Abstract

This article addresses the role of transnational socialist party cooperation in setting the agenda of the European Community (EC) in the policy field of development aid in the early 1970s. Although agenda-setting has a high relevance for understanding why certain issues are successfully inserted in the EC (later the European Union) policy-making cycle while others not, this important stage of political decision-making often tends to escape our attention. The article argues that socialist transnational party cooperation through networks on the European level developed various strategies for placing development aid issues on the EC agenda. However, the article also shows that with a view to implementation there were several reasons that made it difficult for transnational socialist party cooperation to push forward development aid issues in the cycle of EC policy-making beyond agenda-setting.

Keywords: socialism, development aid, transnational cooperation, European Community

Introduction

In line with their internationalist origins, socialist parties felt and still feel special responsibility for developing countries. Their similar ideological preferences and worldviews traditionally contained addressing the miserable situation in the Third World after colonial exploitation and criticising capitalism for generating worldwide trade conditions to the developing countries’ disadvantage. Thus, when in the beginning of the 1970s the wealth gap between developed and developing countries began

1 See, for example, Enzo R. Grilli: The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge 1993, p. 3.
to widen, socialist parties emphasised the moral case for more equitable international institutional arrangements. This also included a shared European Community (EC) approach in development aid policy that was only beginning to emerge. The partly institutionalised global network of socialist parties, the so-called Socialist International (SI), for example, encouraged the socialist parties in the EC to take the lead in pressing both at national and Community level for a more effective EC development aid policy.²

By then, the EC had only implemented two development aid policy mechanisms of global reach: the EC food aid policy and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Following the International Food Aid Charter of 1967, the EC began its food aid policy in 1968.³ As laid down in the resolution of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) of October 1970, the EC accepted the trade policy principle of generalised preferences in July 1971. The GSP as a principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required that the EC imported finished or semi-finished products of developing countries from the Third World as a whole, not just former colonies of EC member parties, duty free or at reduced rates. Although the system only covered a limited number of products, the EC member states thus became the first of all developed countries to implement a comprehensive preference system.⁴

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, the EC association approach in form of agreements with former colonies was the core of the EC development aid policy: the Yaoundé Convention I from 1964 to 1969, the Yaoundé Convention II including eighteen French-speaking Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS) and the Arusha Convention with three associated English-speaking developing countries from 1971 to 1975.⁵ From the view of the EC socialist parties, this EC development aid policy was too narrowly-based. They thus aimed to move forward the EC policy in development aid by replacing the existing association ap-

⁵ On the development and content of the Conventions, see, for example, Carol Cosgrove Twitchett: Europe and Africa: From Association to Partnership, Guildford 1978, pp. 97–142.
approach by a comprehensive global concept of development aid.\textsuperscript{6} For achieving this objective, obviously, for the EC socialists’ agenda-setting was an important part of their transnational cooperation in the context of policy-making in that EC policy field. In other words, getting the issue of a global EC development aid concept considered was a precondition for decision-making.

As the historian Jan-Henrik Meyer has recently argued with a view to policy-making on the European level, “agenda-setting is not only the first, but also a crucially important stage of political decision-making that tends to escape our attention”\textsuperscript{7}. Although in theoretical studies several political scientists have already emphasised the high relevance of agenda-setting processes for understanding why certain issues are successfully inserted in the European Union (EU) policy-making cycle while others not,\textsuperscript{8} there has been extremely little historical-empirical research on them.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, the role of societal actors in agenda-setting over longer time spans in policy-making on the European level has been neglected in EU historiography.\textsuperscript{10} It is therefore the aim of this article to analyse agenda-setting – from an historical perspective – as an important function of the transnational cooperation of socialist parties on the EC level at the example of the emerging policy field of EC development aid in the early 1970s. Political parties in European politics were and are an important transmission belt between EC/EU national societies and the emerging transnational European society on the one hand and policy and decision-makers in Brussels and Strasbourg on the other hand.

The article is structured in four main sections. The first main section will characterise the policy field of EC development aid by describing its origins and situation not only on the EC level, but also on the international level, at the start of this decade.

\textsuperscript{6} Verbindungsbüro der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kommentar zur Allgemeinen Entschließung, PS/CE/53/71, The Danish Labour Movement’s Library and Archives (ABA) Copenhagen, Sammenslutningen af de Socialdemokratiske Partier i EF (SSDEF), 1203.


\textsuperscript{9} Jan-Henrik Meyer: Getting Started is the only larger historical study on agenda-setting in the EU at the example of the emerging European Environmental Policy in the 1970s.

