of men as well as women identified with a kind of “feminized” language in identifying themselves as Germans—though feminists were naturally somewhat skeptical about men’s real transformation. And this too played an essential role in preparing West German women and men alike for the new virtues of joining a peace movement. This was a fascinating twist on the now decades-old trading of barbs between Americans and Germans, by which Germans characterized Americans as blundering “bully boys,” while Americans looked at Germans, along with other Europeans, as “soft” and “feminized.” The exception was Americans’ view of Germans in the National Socialist period. In the immediate postwar period, Germans in the American and other Western zones took on the aspect of a dependent wife, or of a dutiful daughter to an authoritarian father (an ironic role for the U.S. under the circumstances), as rhetoric in that period suggested. By the 1960s, many West Germans came to chafe publicly under such roles, resenting heavy-handed American pressures. By the late 1970s, West German left activists adopted simultaneously a more “feminized” affect, as discussed, including as evidenced through the incipient Green movement and its constituent issues. In turn, even before Reagan’s presidency, when Schmidt was rather pushing Carter on NATO “rearmament,” peace protestors, including the new group Women for Peace (Frauen für den Frieden), often cast their concerns through the identity of the abused German wife, or mistreated daughter, both victimized by and facing up against a rough-and-ready American president riding roughshod over West German interests and will; this too would form a powerful image in the peace movement of the early 1980s. Thus many emergent and longstanding peace activists alike came to adopt a gendered language of foreign policy and national identity, which played a key role in galvanizing German public opinion on the issue; interestingly, this language often mirrored that of supporters of the “double-track” policy.

27 Compare Lorenz Knorr: Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik, Köln 1983, especially pp. 182–196. This rhetoric is reflected in all its facets in Die neue Friedensbewegung – Aufmarsch gegen die Rüstung, in: Der Spiegel 25 (15 June 1981); see likewise John Vinocur: The German Malaise, in: The New York Times Magazine (15 November 1981). Both point up the language of this “softness” as a “sickness” (adopted ironically by activists themselves, as in the contagious “Dutch disease”); and of this softness as including a “softness on communism,” another means by which critics attempted to discredit peace activists. At various points, it seemed important to put forward a very traditional “masculine” male face as well, as counterbalance: I would argue Bundeswehrgeneral Gert Bastian’s presence at rallies offered legitimacy for this as well as other reasons, alongside perceived “softer” men, including particularly male Christian religious leaders.

Women, Gender, and the “New Pacifism”

This was then some of the background that would inform groups of self-identified feminists’ interest in joining and even taking the lead in the new, burgeoning peace movement, the “new pacifism,” following the December 1979 NATO double-track determination, explicitly as women, and even in the new or newly prominent all-women peace groups. One should be clear that many of those in the latter came to feminism through their ongoing work in the peace movement, rather than vice versa. Indeed a key element of the calculus of feminists and the peace movement was the enormous broadening of those who constituted themselves as feminists, supporting the assertion about the usefulness of the peace movement for feminism. These latter groups, such as Women for Peace as well as Women against War and Militarism (Frauen gegen Krieg und Militarismus) were naturally all the more hostile to Schwarzer’s suggestions, and argued, now to some greater reception, that, far from arguing to join West German armed forces, women had a special role in forging a new call for peace. In 1979, Christine Rattinger, executive committee member of the Federal Union of the German Peace Society—United Opponents of Military Service (Bundesverband der Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft -Vereinigte Kriegsdienstgegnerinnen), pointed to the contradiction she perceived in Schwarzer’s call for women “to fight for freedom,” claiming that the “militarism” enveloped in Schwarzer’s own word choice could only bring forth further violence. This play on the paradox of “fighting for peace” and the conflict of confronting “power” with “strength” reflected a major trope of the new movement—and further evidence of the difficult tensions the new movement raised concerning power relations, victimization, and violence.

To be sure, other constituent populations of the emergent peace movement, including ecological, anti-AKW, communist, and Christian groups, constituted their mission as embracing morality, sensitivity, nurturing, emotional awareness, and support of life in all forms, characteristics customarily constituted as “feminine.” This affect too helped make it acceptable for feminists more broadly to support this new movement—even, paradoxically, to act as strong, forceful leaders. That is, though about eschewing power, peace no longer looked like “just” a “women’s issue.” This was so despite the more essentialist connections made at least rhetorically between the women’s and peace movements by some groups such as the Democratic Women’s Initiative (Demokratische Fraueninitiative), which emphasized the need for “peaceful women” to take the lead against “aggressive men.” Thus, two tensions were already clear in the movement from its early stages: first, how closely linked these “feminine” qualities were linked (only) to physical women; and, secondly, how one could embrace these characteristics and simultaneously adopt a strong stance against a set of dominating and forceful powers. Dorothee Brockmann asked in the pages of Courage how viewing war as pa-


triarchal and a product of the "men's state" could be distinguished from such gender stereotypes.\textsuperscript{31} Jutta Ditfurth noted however that women had been the voice of "militancy" in the anti-AKW movement, and could serve the same function in the peace movement, thereby refuting gender stereotypes. Others asserted that non-violent protest did not make one passive and soft, but reflected rather a very rebellious form of communication.\textsuperscript{32} All these exhortations seemed imperative to adopting and asserting the value of "positive" "feminine" qualities across gender lines, while rejecting the need for this to reflect a position of victimization—or at least of particularized victimization—and lack of power. This was a potentially workable solution—but one might argue that it did not always work.

These rhetorical strategies, often in tension with one another, were at the same time essential in launching and maintaining the movement as it rose rapidly to mass proportions in the early months of 1980, among a remarkably broad swath of self-identified feminists—and other women—as well as among huge numbers of men. While earlier scholars have taken up the question of rhetoric in this movement, as for example in the fine collection edited by Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke, the gendered nature of this language and its conflicted nature in this period, for example in relation to power and powerlessness has not been discussed beyond that by contemporaries themselves.\textsuperscript{33} Activists across vastly different backgrounds used these remarkably consistent and tightly interwoven rhetorical themes both consciously and unconsciously, to express honest feelings, including of enormous and understandable fear, to motivate others to protest, and to influence policy-makers at home and abroad. Some of the themes that emerge vary notably with the discursive practices of American peace activists, with whom their German counterparts claimed to identify closely, though there are of course some overlaps, including precisely in the way that some of the most significant pieces of the American movement grew out of segments of the feminist movement.\textsuperscript{34} There are themes that West German peace activists share more closely with American officials and politicians than with fellow activists: the parties simply approached these ideas differently, as in the idea of the United States as a "maverick" and a "strong man," which U.S. officials viewed overall positively, while peace activists saw as negative. There are great similarities of rhetoric moreover with the movements of other European countries, including England and the Netherlands. But there are also themes that come specifically out of

\textsuperscript{31} Brockmann, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{33} Maruhn/Wilke (eds.), particularly Josef Kelin: Zur Semantik der Nachrüstungsdebatte, pp. 49–65; as well as Jochen Staadt: Die SED und die "Generale für den Frieden", pp. 123–140. To be sure, this gendered aspect has been treated concerning peace activism more generally; compare essays in Benjamin Ziemann (ed.): Perspektiven der Historischen Friedensforschung, Essen 2002; also Journal of Women's History 13, 3 (Fall 2001), special issue on gender and pacifist movements.
West German thinking.\textsuperscript{35} These themes are remarkably consistent across this extremely varied movement, as well as in West German popular cultural manifestations broadly. It goes without saying that these themes were as often a source of disagreement on issues within the movement and its numerous constituent groups as of unity, but they provided a common language of the protest. Some reflected the positive transformation in West German political culture and ideas of democratic participation that had taken place over the preceding decade and a half.\textsuperscript{36} Others seem to reflect still a past not yet “overcome”: unresolved issues concerning power, domination, victimization, and German identity emerging from the Nazi period.