Subsequently, the second main section will explore the EC socialists’ transnational cooperation by reconstructing its main structures and policy objectives in that policy field. The third main section will analyse the EC socialists’ agenda-setting strategies in EC development aid policy. Finally, the fourth main section will evaluate the principal reasons that made it difficult for the EC socialists to push forward their common policies in the cycle of EC policy-making beyond agenda-setting. Building on the results, in the conclusion some more general implications of socialist parties’ agenda-setting in EC development aid policy in the early 1970s will be discussed.

European and International Development Aid Policy in the Beginning of the 1970s

Since the EU’s foundation in form of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, development aid was a policy field marked by agenda-setting. As a policy field it had a controversial nature from its very beginning, when in the EEC founding negotiations the French government’s delegation surprised its partners by making the association of its overseas territories a precondition for signing the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC. Integrating the concept of *Eurafrique*, the EEC provided an opportunity for France to address the major problems of its colonial policy. Backed by the Belgian government, the French proposal included, among other things, purchase commitments for overseas products and especially the implementation of a common European Development Fund (EDF).11 And indeed, the policy field was to remain controversial in the beginning of the 1970s due to the persistent differing interests of the French, German and Dutch governments in particular, and – following its accession to the EC in 1973 – Britain with its robust links to developing countries belonging to the Commonwealth.

France continued to advocate limiting a policy of association to the former colonies.12 The *Eurafrique* concept still strongly shaped the French government’s policy towards EC development aid policy in the early 1970s. France’s trade with the African

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countries surpassed that of the other EC member states. The French government wanted to maintain the traditional concept of privileged Franco-African relations. Despite international changes such as the quadruplication of the price of oil as a consequence of the first oil crisis of 1973 and the breakdown of the world monetary system leading to structural weaknesses, there was no fundamental debate in France to moderate the strong focus on Africa in development aid policy, either on the national or on the European level.\footnote{For an analysis of the French government’s reaction in terms of development aid policy to the economic crisis in the 1970s, see Miles Kahler: International Response to Economic Crisis: France and the Third World in the 1970s, in: Stephan S. Cohen/Peter A. Gourevitch (eds.): France in the Troubled World Economy, London 1982, pp. 76–96; for an overview on the French development aid policy with a special focus on Africa in the 1970s, see Stefan Brüne: Die französische Afrikapolitik: Hegemonialinteressen und Entwicklungsanspruch, Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 85ff.}

In contrast, the Netherlands were eager to extend national and EC trade to Asia and Latin America. In addition, political-strategic ideas drove the Dutch motivation of playing a role as an intermediary between the poor South and the rich North, or between the EC and the developing countries, in a more global approach in EC development aid policy.\footnote{Marc Dierikx: Developing Policy on Development: The Hague 1945–1977, in: Helge Ø Pharo/Monika Pohle Fraser (eds.): The Aid Rush: Aid Regimes in Northern Europe During the Cold War, vol. 1, Oslo 2008, pp. 223–249, 241.} In Germany, likewise, EC development aid policy was considered a political task of building bridges between the western European industrial countries and the less developed countries in the world.\footnote{See, for example, Volker Alberts et. al (eds.): Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: 1957–1983, Münster 1986, p. 48.} In general, the orientation of development aid policy was in line with the liberal global trade policy, which was a cornerstone of German economic policy.\footnote{See Lili Reyels: Die Entstehung der ersten Vertrags von Lomé im deutsch-französischen Spannungsfeld 1973–1975, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 42.} Moreover, in the beginning of the 1970s the demand for raw materials increased and became a central German interest. Especially after the first oil crisis of 1973, which threatened the prosperity and stability of Germany, a global coordination of development cooperation became a central element of German development aid policy.\footnote{See Ulf Engel: Die Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1999: Rollen und Identitäten, Münster 2000, p. 62.}

On the international level, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly proclaimed the International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade (1971–1980) in November 1970. Partly continuing the development programmes of the First UN Economic Development Decade (1961 to 1970), the strategy called for a global development approach based on joint concerted action by developed and developing...
countries in order to extend and coordinate the international community’s contribution to the economic and social progress in the Third World. Moreover, it contained one of the most frequently discussed policy targets concerning international development aid, namely that each economically advanced country should progressively increase its governmental development assistance to the developing countries and would do its best to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) by the middle of the decade.

At the same time, the increased international bargaining power of developing countries as producers of crucial raw materials and their position in the Cold War competition between the superpowers gave them some leverage on the broader international economic policy debate of the North-South Dialogue. For example, the so-called Group of 77 (G-77), the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing states in the UN, claimed the implementation of the International Strategy for the Second UN International Development Decade and a New International Economic Order (NEIO) in the UNCTAD deliberations. The demand of the G-77 for a NIEO aimed primarily to reform global trade relations between the developed and the developing countries, including such central points as the increase and stabilisation of commodity prices, improving economic infrastructures through capital and knowledge transfer and improving access to the markets of developed countries for export products of developing countries. The North-South Dialogue also drove negotiations between the EC and its associated developing countries to continue the Yaoundé Convention. By that time, at the end of the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, the EC had become the largest and fastest expanding market for products from developing countries. In addition, the accession of Britain to the EC was to transform the Commonwealth system and make the Community even more important to the developing

19 UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), Paragraph 43, 19 November 1970.
countries.\textsuperscript{23} For these and the above mentioned reasons, in particular the Netherlands and Germany wanted to move far beyond the association policy with the developing countries and the two existing aid mechanisms with global outreach, the food aid policy and the GSP, by implementing a common approach for an overall global EC development aid policy.

Given the Community’s growing weight in international politics and world trade, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for development aid (DG VIII) also suggested that the time had come to work out a common EC development aid policy. In July 1971, the Commission published its first memorandum on a Community policy for development cooperation.\textsuperscript{24} The memorandum recommended offering new mechanisms of development cooperation and aid on a worldwide scope. Nevertheless, with its memorandum on the future relations between the Community and associated developing countries of April 1973, the Commission expressed its clear preference for the association policy and towards conserving the status quo of the EC’s existing approach to development aid policy.\textsuperscript{25}

Crucially, the establishment of a global concept was the core topic for the advancement of EC development aid policy. To achieve this goal, two different systems of development aid had to be integrated into one single system: the individual development aid policies of the EC member states as well as the already existing EC policy system of regional development aid in the form of the association conventions.\textsuperscript{26} This integration could only be achieved if EC development aid policy was formulated in global terms for relations with all developing countries. A pivotal instrument for this policy was a common development aid fund, similar to the EDF of the EEC Treaty.


\textsuperscript{25} Commission of the European Communities: Memorandum to the Council on the Future Relations Between the Community, the Present AAMS States and the Countries in Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans referred to in Protocol No. 22 to the Act of Accession, Supplement 1/73 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973. This memorandum is often referred to as the Deniau memorandum. Robert Deniau was Commissioner responsible for external relations and development aid in the Malfatti Commission. For an assessment of the Deniau memorandum, see Enzo. R. Grilli: The European Community and the Developing Countries, p. 92, 96–97.

\textsuperscript{26} See Klaus Billerbeck: Europäisierung der Entwicklungspolitik II: Gemeinschaftliche Entwicklungspolitik für den Mittelmeerraum, Asien und Lateinamerika, Berlin 1972, p. 2.
Therefore, the implementation of a common EC development aid policy with a global approach for replacing the EC association policy undermined a central pillar of the founding bargain of the Community.

It was in this broader context that the EC socialist parties became engaged in EC development policy at the end of the 1960s.

**European Socialists’ Transnational Cooperation in European Community Development Aid Policy**

Two organised transnational party networks formed the backbone of the cooperation of socialist parties in Western Europe and the EC in the beginning of the 1970s: the above-mentioned global network of the SI and the so-called Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC.

European integration became a top priority for the SI in the 1970s. Although questions of European unity had always been important for the SI, since its revival in the early 1950s, it now became much more concerned with EC politics due to the prospects of enlargement and new impulses of further integration in context of the summit of The Hague in December 1969. As early as March 1969, the SI had held a party leaders’ conference in Vienna dealing with the stagnation of European integration in the wake of the empty chair crisis of 1965/1966. Following the summit of The Hague, the SI party leaders and high-level representatives of the western European member parties met again in Brussels in March 1970 to discuss further scenarios for the political and economic integration in the EC and the socialists’ role and action within it. Two suggestions for influencing the policy- and decision-making processes of the EC were made: firstly, that there should be closer consultation among the socialists on matters relating to the EC before decisions on politics and policies were taken by the Community; secondly, that there was a need for a much closer cooperation at the EC level among the socialist parties.

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28 The empty chairs crisis was triggered by the refusal of French representatives to attend intergovernmental meetings of EC bodies due to a disagreement with the European Commission on the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). For an in-depth study on the empty chair crisis, see most recently Philip Bajon: Europapolitik “Am Abgrund”: Die Krise des “leeren Stuhls” 1965–66, Stuttgart 2012.