These themes in the rhetoric include the following. First, there is the gendered nature of the nuclear threat, conceived above all as “male craziness” (Männlichkeitswahn), against which perceived feminine qualities must triumph. As with all these discourses, gender operates here both at the level of “men” versus “women” and as masculine and feminine qualities, which anyone can—and/or is forced to—adopt as their own, regardless of physical body. In this context, the “enemy,” most often perceived as “the U.S.,” or as the troika Reagan-Haig-Weinberger, was aggressive, and crazy with power, which “he” exercised in part as a consequence of perceived threat and “shameful” vulnerability, in response to which he must demonstrate his truly superior power by crushing those who challenge him. This power lust, activists asserted, rendered the U.S. inimical even to its presumed allies—and even purposefully so. Thus as editor of the Kor-Inform newsletter Fritz Teppich described it, “So a North American nuclear war in Europe, by us. That means that all our deaths are part of Washington’s equation.”\textsuperscript{37} For its part, the West German government responded with “submission,” as some activists characterized it, confirming a destructive dependency—and indeed precisely the vulnerability that the U.S. sought to refute.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore the feminized “we” must, in response, both embrace vulnerability and demonstrate a different kind of power—or “strength,” as opposed to power.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, the relation between the “we” and the aggressive

\textsuperscript{35} Stern magazine among others argued that the simultaneous unique and unifying theme of the West German movement was its nationalism: compare issue Der neue Patriotismus, Deutschtunde (October 1981), which identified nationalism as the source of the peace movement’s “anti-Americanism.” Certainly there were strongly nationalist elements to the movement, but such a generalized characterization seems unhelpful. Compare variously Dan Diner: Die “nationale” Frage in der Friedensbewegung. Ursprünge und Tendenzen, in: Rudolf Steinweg (ed.): Die neue Friedensbewegung, Analysen aus der Frauenforschung, Frankfurt a.M. 1982, pp. 86–112; and “Gegen Ost und West”, “die nationale Frage und die Konsequenz daraus ...,” in: Texte zur anti-nato-woche Oune 1982), APO Archive, File Friedensbewegung 1982.


\textsuperscript{37} Kor-Inform, 3 (24 January 1981). Teppich adds, “The danger that our fellow humans [here, American citizens, compared to Germans in the 1930s, bd]—as already once under Hitler—might be duped by the anti-peace right in the coming election must be averted.” Thomas Rochon correlates anti-Americanism with willingness to join the peace movement in: Rochon, p. 39. He also however finds a correlation of this group with a more critical than average stance toward the Soviet Union, pp. 40.


\textsuperscript{39} See e.g. Ellen Diederich: Frauen gegen Militarismus und Krieg, in: Frankfurter Frauen Blatt (June
enemy character bore more than ever the aspect of a bad marriage, in which West Germans played the role of battered wife to an overbearing husband, who bullies her as part of his “protection” of her. This discourse, in which masculinity and femininity were fairly fixed but not to actual sexed bodies, was mapped onto the co-existing discussion especially among feminists concerning “everyday violence”: from rape and domestic abuse to the structural violence of patriarchy itself, in which men and women were figured in far more essentialist fashion, the latter indeed prisoners of their physical vulnerabilities.

Other related elements also make frequent appearance in the texts and parole of the period. Taking off from the “abusive husband,” rockets are readily represented as phallic, poised as if to penetrate not Eastern Europe or Russia but rather a vulnerable West Germany. (It is fascinating how little the Soviet Union figures as a player at all in this “family drama.”) The rockets get figured as evidence of “boys” “superhero” fantasies, characterisable by not only “super powers” but also by a love of technology, which gets cast as inherently bad in this discourse. For many activists, this could be counteracted through their feminine closer connection to, understanding of, and source of power from “nature,” broadly conceived. For many devout Christians, this was achievable by emulating Christ—figured here in the character of a soft but powerful woman. In either case, as some envisioned it, protestors were to draw on “mystical” powers as a way to fight off the deathly threat, weapons that kill “even without war.” Simultaneously, women were “responsible” for exercising their greater “rationality”—a quality they possessed precisely because of their proximity to and recognition of “emotion”—and therefore they specifically must be brought out of the isolation of their homes and into the place of public, collective expression. In this context too, protestors cast their lot with, and assumed an identity with, the “Third World,” beaten down by a rampaging United States (or, rarely, by the brawling “superpowers” together), and sometimes also thereby with the victims of the Nazi past. By elaborating on these themes, I intend in no way to disparage the remarkable contemporary movement, nor to criticize use of these images and metaphors, which reflected genuine experience; certainly I am not defending the actions of American officials in this era. I find it valuable to identify these images, however, both in the context of understanding how such elements functioned in politics broadly and specifically in “grassroots” movements, as well as of investigating a West German sense of self in this era, including as related to the longer history of German identity, and certainly to consider their broader political implications, including as both conceptually and strategically problematic.


Rhetorics of War

Among the many categories of activists, peace protest in the early 1980s was cast overwhelmingly in terms of a battle of one group against far more powerful, indeed mortal, enemy, whose sheer love of power, alongside a simultaneous fear of vulnerability, compelled that enemy to aggressively pursue ends potentially so violent as to ensure “mutually assured destruction.”41 The enemy was for many of these activists the United States—or the United States government—West Germany’s closest diplomatic ally and putative “protector” since establishment of the West German state. This was so even before Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981; moreover, the rhetoric of many activists seemed to cast Reagan’s foreign and military policy retroactively, as if he had already been president before this point. To be sure, Ronald Reagan’s plans to cease arms talks, alongside the already-planned Pershing missile deployment, and, by 1984, his vision of “Star Wars” were mortally disturbing prospects for the nation that likely lay on the front lines of any Cold War nuclear interaction. Reagan’s assertion of the possibility of “limited nuclear war,” his “joke” that “bombing of the Soviet Union would begin in five minutes,” Haig’s misfired avowal that “some things were more important than peace” all understandably sent chills up West Germans’ spines. But it is fascinating to observe how singlemindedly attention was devoted to the United States, although it was Helmut Schmidt who pressed NATO over Jimmy Carter’s objections for the “double track” approach to relations with the Soviet Union.42 Only later did Schmidt retreat from this stance, at least rhetorically, in response to public opinion and party pressure. But his successor, Helmut Kohl, fully supported Reagan’s plans and worked to follow through on them in the foreign and domestic context. Yet, despite the CDU/CSU’s unapologetic stance on a nuclear arms race, neither Kohl nor his party (and only even rarely Franz-Josef Strauß) were almost ever identified in the role of enemy, object of fear, or even as addressee of the protest. NATO was treated consistently purely as a tool of U.S. domination. Occasionally protestors appealed to West German officials, particularly while Schmidt was still in power, to act as intermediaries between the West German populace and the United States—or, in effect, to act as West Germans’ deputy to Ronald Reagan, rather than as submissive servant to the latter.43 Though the laying of SS–20 missile sites within target range of Western Europe set off the