The EC socialists reacted to this suggestion by holding their long overdue eighth congress in Brussels in June 1971. At this congress, different versions for reforming the transnational cooperation of the socialist parties on the EC level in form of the Liaison Bureau were discussed.30 Funded almost simultaneously with the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the Liaison Bureau was the managing network that was supposed to organise the permanent contact and exchange between the member parties.31 Consisting of one delegate of each member party and one delegate of the SI, the Liaison Bureau was tasked with reaching agreement on political issues and providing a functional link between the EEC, later EC, level and the national levels of the member parties.32 In spite of this institutional organisation, the formal transnational cooperation of the socialist parties in the EC remained weakly developed throughout the 1960s. However, a decision on the proposed reforms for improving the EC socialists' formal transnational cooperation was not taken at the eighth congress in Brussels in June 1971.33 A relative stability and regularity of informal transnational cooperation in and through the Liaison Bureau compensated for the formal cooperation weakness and allowed the EC socialist parties to contribute to EC politics and policy-making in the early 1970s.34 Nevertheless, the international structure of the SI was the dominant socialist transnational party network for the EC socialists for defining common policies in development aid in the early 1970s.

Embedded in similar ideological preferences and worldviews, their informal cooperation allowed the member parties of the SI to formulate in the 1960s to closely related preferences on development aid policy: achieving an increase of development aid on a multilateral basis, preferable via the channels of International Organisations,

30 See, for example, Norbert Gresch: Transnationale Zusammenarbeit in der EG, Baden-Baden 1978, p. 117f.
32 The member parties of the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC were in the early 1970s: Parti Socialiste (PS, Belgium), Socialistische Partij (SP, Belgium), Parti Socialiste (PS, France), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD, Germany), Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI, Italy), Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI, Italy), Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois/Letzburger Socialistes Arbechterpartei (POS/LSAP, Luxembourg), Partit van de Arbeid (PvdA, The Netherlands), from 1973 on Socialdemokrattiet (SD, Denmark), The Labour Party (LP; Ireland) and from 1976 on The Labour Party (LP, Great Britain) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP, N. Ireland).
33 See, for example, Simon Hix/Urs Lesse: Shaping a Vision, p. 20.
34 For an assessment of the importance of informal dimensions of transnational party cooperation for the purpose of understanding European and EC politics and policy-making and its outcomes, see Christian Salm: Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: The Cases of European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement, PhD Dissertation, University of Portsmouth, 2013.
and the coordination of national aid programmes in the case of bilateral development aid. At the end of the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, these preferences considerably eased agreements among the socialists for taking a common position on development aid policies and initiatives with a multilateral approach. This applied in particular to the SI position on the UN Strategy for the Second Development Decade.

At the eleventh SI congress in Eastbourne in Britain in April 1969, Jan Tinbergen, a member of the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), chair of the UN Developing Planning Committee and winner of the Nobel Prize for economics in 1969, presented unpublished documents of several UN agencies (especially UNCTAD) on the International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade highlighting that these proposals were clearly in line with socialist policy. Following Tinbergen’s information on the UN ideas and policy measures for development aid and an exchange of view within the SI on content overlaps with socialist policy goals, the SI adopted a resolution expressing that the SI member parties would assume a common position vis-à-vis the UN Strategy for the Second Development Decade. Clearly, that common position of the SI socialist parties also included one of the most central policy measures of the UN Development Strategy: the 0.7 per cent target.

Their transnational cooperation through the SI helped the socialists to ensure that all member parties stuck to the agreement to demand the implementation of the policy measures identified in the UN Development Strategy. Circulated regularly within the network of the SI and beyond, the SI circulars, statements and resolutions reminded the member parties to assume a uniform position vis-à-vis the proposals of the Second UN Development Decade. For example, to provide detailed information on the issue of the UN Development Strategy, the SI Bureau circulated to its member parties a report on accelerated development prepared by Tinbergen’s UN Development Planning Committee. Published by the UN under the title Towards Accelerated Development, the aim of this report was to give impulses for creating an international environment conducive to strengthening the efforts to accelerate the economic and social progress in the developing countries by outlining numerous measures for improving the inter-

national trade relations. The SI thus created political pressure on the national western European socialist parties that they should use their political power and influence their countries. They should, for example, set the objective to raise their public financial flows to developing countries to the minimum target of 0.7 per cent of their GNP and comply with the recommendations on the elimination of import impediments to products from developing countries. A tight network of socialist international secretaries and secretary-generals usually elaborated the statements and resolutions in the run-up to high-level SI meetings. The socialist party leaders and heads of state or government then often agreed to the resolutions without or with only view amendments. However, the SI did not have any formal power or instruments to force the member parties to adopt a particular political position, option or strategy.