41 The term comes from the American movement, but was much discussed among West Germans—who saw however that the “mutual” regarded not necessarily Americans, but themselves, as a consequence of their country’s dubious diplomatic and military relationship with that country. Compare on the fear of vulnerability Johannes Theurer: Blutig, Blutig, in: Zitty 18 (1979), pp. 32.
42 The epigraph of this paper demonstrates a coupling of “Reagan-Haig-Weinberger” with “Schmidt-Apel,” but this was surprisingly rare. This is not to suggest that Carter was a man only of peaceful means: deploying neutron warheads for deterrence was his idea. Compare an interesting and provocative discussion of Carter’s own mingling of nuclear warheads and Christian morality in Bertram Gross: Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America, Boston 1998.
43 This was the message of the demonstrations in Bonn, particularly in October 1981. But many indicated their lack of expectations; compare Sölle: The Arms Race Kills, p. 73, p. 106; and Die Neue Friedensbewegung, which cites Günter Volkmar asserting that Bonn must “follow Cowboy Reagan’s line in lockstep.”
new arms build-up, and despite the invasion of Afghanistan, efforts to quash the Polish opposition organization Solidarność, and the break-up of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, even Leonid Brezhnev was almost never identified as the enemy in this narrative. This was so despite the extremely broad political spectrum represented by activists—and in spite of most activists’ insistence that, contrary to accusations, they were not communists. The DKP played a significant but not a unique role in the movement’s leadership. The power of identifying an outside enemy to unify those within the nation and within Europe, a strategy with a long pedigree, cannot be ignored as key to the success of peace activists’ clarion call.

So this enemy was “the United States,” or Reagan-Haig-Weinberger (though, it was sometimes disclaimed, not “the American people,” nor of course particularly those whose own peace movement West Germans at times proclaimed to emulate). Only in this context could a call to demonstrate with the words “We Want to be Friends of the American People” have such a startling impact, in contrast both to the perceived relation to the United States government and even to their actual existing relations with the U.S. population. Helmut Schmidt responded to early peace movement rhetoric by chiding, “Stop behaving as if the Americans were your enemies.” I have alluded to the long and well-documented trajectory of German (and European) ambivalence toward the United States. Contemporary West German descriptions of the U.S. both bore similarities to earlier rhetoric and reflected some new twists. The United States suffered a “craze for power,” and boasted a “monopoly of power” (which of course dismissed the entire premise of the Cold War), the two elements mutually informing and destructive. Frankfurter Rundschau journalist Anton Andreas Guha declared that U.S. was “grotesque” as a superpower, while Dorothee SöHe described “power”

44 See poster “Wir sind die Freunde des US-Volkes,” making a clear distinction with the American government, calling for a demonstration on 15 January 1981, reprinted in: Fritz Teppich (ed.): Flugblätter, p. 79; compare to a poster issued notably by the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) Charlottenburg, stating “We are afraid of a war! ... We want to stay partners with the Americans (Amerikaner), but: peace is the most important thing, Mr. Haig!,” included in ibid, p. 76.


as an “ersatz religion” for the Americans, for her, in contrast with true religion; this was a sign of their real “weakness.”

One coalition poster promoting the 1981 peace demonstration in Bonn argued against the “major power craziness and the merciless toughness demonstrated against all of those who get in the way of Washington’s interests. The new U.S. government under President Reagan . . . wants to lead the U.S. toward dominion (Herrschaft) over the entire world.”

This “power craze” played out, not against the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, but rather against West Germans, who thereby cast themselves as the direct potential victims of the U.S. To be sure, should Washington have launched medium-range missiles, West Germans would very likely have been the objects of a return Soviet strike. The notable point is that the Soviet Union fell out as an element altogether in this rhetoric—including as a possible “first striker.”

This hermetic two-sided relationship, West Germany versus the United States, was reinforced constantly by rhetoric of the weak and the strong—and by the “feminine” and the “masculine.” But how ought West Germans to act for their part? A speech by a cohort of women from Kassel at the June 1981 peace demonstration in Bonn, intimating parallels between the U.S./West German relationship and that between men and women, claimed, “War is always the subjugation of the weaker by the stronger. War is the attempt to re-establish unequal relations. War is pursued to re-establish power and impotence, to rearrange the powerful and powerless.”

Activist and group dynamics scholar Ute Volmeropined, “With security policy it’s about strength, weakness, superiority, inferiority, powerlessness, and dependency with regard to catastrophes and the danger of extermination. These symbols evoke in us images and emotions that don’t emerge from security policy, but rather have quite a different background.”

Petra Kelly noted that the only appropriate response was a “solidarity with all disenfranchised and oppressed of the world,” who must together demonstrate their “power.”

Yet: what was this power? As per the pre-movement debate, if it were the same as


48 Reprinted in Teppich (ed.): Flugblätter, p. 77. The poster was put out by the Judos, Jusos, and Evangelical Students, among others.

49 Of course weapons and weapons programs were regularly developed first by the United States, then followed by the Soviet Union. Compare Friedensalmanach WestBerlin, West Berlin 1982, pp. 33.


what the Americans practiced, even were it possible, would that not only represent a principle of "might makes right"?

Activists sought to spur their fellow citizens to action, claiming they must not allow themselves to be victimized; at the same time, they attempted to delineate carefully between "bad power" and "good power," or "power" versus "strength," or, finally, power through violence in contrast with power not derived through violence. Peace demonstrator and student of African history Michaela von Freyhold observed the relationships set up by Reagan's policy: of strength versus weakness, power as against powerlessness, imperviousness versus vulnerability. But, she proclaimed, moving seamlessly from "the feminine" to "female," women in particular must no longer act with "impotence and naivete." Activists of such varied backgrounds as Peggy Parnass, Gertrud Gumlich, Dorothee Sölle, and Hanne Birckenbach too all exhorted women specifically to "be courageous," "feel their own strength," and "take power": then they would be too powerful to be "victimized by men," as Birckenbach explicitly put it. Student of nuclear physics Rosemarie Rübsamen likewise collapsed the parallel relationships, so that "women" directly fought "the United States": women, she claimed, could never leave politics to the "leaders," as the latter represented only "the power of the ruling men's cliques." The appeal of this identification with the victimized but strong woman was enormous, as West Germans enamored of the figure of the "ruins woman" had already long revealed. This aspect appears far less visible in the peace movements of the U.S. and other European countries. This must be viewed as having played a very powerful and positive role in...
bring men and women alike into the movement, transcending a helpless paralysis. At the same time the role of "victim" continued, it seems, to play a rhetorically counterproductive role as well, rendering activists and "West Germans" more broadly as inherently weaker and dependent. Such identities corresponded of course to authentic sentiments among many West Germans; how the rhetoric could have played out otherwise is unclear.