Given that the SI was the more important transnational party network for the western European socialist parties for defining socialist policies on development aid, the EC socialists normally adopted the agreements that were made within the SI. Nevertheless, especially their informal transnational cooperation on the EC level enabled the socialists to translate SI positions on development aid policies into the EC sphere of policy-making. In 1971, for example, the EC socialists agreed on working for a design of EC commercial policy with increased imports of manufactured and semi-manufactured products from the developing countries by reducing import duties on such products. Furthermore, from their shared perspective this policy should be backed by aid from the EC countries amounting to 0.7 per cent of their GNP in compliance with the UN Development Strategy. More importantly, in accordance with the UN recommendation for a global development approach, the EC socialists demanded for the Community the implementation of a common development aid policy directed to the developing countries worldwide. The EC socialist parties took the joint position that EC development cooperation with the associated developing countries in the framework of the Yaoundé and Arusha Conventions would be necessary and desirable only as long as there was no effective development aid policy on a global scale. In other words, the policy objective that united the EC socialists was to turn development aid policy into an EC competence with a cohesive global approach.

40 See for example the Report of the 12th Congress of the Social International held in Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, 263.
42 Verbindungsbüro der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kommentar zur Allgemeinen Entschließung, PS/CE/53/71, ABA, SSDEF, 1203.
Agenda-Setting Strategies

The Second UN Development Strategy clearly was a trigger for the EC socialists to call for a new concept of EC development aid policy. Following the example of the UN Development Strategy, the socialist parties contributed to moving the policy debate on the future of EC development aid over a longer period. For this purpose, the EC socialist parties used six different strategies for placing the issue of a common policy of EC development aid with a global approach on the EC agenda.43

Firstly, they claimed the authority of the EC by combining the issue with an already far more established EC policy: the common trade policy, which has been under the EC’s mandate since the EEC Rome Treaty. Most of the EC’s measures like the GSP with effect on the developing countries fell within this policy area of exclusive EC competence.44 According to their common position towards the association policy outlined above, the EC socialist parties argued that the Community’s existing regional cooperation in the form of the association agreements of Yaoundé and Arusha providing for the reduction of trade barriers only served a useful purpose as long as no effective global policy of development aid cooperation was yet in place.45

Secondly, through their transnational cooperation, the EC socialist parties framed the issue by using powerful rhetoric and highlighting the moral dimension of development aid cooperation. They argued that a common EC development aid policy with a global scope would be the best proof that the Community was not only following its own interests, but was also conscious of its responsibility for the world’s economic development.46 Moreover, in the EC socialists’ opinion this responsibility also included a rapid implementation of the 0.7 per cent target. With a view to the situation in the Third World, the socialist parties furthermore stressed that the EC must be aware of its importance and influence in the world economy and in world trade and live up to its responsibilities.47

44 See also Gerrit Faber: The European Community and Development Cooperation, p. 53.
47 Resolutions of the 8th Congress of the Socialist Parties in the European Community, HAEU, GSPE, 6.
Thirdly, the EC socialist parties aroused interest for the issue of a global approach towards a common EC development aid policy by publishing studies on the current stage of European integration. For instance, in early 1971 the Liaison Bureau of the EC socialist parties circulated the results of a study on the future of the Community from a socialist perspective prepared by the EC committee of the Dutch Koos Voorink Instituut in cooperation with the PvdA. The study was designed as a source of inspiration for an intensive discussion in all member states on the structures and policies of the EC. A large part of the study was devoted to the relationship of the Community with the countries of the Third World. It revealed that the Community had no real development aid policy of its own. In order to devise and implement such a common policy, the EC committee of the Koos Voorink Instituut recommended that the Community should take as a starting point the necessity of adopting a global approach to the solution of the development problems. The study’s key message was that both the policy of the Community and the policies of the individual member states should be brought into line with the objectives as originally formulated in the report Towards Accelerated Development prepared by Tinbergen’s UN Development Planning Committee and in the programme of the Second UN Development Decade. 48