In the rhetorical relationship between "male violence and war," West Germany consistently took the form of a victimized but enduring woman took on the aspect of an abused wife, who must either take a stance against a bullying husband, or risk fatal injury. An important element of this metaphor was the constant threat—and indeed continuous lower-level violence—wielded by the aggressor in this relationship, such that the threat was as violent as the reality. "People in the Third World War will then die not first with the war but rather already with armament." This "intimate enemy" was dangerous in his "craziness," indeed in his "mental illness." The United States was willing to sacrifice "us" in displays of macho bravado—a category that included West Germany and Europe—and women, children, and the handicapped. Egon Bahr claimed that, "The people," in turn, "are afraid of their protectors." Yet, pled activists, West Germans must not give in to this "bullying." If West German "men and women" "served" the United States—and "serviced" its rockets (!), as peace researcher Hanne Birckenbach put it, they must now snap out of this subservient role. Michaela von Freyhold decried most of all West German "willingness" to be a "victim" of U.S. policy, which would have its violent way with Europe, over which it claimed control; she relates this directly to women's experience. Economist Gerhard Kade spoke at the June 1982 demonstration urging activists to reject the U.S.'s aggressive and "threatening behavior." Others likened West Germans' response to girls' learned impotence, which must be


Für einen stürmischen Friedensherbst!, flyer of the Alternative Liste (AL), reprinted in: ibid, pp. 73–74; the flyer characterizes Ronald Reagan thus, quoting a Danish newspaper.

Sölle: Sonne, p. 62; compare Quistorp: Frauen gehen meilenweit.

Here he refers particularly to NATO; cited in: AL, Für einen stürmischen Friedensherbst!

Freyhold, 49; see also "here it is made apparent that the US wanted to limit a future nuclear war to the battle field of Europe," Aufruf zur Demonstration.

overcome. A flyer rallying participants to the 1981 anti-war day cited former American ambassador Paul Warnke, who divulged, “if I were a European, I wouldn’t allow this stationing [of weapons] . . .” So, the flyer continued, West Germans must pull themselves up and do something about this destructive and violating treatment. Yet, despite Birckenbach’s and von Freyhold’s plea, this rhetoric itself seemed to accept and reinstantiate the role of the U.S. as “protector,” desired or not, protecting or not, and in that sense seemed to preclude transcendence of that relationship. In some respects, the very sentiment of victimization that brought so many West Germans together became very difficult to transcend without resulting in a bursting of these new bonds.

To be sure, feminists and other peace activists, including men, demanded a “strong” response, which, though advocating compromise and peacefulness, would not fall victim to “women’s” conditioned need to compromise, and condoned rather appropriate conflict. Free University lecturer Herbert Ammon claimed U.S. officials were “primarily responsible” for the current political and military crisis, and demanded Helmut Schmidt relinquish his “passive” acceptance of the U.S. position to lead the Germans (an interesting view in light of Schmidt’s earlier leading role), and initiate a real separation of Germans and Europeans from the U.S. Heinrich Albertz urged “young Germans” to depart from their current passive and accepting stance to “defend the German people from danger.” The Christian initiative “Frauen wagen Frieden” (women risk peace) distributed at a Darmstadt seminar “Ten Questions about Peace—and How a Woman Can Answer them,” a sort of self-help guide and rally addressed simultaneously to women and, by implication, to West Germans and West German officials. In the same spirit, poet Angi Domdey penned a “love poem to her enemy.” “I like to argue,” the text announced, “and hit you with words in the face/until your self-possession breaks/but you won’t get me wirb a gun.” “That makes you aggressive/my idleness/okay,” the text continued, “hit back/but console me too/you low dog! Your power is my fear/that’s why I’ve got to be brave/your stupidity my destruction/why I gotta be smart/your hate my downfall.” Feminists drew links between patriarchy—or, effectively, “rape in marriage”—and West Germany’s subservient relation to the United States, in multiple ways.

65 Volmerg, p. 121, also 109; cf. Eva-Maria Epple/Cornelia Bauer-Buchrucker: Friedensanstifterinnen, in: Quistorp (ed.), Frauen, pp. 21f.; Gertrud Gumlich: Eine Widerstandsbewegung gegen die Ressigna-

66 Aufruf zur Demonstration.

67 Herbert Ammon: Die Friedensbewegung vor der deutschen Frage, in Koplik/Kelly (eds.), pp. 100–110. Ammon speaks explicitly of separation from both superpowers. Ammon was simultaneously ac-

68 Cited in Vinocur. Albertz claims this as a “patriotic duty” to defend “Germans.”


As Christian feminist peace activist Eva Quistorp characterized it, “peace in patriarchy is war for women.” Activists decried the “patriarchal death machine”—talking about both gendered society and West Germany/U.S. relations, as war, conflicts, and violence that endangered every day. In a speech on “Love and middle-range missiles,” leading feminist Helke Sander likewise pointedly drew these connections. Yet, by making the comparison with patriarchy, movement leaders intimated a very deep and tenacious set of structures and relationships that could scarcely be transcended in any short period of time. Clearly there were psychological elements involved. Many psychologists involved in the movement played on these arguments, eliding such metaphors with incidents of real family violence and fear within families, related to both domestic violence and the possibility of “mass extermination.” In this sense, the victimized must “learn” to “disobey,” must not fear, or feel “guilty” or “shameful” of, the potential effects of their own “non-violent resistance.” To be sure, this “lesson” had its domestic political parallel, in the form of a call to public action even among those who might have been otherwise inclined after the near civil war in West Germany, ending only shortly before in the “German autumn” of 1977.

Picking up on themes in the discussion of “everyday violence” in feminist circles in the late 1970s, Dorothee Sölle extended the discussion, to compare the relation of “the U.S.” and “West Germans” (note the unparallel structure) to that of the rapist and his victim. As writers for Emma had asserted already in the 1977 series on rape, citing Susan Brownmiller, “With rape, it’s not about desire, but rather about power. Men’s power over women, and power among men, who use it to shame the women of other [men]... This becomes especially clear in war time.” Yet, though already casting the significant relation as that, unevenly, between “women” and “men’s states,” that series spoke to women’s role as “booty,” to literal

71 Compare Freyhold, p. 49, who notes like others how rape acts not only metaphorically but quite literally to render comparable women’s position in war and in everyday life.


rape as a by-product of war, evidence of the “impotence of the conquered,” whereas in the newer rhetoric, the U.S. “raped” the vulnerable on its “own” side. Anna Malkowsky drew the connection between the metaphorical and real levels, as well as between the issue of women in the military and the new move to arms build-up, publishing an interview with a female soldier in the U.S. army, in which Malkowsky seems to push the interviewee to speak of the threat of rape as an important characteristic of her military life—as it was of life generally in the U.S.: “…on the streets in America it’s not any different.”

Activist and artist Christina Tröber drew the red thread of violence through the entirety of women’s experience, including by virtue of their physical characteristics, observing an entire “warlike environment,” manifested by “rape, birth, delivery, powerlessness.” Her paintings of the era demonstrate this sense of women’s total victimization. Consistent with this imagery, another activist observed, “The erect penis establishes its monument in a missile-studded bulwark against bolshevism”. Male citizens applaud when it’s said that weapons are necessary, and demonstrate only their own fear for submission, their inability to allow their own weaknesses. The woman on the other hand associates war with rape, fears from the enemy that which one’s own men don’t dream, [as they] let themselves be protected by the weapons. Better dead than red, they say, but their fears come from inside, from the putrefying patriarchal order.”

One may consider however that such connections did as much to emphasize an essential inviolability of these relations as to permit activists to work to transcend them.

The rocket as phallus—for West German peace protestors, an unwanted, violating penis, in contrast to its symbolism as macho strength for some Americans, figured prominently in poster art, in cartoons, and as icons for various constituent groups of the movement. This image was closely related to the rocket as a “boy toy,” the playthings of grown-up men, growing out of a kind of “superhero” lust, vastly expanded in the Cold War “silver age,” and the extreme form of that represented by the “American cowboy.” In a commonplace image, the Socialist Student Organization (SHB) newspaper Vorwärts featured in 1975 a front-page image of a cartoon “superhero,” with “inner Sicherheit” emblazoned across his broad chest. Now that objectionable superhero was found outside the country. Here again it is clear that a kind of “working-out” of domestic, intra-West German issues became mapped onto the question of international peace and security, including with references to the German past, more and less immediate. Nordrhein-Westfalen SPD leader Hans-Otto Bäumer reinforced the commonplace view of Ronald Reagan as a cowboy in a “politischer Rodeo” (as well as

75 Anna Malkowsky: Als Frau bei der Army ... Ein Interview, in: Quistorp (ed.): Frauen, pp. 87–89.
77 For Americans in the peace movement, however, this played a comparable role. Compare files of the Swarthmore Peace Collection, including Files U.S. Women’s 1980 Pentagon Action, 1980; and 1983 Seneca Peace Encampment, Mailings, Flyers, Press Releases, Etc.; and Women’s Encampment for the Future of Peace and Justice (Seneca)—General Information. Generally however in this movement the potential for victimization as the flipside of empowerment seems less visible than in the West German movement, likely at least in part a function of a possibly less immediate sense of personal danger than many West Germans felt.
78 Compare Friedensalmanach, 51. See also Staadt.
third-rate actor), while posters, bumper stickers, cartoons, and makeshift sculptures depicted Reagan jubilantly waving a cowboy hat, or riding a phallic-looking missile as in a scene out of Fail Safe. (To be sure, a glance at Dutch and British peace movements’ representations of Reagan carried much the same rhetoric, in this instance.  

Rübsamen perceived this cultural phenomenon as a game of competition, as “men” “spread their seeds,” or “peed,” like hounds, to “mark their territory.” Sölle described a kind of larger destructive cultural ethos she believed had infected West Germans as well as Americans, indeed adopted from the latter (here, strikingly, without the references to Germany’s own past that were fulsome in other texts from the movement)—including precisely with reference to women in the military. Many psychologists, including Gertrud Gumlich, commented on the practice of boys in particular playing with weapons in a particular fashion, imported from the U.S., that emphasized total strength, born of twin sources: perceived moral rectitude and technological superiority. Ute Volmerg claimed of contemporary boys, “The war fantasy is their fantasy: the fantasy of death and destruction, but also the fantasy of destroying.”

Closely connected to disaffection for the “superhero,” “boy toy” phenomenon was protesters’ far-ranging technophobia, or animus against “men’s technology,” as expressed in this imagery, again, apparently fairly specific to the German case in this period. This sentiment was also expressed by anti-AKW activists already in the mid- and late 1970s, as they decried the possibility of “peaceful nuclear technology.” It is as well a notion long associated with

79 See Tekeenen voor vrede; Road to Greenham Common; and Toward Nuclear Abolition. In 1980, members of one occupied house in Amsterdam decorated the sidewalk before their building with a papier-mâché rendition of Ronald Reagan in a cowboy hat, riding a “Euromissile,” an image that impressed many West German peace activists; see APO Archiv, File Friedensbewegung 1982. “Take the toys from the boys” was also a leitmotif in the 1980 U.S. Women’s Pentagon Action, as well as in the Canadian movement; for the latter, compare Road to Greenham Common, p. 194.

80 Rübsamen, pp. 73–4.

81 Certainly such cultural references abounded. Frau ans Gewehr. Soldatinnen auch in der Bundeswehr?, in: Der Spiegel, 46 (13 November 1978). Punk group Ton Steine Scherben’s “Keine Macht für Niemand” (no power for no one) (compare the American punk group hit, “We got the Neutron Bomb”), picking up on the political slogans of Autonomie and others, as well as television replays of “The General, the Mother, and the Children,” Der Spiegel’s depiction of “post-nuclear bomb life,” the daily words of television news broadcasters, and statements by such figures as Hanna Schuygulla, Nina Hagen, and Marius Mueller-Westernhagen, spoke to the flip side of this relation: the feelings, positive and negative, of powerlessness, of giving up power as defense against total destruction.


83 Quistorp: “Haus-Friedens-Brüche”; Laudowicz, p. 76; Gumlich, 59; Kelly: Weltgeneralstreik, p. 71; Rübsamen, p. 73; among men, Knorr, pp. 182–183; even before the new movement, Sollen Frauen lernen zu töten?, in: Emma (December 1978), 28–31. Compare against use of “Männertechnologie” in Marion Clausen/Christa Widmaier: Frauenkongress gegen Atom und Militär, in: Frankfurter Frauen Blatt (October 1979), pp. 7–8. And, to be sure, while “science” is not “technology,” there were many professional scientists and students of science and math among the activists; compare Friedenssalmanach WestBerlin, edited by “a group of natural scientists and mathematicians”; and Hans-Peter Dürr et al. (eds.): Verantwortung für den Frieden. Naturwissenschaftler gegen Atomrüstung, Hamburg 1983, among many others.
German and broader European anti-American sentiments. Opponents of women in the Bundeswehr had also raised the specter of “technology” in negative fashion, for example, as having a violent, massifying effect on Bundeswehr soldiers. By the early days of the peace movement, Michaela Freyhold represented the beliefs of many contemporaries when she asserted that the U.S. “death machine” and “extermination machine” was the result of specifically male fantasies of total destruction—closely related to sexual fantasies—and that they stemmed at least as much from “men’s” fears of being themselves beaten or destroyed as much as from any perception of themselves as all-powerful and invincible. Others saw the technology as a kind of cold, unstoppable, inhuman force, out of touch with nature and/or God. Dorothee Sölle decried “the greatest death factory (Todesfabrik) of the world,” as she described the Pentagon—with no innocent reference to Germany’s own National Socialist past. She urged protestors to “feel [their] own strength!” in response, using one’s hands and soft bodies against this force—drawing presumably on the imagery of the American Women’s Pentagon Action of two years earlier. Petra Kelly, who focused her description of “weapons of mass destruction” on the technical horror she saw it representing, intimat ed that this generalized disaffection arose from the “enemy’s” seeming fascination with it; she herself thereby cast “technology” against “security,” the contrast illustrated by weapons of mass destruction. Edith Laudowicz saw both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy plants as examples of despicable men’s technology. Rosemarie Rübsamen defined patriarchy through technology, of which atomic energy was only one “dangerous” and “grotesque” example: patriarchy was the “strange/homely ((un)heimliche) content of the natural sciences and technology.” “The practice of violence and fight for power as a motor of further technological development: the crassest example of this is nuclear power... The technology of patriarchy showed itself through “its craze for expansion, violent acts, and prodigality...”