Fourthly, high-ranking socialist politicians active within the transnational cooperation of the EC socialist parties used frequent public interventions at European or international governmental meetings to place the issue high on the EC agenda. They attempted to construct discursive links between development aid and the EC’s political objectives and identity. In May 1971, for example, Willy Brandt, the West German Chancellor from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) commented on the results of the talks of the EC Foreign Ministers on development policies, insisting that the Community should increase its efforts to achieve the aims of the Second UN Development Decade. 49 Moreover, Brandt added that development aid policy was an important instrument for peace. Framing a common EC development aid policy as a peace issue aligned the proposed common global approach with the principle purpose of European integration and thus, with a core value shared by the EC member states. Likewise, Sicco Mansholt, member of the PvdA and the president of the European Commission representing the EC at the ple-

48 Koos Voorink Instituut for Research in International Relations/Partij van de Arbeid (eds.): The European Community in A Socialist Perspective: A contribution by the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) to the discussion on the restructuring of the European Community. A report of the EEC Committee of the Koos Voorink Instituut, January 1971, IISH, Archief Partij van de Arbeid (APvdA), 2719, II.

nary meeting of UNCTAD III in April 1972, demanded that the Community should increase its official development assistance in accordance with the UN Development Strategy.\(^5\) Mansholt habitually referred to the 0.7 percent target in the UN Strategy.

Fifthly, their transnational cooperation allowed those EC socialists, who strongly supported the implementation of a global concept of EC development aid policy and the goals of the UN Development Strategy, to mobilise supporters with significant influence on EC politics. The SI especially helped to mobilise such support in the early 1970s. Thus, the SI made EC development aid policy an important issue at its congress in Vienna in June 1972. Taking the Second UN Development Strategy as a blue-print, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a member of the SPD executive and former Federal Minister of Economic Cooperation from 1966 to 1968, reminded his audience of prominent socialist party leaders and members of EC member state governments that the Community “cannot adopt such different attitudes towards the countries of the Third World”\(^5\) as was still the case at the time. Wischnewski, an insider when it came to German and European development aid policy, who passionately supported assistance to the Third World,\(^5\) urged them to change EC development aid policy towards a global concept in order to overcome the splitting of the world into different categories of underdeveloped countries with different levels of support. Judith Hart, at that time British Shadow Minister for Overseas Development for the Labour Party, also called on the SI and the delegates who played a role in socialist or socialist-led governments in western European countries to realise the targets of the Second UN Development Strategy, namely, that every industrialised countries should devote 0.7 per cent of its GNP to development aid.\(^5\) Moreover, this objective was also restated in the resolution of the congress on international development aid policy.\(^5\)

Sixthly, the EC socialist parties used their transnational cooperation to bring issues of development aid policy to the attention of the EC decision-makers shortly before decisive meetings or summits. For instance, before the EC summit of heads of state or government in Paris in October 1972, the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC adopted a resolution emphasising that the EC must give priority to its development aid policy. The Bureau hereby also took on the report of the European Parliament (EP) of July 1972 by the member of the Socialist Group in the EP, Henk Vredeling,

\(^5\) Statement of Sicco Mansholt, President of the EC, in the plenary meeting of UNCTAD III, 17 April 1972, IISH, Archief Sicco Mansholt (ASM), 213.
\(^5\) Report of the 12th Congress of the SI held in Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, 263.
member of the PvdA, Dutch Minister of Defence from 1973–1977 and European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs from 1977 to 1981, which carried as a central message that an overall common EC development aid policy could be more efficient that the sum of the single national policies by avoiding duplication and inconsistencies. The resolution of the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC called on the EC heads of state or government to pursue such a policy on the global level, thus overcoming the traditional focus on former colonies of EC member states.

Actually, the common EC development aid policy subsequently played an important role in the discussions of the EC heads of state or government at the Paris summit in October 1972, and the issue became enshrined in the Community’s larger policy agenda from then onwards. Paragraph 11 of the summit’s official declaration stated:

In the light of the results of the UNCTAD Conference and in the context of the Development Strategy adopted by the United Nations, the Institutions of the Community and Member States are invited progressively to adopt an overall policy of development cooperation on a worldwide scale.