Rhetorics of Peace

In turn, West German activists embraced a self-image as sensitive, nurturing, caring for life and for the world’s ills. Petra Kelly averred that overweening power of technology could be counteracted only by an embrace of nature and of God: by “reconciling oneself with the cosmos,” an act she associated most closely with women. This sense of women’s special “mystical” powers—of which however it seems men could also sometimes partake—was crucial to the peace coalition that brought millions together. While such notions were, to be sure, less compelling for,

84 Compare among many examples, on the early twentieth century, Nolan; on post-WWII Europe, Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques: Le défi américain, Paris 1967; in the years before the peace movement, Courage, special issue Atomkraft, July 1979.
85 Sölle: Sonne, p. 63.
86 Kelly: Weltgeneralstreik, p. 71
87 Rübsamen, 73.
88 Kelly, p. 72; see Sölle likewise on God and Mother Earth: Sonne, p. 60; and cf. the juxtaposition of a rocket flying toward earth and women on broomsticks, in Die Zukunft gehört den Frauen, in: Warum (December 1980), pp. 49–51, here 49.
e.g., members of the DKP, an important segment of the movement, it was also a key point of common ground for some self-defined Christians (particularly though not exclusively Protestants) and feminists alike. Indeed, there were fascinating convergences between these populations, often along with environmental activists, as well as a groundswell of those who identified explicitly as Christian feminists, whose role in the movement cannot be overstated. A key element of this “new” Christianity was a kind of “feminized” Jesus. This notion too emerged at least as early as the late 1970s, though in jocular feminist context: compare for example the Christmas-week spoof in the 1978 Frauenkalender, captioned, “I think...we have to make sure that the little baby Jesus is not a girl.” Spiegel magazine observed this phenomenon as associated specifically with the peace movement in a cover article in 1981, featuring a Jesus who was “soft” but also strong, who could, consistent with the themes discussed above, break guns over his knee with this soft strength. Dorothee Sölle squared the circle, commenting, “The God of the Bible is a God of ever-subjugated human solidarity which the Scripture refers to as the strength of the weak.”

A feminized—or particularly masculinized—Jesus was no new phenomenon: historians have observed such transforming gender assignments over the centuries, as in the view of “Jesus as mother” in the high middle ages. As Stephen Prothero and others have noted, moreover, the Cold War reflected an intense “masculinization” of Jesus by American officials: an aggressive, dominating, self-righteous, and macho Christ that justified the Manichean foreign policy of many post-WWII presidents. The Jesus of the peace movement served a like role: providing a kind of model of action corresponding to a larger world view. And, as among some in Washington, leaders of the peace movement claimed to speak for Jesus: Sölle declared for example that Jesus clearly supported unilateral disarmament. This was a “femininity” to which men too could ascribe, and the male leaders of the Christian peace movement adopted such rhetoric wholeheartedly. The 1980 Christian Krefeld Appeal for peace and against arms build-up was couched in such language, while the campaign’s slogan “fear not” was transformed startlingly by some activists into “you should fear,” a sign that the fear, perceived as weak, feminine, emotional, was the appropriate response to nuclear threat. “Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen,” create peace without weapons, likewise reflected the need to cede power, to expose one’s weakness and vulnerability, in the interest of peace. Yet how could such a force prevail in this world against an enemy so bent on concealing “his” own vulnerabilities?

If self-identified “Christians” drew on “feminist” images, of women in touch with nature, so too did the inverse occur. Feminist images of the threat of nuclear destruction sending

89 Compare Die Friedensbewegung vor der deutschen Frage; Sigrid Römelt: "Frauen wagen Frieden“—eine christliche Initiative, in: Ele Schöthailer (ed.), pp. 55–56; Nicht nur die Männer sind schuld; Quistorp (ed.): Frauen; Sölle: Strength.
90 Die neue Friedensbewegung.
91 Sölle: Strength, p. 17.
Mary and the Christ Child fleeing on the “holiday of peace on earth,” photomontages of Mary with Jesus on a donkey fearfully regarding phallic, high-tech missiles emblazoned with “U.S.,” and the like aided in drawing in protestors—as did very likely the concomitant emphasis on “mothers,” “motherhood,” and the significance of this role, here one of essentialized gender. Some of those who came to the movement as “feminists” also shared with their “Christian” counterparts a more diffuse, and often quite different, sense of mysticism, including a notion of “communing with nature,” particularly as women. This pursuit too characterized an ambiguity concerning gender essentialism: for many feminists, this mysticism was accessible only to women, who could however share the results of their experience with men, while others imagined men too could partake of this mystical influence if they let themselves. This ambivalence was a legacy inter alia of the ecological and and anti-AKW movements, and, of course, survived into the fledgling Green Party. Hamburg psychotherapist Anita von Raffay advocated that one “extol powerlessness, weakness, the crazy and the ridiculous,” in the interest of “love” and “beauty,” “letting go of power rather than retaining it.” Such views reflected widespread binaries, here in the context of a willing “lack of power” or “impotence,” before nature and one another. This, she claims paradoxically, was the source of women’s power, closely related to the most “primitive instincts,” and presumably counteracting the type of male primitive instincts that she and others bemoaned. Like many others, including many Christian feminists, Rübsamen drew in turn direct connections between living in and with nature and acting out of a “maternal instinct.” If women from Courage had in 1980 denied that their objection to women in the Bundeswehr was related to such an essentialist vision, soon afterward many self-proclaimed feminists fully embraced this view. As the Green party developed in this climate, others seemed to take the view that men could be like “mothers” too. But one might argue as well that, once more, by


95 Cited in Nicht nur die Männer sind schuld, p. 61.

96 Compare Courage, special issue Alltag im 2. Weltkrieg.

instanciating men in the role of essentially irrational and power-mongering beings, and, further, by putting the United States in the same place, some activists may have played a rhetorical trick on themselves that was difficult to supercede.

And, in still another paradoxical twist, contemporary feminist peace activists represented themselves simultaneously as the "rational" sex, here bucking conventional contemporary gender stereotypes. This rationality was played out against "the U.S.'s" and "men's" "power madness," "military madness," and simply "male madness" (the "naturalness" of which remained ambivalent), in a sort of Enlightenment-era sense of the term, rather than as it evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That is, this was a rationality in tune with nature, indeed, the latter virtually defining the former. It was, further, a rationality derived precisely from a greater emotional capability and awareness (for many but not all, a function of their ability to bear children).98 Consistent with the slogan reacting to the Krefeld Appeal, claiming that indeed one "should fear," protestors for peace asserted that women's ability to fear was a particular gift that they needed to acknowledge and act upon. Ingeborg Ammonn claimed that women's emotions may have been derided by men, but they were essential in fighting nuclear death, above all in the form of fear, for this was needed against "the prevailing power- and male-madness, under which many men suffer."99 In a speech characterizing the battle between "women" and the U.S. government, Dorothee Sölle suggested, "God created us vulnerable—that means capable of peace."100 Ute Volmerg asserted more ecumenically, "Also exactly because a rational and informed discussion scarcely takes place in public, subjective experiences...are mobilized for the judgment of national security"—and presumably more of these experiences need to guide the discussion.101 But with this greater "gift" came "responsibilities": activists urged women out of their "isolation as housewives," claiming that their special abilities as women virtually required them to act in the public sphere, a sphere still regarded by many, particularly older women, as male.

In many respects these appeals were remarkably successful: if the peace movement of the early 1980s was the largest such movement ever, and if this movement played an even greater role than §218 in uniting "the women's movement" (with limits, as we've noted), certainly

for that matter also many men, particularly among the younger ones—all who want nothing to do with power and arms..."


100 The Arms Race Kills, pp. 76–77; Sölle compares this, as does Petra Kelly, to the use of U.S. policy makers of the notion of a "window of vulnerability" as a source of military advantage: ibid, 71; also Weltgeneralstreik. Compare Sölle: Spiel doch von rosa anna & anna, in: Quistorp (ed.): Frauen, pp. 110f.

101 Volmerg, 109.
one can combine the two to say that the peace movement was astonishingly effective at bringing together women of varied backgrounds, age, and otherwise, who thereby came to characterize themselves as feminists. If women were uniquely “deeply concerned” (betroffen)—and simultaneously “small,” it was their responsibility to “hold out” against “men” and “the U.S.” Women could not allow themselves to be “powerless”—at least when it came to “insane” thinking: indeed they were the only ones who could fight the latter. Women might feel more comfortable with these discussions “around the kitchen table,” but, as the publicly circulated “Brief einer Hausfrau” prototypically proclaimed, they really had no choice but to act in the arena for change established by men—including in order to influence and change men. As Hamburg publicist and activist Peggy Parnass put it, men could trick women with their “military madness,” but women just needed to use their courage and intelligence (characteristics of course at certain points in history associated with men) to ensure they would prevail. To accomplish this, ironically, women had to “overcome feelings that all should be harmonious.”

Yet harmony was valued in its place: harmony, solidarity, and unity, among “all the oppressed”—and here again categories of identity were employed in both essentialist and more malleable terms. “Women” must join “Third World peoples,” along with all West Germans and Europeans (viz. constant references to “Hollanditis” as a “women’s disease”), in their shared experience as victims of men and/or the United States government. The Vietnamese, Chileans, Salvadorans, African-Americans, even Muammar Quaddafi all earned special mention as victims of American aggression with whom peace activists identified. While from the 1960s on, West German activists demonstrated admiration for American civil rights activists, Dorothee Söhe in particular sought to establish the equivalency of African-American


103 Compare Ele Schöfthaler: Spuren, in: Schöfthaler (ed.), pp. 5–6; Beim Essen Frieden proben, in: ibid, p. 99; and, on the other hand, Autonome Frauendemo in Bremerhaven am 14.10., in Oldenburger Frauenzeitung, 9 (November 1983), pp. 4–6, in which a cartoon dismisses the idea of “drinking a tea” together when there were “much more important” things to do.

104 Cf. Elisabeth Burmeister’s “Brief einer Hausfrau an die Verfasser der Denkschriften der EKD,” distributed as a handbill, republished as Burmeister: Ausgewogen—halb geloben, in: Burmeister (ed.), 44f.; also Karin Hempel-Soos: Keine muß alleine bleiben, in: Burmeister (ed.), p. 7. See also the initiative “Frauen in der Bundeswehr—wir sagen Nein,” a group that saw itself as moving women out of the household to protest this idea—though ironically in part at least initially to defend women’s right to stay in the home. Compare too Zehn Fragen zum Frieden—und was eine Frau darauf antworten kann; as well as claims of the Fraueninitiative that Markolsheim and Wyhl represented “Hausfrauenprotest”: in Frauen machen Frieden, pp. 127–128; and Claudia von Werlhof: Der Proletarier ist tot. Es lebe die Hausfrau. Gesellschaftliche Grenzen der Alternativen und der Modellcharakter der Frauenfrage, in: Wohin denn wir, pp. 56–61.


106 Zehn Fragen zum Frieden, 28.

107 Compare AL poster, in: Dokumente der Westberliner Friedensbewegung, p. 74.
slavery and West Germans’ “slavery” to American foreign policy and the nuclear threat.\textsuperscript{108} Impressively, peace activists in the 1980s accomplished what their postwar predecessors had failed to do: to draw an appealing connection over time, as well as across place, including emphasizing the trajectory of women’s activism. If in the 1960s young activists had no use for e.g. the likes of Klara Fassbinder, now protestors cited inspiration from and connection with women from Bettina von Arnim and Hedwig Dohm to Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin to Sophie Scholl, once again drawing connections across political spectrums and other divides as well.\textsuperscript{109} This served in the present to unite particularly women across generational gaps, and older women as well as men, some former activists, some never politically active, came forward in huge numbers to join the movement, bridging also the rural/urban split and the education gap. Of course, Rosa Luxemburg and Sophie Scholl served not only as models for courageous activism but also for ultimate victimization, and this thread too ran unbroken through the discourse. Likewise regularly cited were the countless unnamed German women and girls who fell victim to Allied (often indicated as American) bombing in World War II, as well as the experience of the “ruins women” (Trümmerfrauen)—alongside the violence of the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{110} Activists read aloud and published poems and fiction of the period (“mommy, will there be war tomorrow? Will there be war the next day? ... mommy, will it hurt when the bombs kill me?”) with excerpts of memoirs, e.g. of single mothers, whose husbands in “the resistance” were sent to concentration camps—and who themselves then joined resistance efforts.\textsuperscript{111}

Movement organizers and others also regularly drew connections to Hiroshima (including of course as “Euroshima”), establishing their identification with the Japanese victims. This was of course in many senses a rather obvious connection to make: West Germans who

\textsuperscript{108} Sölle: The Arms Race Kills, 68–75; Sölle: Sonne, 61ff.; compare Kelly: Schwerter zu Pflugscharen, p. 15. Once more this rhetoric was shared with “the enemy,” certain segments of American officialdom and the American public, who criticized West Germans’ desire to see themselves in a “master/slave relationship”; see here The German Malaise. See more recently the rhetoric from Robert Kagan and others, describing Europeans, Middle Easterners, and others as weak and powerlessness—as evidenced by their anti-Americanism. Cf. Robert Kagan: Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New York 2003. Kagan pointedly refers to Americans as “from Mars” while Europeans are “from Venus”—echoing an American bestseller of the same year, John Gray: Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, New York 2003.