However, in the following years, the French Gaullist government effectively blocked the implementation of the Paris summit’s declared objective of extending EC development policy. Nevertheless, the EC heads of state and government opened a window of opportunity and created a certain path-dependency for progress by inviting the EC institutions and member states progressively to adopt a common policy approach and establishing a Working Party on Development Cooperation. Moreover, in summer 1974, the EC Development Ministers, this time also including the French Development Minister from the new French liberal-conservative coalition government under President Giscard d’Estaing, signalled in an EC Council meeting the will of progress towards a global concept of EC development aid policy. In addition, the

56 Resolution addressed by the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the European Community to the Heads of States or Governments, 1972, HAEU, GSPE, 6.
59 See also Marwood: The European Community and the Third World, p. 208.
60 EC, The Council, Development Co-operation – Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, Financial and Technical Help to non-Associated Developing Countries (Resolution), Brussels, 29 July 1974, European Union Archive of the Council of Ministers (EUACM), Brussels, Documents R.
EC Development Ministers adopted a resolution stating that the EC member states should “make efforts to attain as soon as possible the target for official assistance of 0.7 per cent of the GNP mentioned in the International Development Strategy for the Second Decade, as adopted by the UN”.

With their different strategies, the western European socialist parties contributed to keeping the issue on the Community’s agenda. In this context, the socialist press played an important role. For instance, the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC organised a cooperation among all socialist journals in the Community. Articles on various topics of EC politics written by leading European socialist politicians sought to address a partly transnational European socialist public sphere. They were simultaneously published in the British Socialist Commentary, the German Die Neue Gesellschaft, the French Revue Socialiste, the Italian Mondo Operario, the Danish Ny-politik, the Luxembourg Le Pharo, the Belgian Francophone Socialisme, the Flemish Belgian Sozialistische Standpunten and the Dutch Socialisme en Démocratie in February 1973. Thus, in his article on the relations of the EC with the Third World, the SPD’s Minister for Development Cooperation from 1969 to 1974, Erhard Eppler, underlined that regionally-limited EC development aid policy had to be overcome and replaced by a global concept guaranteeing development aid also for non-associated developing countries; a policy to be designed and coordinated as a supplement to UN development aid. Eppler also claimed that different forms of development aid including financial and technical aid, trade preferences as well as agricultural and industrial policies had to be incorporated into the EC development aid concept. Crucially, Eppler argued that the EC could take on a significant role vis-à-vis the Third World only if and when all EC member states raised their development aid to 0.7 per cent of their GNP.

In the following years, other socialist politicians in positions to directly influence policy-making on the highest level in the field of EC development aid policy repeated Eppler’s points in their own public statements. For example, Jan Pronk, Dutch PvdA Minister for Development Cooperation from 1969 to 1974, stated in an interview for the CERES magazine of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN in early 1974 that the PvdA-led Dutch government considered the EC as the politically

61 EC, The Council, Development Co-operation – Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, Volume on Official Development Assistance (Resolution), Brus- sels, 29 July 1974, EUACM, Documents R.

62 Among them, for example, Mansholt, Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor of Austria from 1970 to 1983), Joop den Uyl (Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1973 to 1977), Jens Otto Krag (Danish Prime Minister from 1962 to 1968 and from 1971 to 1972) and Altiero Spinelli (European Commissioner from 1970 to 1976).

most important factor in international development. Pronk emphasised that there was an urgent need for the EC to develop a more constructive global development aid and cooperation policy. Furthermore, speaking to the Labour Committee of Europe in London in June 1976, Reg Prentice, Minister for Overseas Development for the British Labour Party in 1975 and 1976, also criticised the unsatisfactory status quo of EC development aid policy. He pointed out that the Community still had not realised its intention of providing aid for the wider developing world despite the EC summit’s declaration of October 1972 and the resolution of the Council of Development Ministers of July 1974. Crucially, their statements reflected at the same time the political positions of their governments and those of the elaborated and agreed by the EC socialists within their transnational party networks.

Implementation is Another Story: Limits

After successfully setting the EC’s development aid policy agenda, however, there were seven main reasons that made it difficult for the European socialists to implement the policies of the UN development strategy (such as and in particular the 0.7 per cent target) and a global approach for a common EC development aid policy.

Firstly, the dramatic deterioration of the economic situation after 1973 created structural conditions that strongly limited the margins of distribution for development aid policies and programmes. The socio-economic crisis in Europe, with fast rising unemployment rates and high inflation in the mid-1970s, led to a greater focus on EC economic interests. In the course of the economic stagflation, budget cuts in development aid policy were increasingly on the agenda in the EC member states, as principally reflected in the approach of the German SPD government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who replaced Brandt in May 1974. Reacting to the world economic crisis with a policy of austerity, Schmidt actually decided to reduce German contributions to multilateral development aid. In the mid-1970s, Schmidt favoured an approach that increasingly emphasised German self-interest in the fields of economic and raw materials policy.