\textsuperscript{109} Compare Hempel-Soos; Eva Quistorp: Vorwort, in: eadem (ed.), Frauen, 9f.; see also Autonome Frauenendemo, 5, which includes an image of women protesting other women’s “war production” work in 1929; and of course the efforts of longstanding peace activists to make the longer-term connections, i.e. Von der “Ohne-mich- Bewegung” über die Ostermärsc zur neuen Friedensbewegung, Hellmut Gollwitzer in interview with Eva Quistorp, in: taz (11 September 1981), p. 11; and Andreas Buro: Kann die “neue” von der “alten” Friedensbewegung lernen?, in: Rudolf Steinweg (ed.), pp. 401–417. Even among feminists more ambivalent about women’s stance as women concerning war, compare Vaterlandsverteidigung—Pazifismus—Klassenkampf. Positionen in der Frauenbewegung zum 1. Weltkrieg, in: Frauen auf die Barrikaden, 4 (1983), pp. 1–9. See finally also Holger Nehring's ongoing work, including in this issue, which makes the case not only for continuities between the postwar movement and that of the 1980s, but far more broadly in the “New Social Movements.”

\textsuperscript{110} See Karl Holl: Vorwort, in: Donat/Holl (eds.).

felt threatened by the prospect of American nuclear weapons identified with those who had been the actual victims thereof, and whose horror represented only a pale ghost of what West Germans felt they faced prospectively. But clearly this was no innocent association to make. First of all, West Germans were not actually the direct object of American weapons, though this is not to diminish the connection between potential American aggressions and the ultimate result. Secondly, these memorials, alongside memories of “American bombing” in World War II, projected difficult equivalences and parallels, intimating that the United States was the primary aggressor in World War II, against both Germany and Japan, or alternately that the U.S. government was somehow allied with the Nazi regime in victimizing “ordinary Germans” in that period, týing in with some longstanding less politically attractive notions. This comes out most clearly in the well-intentioned but disturbing ties that many West German peace activists and feminists made to Jews under the Nazi regime, conveniently allied already by the term originating in the United States (and also not innocently, but differently so) with reference to both circumstances, actual and prospective: that of a “holocaust.”

The broad and regular reference to World War II Germany and fascism demonstrates West Germans were not forgetting the history of their own country; quite the contrary, activists claimed that Germany’s past required vigilance, protest, and “witness” on their parts. A poster of the antifascist Union of Nazi Persecutees (UVN) claimed that, “at this moment of great threat to peace,” it was time to “thank the men and women” who had resisted fascism “the first time.”113 (Certainly the inclusion of women as past resistors reflects the influence of the contemporary movement.) Still, the rather easy equivalences are discomfiting. A poem by editorial assistant Ingrid Ernst claiming “ich weiss von Auschwitz”; and Sölle’s characterization of a nuclear war as “Auschwitz and no end in sight,” accompanied by mention of her meeting with Elie Wiesel and her family’s history of having hidden Jews under the Nazi regime; the comparison she draws between her prayer and that of “Jews praying in the gas chamber”; and her discussion of the U.S. “knowing about Auschwitz” and its contemporary politics engender problematic messages. In this context as no where else, unconscious elements appear to battle with conscious choices in the selection of imagery and calls to action. Such rhetoric may have both reflected genuine feeling and been terrifically successful precisely in bringing together broad populations of West Germans in protest against U.S policy, but it also raises some questions about the potential costs of some political strategies, and cer-

112 Compare most prominently Dorothee Sölle: The Arms Race Kills and her discussion of the “Holocaust,” her own connection to Auschwitz, and to Jesus as a powerless Jew; Brandy; Knorr, 217; Irmtraud Morgner: Gewissensfragen, in: Quistorp (ed.), Frauen, pp. 12f.; Cooper, 144. Many drew on the still recent airing of the television series “Holocaust” in January 1979 to make the comparison. This was no new phenomenon among postwar protestors, a comparison helped along to be sure by both police and vigilante brutality and comparable language from that side (e.g. “Students in concentration camps!”). Compare Belinda Davis: Violence and Memory of the Nazi past in 1960s–70s West German Protest, in: Philipp Gassert/Alan Steinweis (eds.): Coming to Terms with the Past in West Germany. The 1960s, New York 2005 (forthcoming).
113 Reproduced in Teppich (ed.), 75.
Belinda Davis
tainly raises questions about what exactly such rhetoric actually signifies for some West Germans’ contemporary sense of self. At the same time, as we have observed, such rhetoric of victimization, often calcified and ineluctable, played a questionable role in activists’ ultimate effectiveness. While it may have been startlingly useful in bringing West Germans together in a “national” movement, it may have simultaneously worked against the effectiveness of that movement in its ultimate ends, to realize the cessation of a “rearmament” policy.

NATO’s laying of medium-range missiles in 1983 more or less ended the mass peace movement, at least in its extremely public form. At the same time, “peace” did not entirely lose its pride of place after that point—and we continue to see these effects now, established as they were by millions of women as well as men (though, as feminist activists grimly noted, women’s role in leading the 1980s movement was almost entirely erased by mainstream media, whatever the actual sustained changes in political culture\(^\text{114}\)). Gendered rhetoric in U.S./German relations over war and peace continues to dominate, often not apparently for the better. From Robert Kagan’s bizarre comparison of Europe and America as Venus and Mars, to the participants in an American Enterprise symposium’s still more outré description of “Euroweenies” and “EU-nuchs” who show a distaste for war, the language continues among powerful figures on the American side. This goes for Germans as well, re-emerging even as German demonstration against U.S. incursions into Iraq represented the largest single-day political protest ever.\(^\text{115}\) Joschka Fischer, former activist in this movement among others, recently characterized Germans’ views as representing a “maturity” of position, based on the very real experience of war; one might add, perhaps, perhaps better than before demonstrating both distance from and acknowledgement of that war. As his Spiegel interviewer cast it just after the U.S. declaration of war on Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. and Germany endured a “separation,” intimating the terms of a marriage gone bad, after the German failed to fall in line at U.S. officials’ demand. How this new willingness to stand up for peace at the official level can signal the “maturity” to break up a bad marriage—or at the very least to stand up to “bullying husbands”, including in the interests of a pursuit of peace, and to create new possibilities for this—will be the stuff of future historians’ observations. It says nothing to observe how enormously powerful political rhetoric can be in building a social and political movement, or to note the range of resonances such discourses can give off. But in both its enormous successes and in its less uniformly appreciable aspects, the gendered language of the peace movement of the early offers lessons for future movements.

\(^{114}\) Compare Haak; Laudowicz.
\(^{115}\) Demonstrations against the “first Iraq war” were also significant, involving tens of thousands, but small compared to those that preceded and followed them.