Secondly, although public awareness of development aid issues rose in the 1970s in western European countries, there was no broad public support for costly development aid policies and programmes. In fact, the socialist parties in Western Europe found it
difficult to influence public opinion in favour of increased EC or national development aid. As opinion polls showed, since the oil crisis in 1973 development aid had become one of the lowest priorities in Western Europe. Thus, with the public in the EC member states giving lower priority to the development aid policy, there was now lower electoral support for development aid policies such as, for example, the 0.7 per cent target. Overall, development aid policy was not a vote winner in the early 1970s.

Thirdly, the improvement of development aid policy at both the EC and national levels was mainly a political issue of the left-wing groups within the western European socialist parties and their transnational cooperation. At the European level, the trio of Erhard Eppler, Judith Hart and Jan Pronk were the most prominent representatives of the left wing in socialist transnational party cooperation. However, socialist politicians with a more pragmatic orientation and other political priorities opposed the policies advocated by the left-wing groups. In the case of the SPD, for example, Chancellor Schmidt, with his focus on German self-interests, marginalised humanitarian objectives in development aid policy, which were more important to the SPD left-wing representatives Brandt and Eppler. In fact, Eppler resigned as German Minister for Development Cooperation in July 1974 because of disagreements with Schmidt on restrictions of the aid volume of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and future German spending on international development aid projects. Thus, Eppler's withdrawal exemplified the confrontation of these two approaches to development aid policy – one based on ideological motivation and the other on more economic interests.

Fourthly, the withdrawal or change of socialist politicians in ministerial posts sometimes hindered or stopped the continuation of policy-making with a view to implementing a certain socialist policy objective in EC development aid politics. For example, after Eppler left office, he stopped working for a common global EC development aid policy.

Fifthly, the socialist parties in power in the EC member states that led coalition governments had to take into account the interests of their partners in order to ensure their governability. For example, the SPD's coalition partner throughout the 1970s, the Liberal Free Democrats (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), was close to business interests and adopted a reserved position on the 0.7 per cent target. Moreover, the formal responsibility for the negotiations on the continuation of the Yaoundé Con-

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68 See, for example, Jürgen Bellers: Entwicklungshilfepolitik in Europa, Münster 1988, p. 6–10.
vention lay with the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economics,\textsuperscript{69} which at that time were both in the hands of the FDP. Thus, the SPD’s formal access to these negotiations was limited.

Sixthly, there were EC governments without any socialists influence. In particular, in France in the 1970s the centre-right governments of Georges Pompidou (1969 until 1974) opposed the EC socialists’ political preferences in EC development aid policy. As outlined above, French development aid policy was driven by the principle of geographical limitation to a zone of privileged cooperation \((coopération privilégiée)\), the francophone African states. The French government’s aim was to maintain its leading role within the EC association with regard to the mainly francophone African states.\textsuperscript{70} A comprehensive global approach of EC development aid policy with a distribution of EC development funds beyond the associated developing countries would have weakened the French position within the association.

Seventhly, there were other competing influences in EC politics that led to the EC socialists’ political preferences in development aid policy being watered down in the beginning of the 1970s. Decisively, French members of the DG VIII dominated the formation of the European Commission’s development aid policy at that time. Most of them were former colonial officials. Their expertise and networks allowed them to build their own authority and power within the DG VIII.\textsuperscript{71} Not surprisingly, their position on the advancement of EC development aid policy usually coincided with that of the French government. As outlined above, the European Commission favoured the association policy and only reluctantly adopted proposals for a global approach of EC development aid policy in its memoranda. In fact, replacing the Yaoundé Convention II in 1975, the Lomé Convention including 46 developing countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) fostered the EC traditional association approach.\textsuperscript{72}

It was only the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 that ultimately marked a watershed in the advancement of development aid policy. The incorporation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU required that development aid policy was consistent and appropriately linked to this new component of the Community’s external relations. Crucially, development aid policy was classed among the Community policies and did not become a part of the intergovernmental

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item See also ibid., p. 65.
  \item Véronique Dimier has demonstrated this in various articles. See, for example, Véronique Dimier: Bringing the neo-Patrimonial state Back to Europe: French Decolonization and the Making of European Development Aid Policy, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 48 (2008), pp. 433–457.
  \item See, for example, Enzo. R. Grilli: The European Community and the Developing Countries, p. 68.
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cooperation of the CFSP. Nevertheless, the coordination mandate of the Maastricht Treaty did not lead to the centralisation of national instruments of development aid policy on the EU level. The objective was rather to gradually form the already existing common development aid policy and those of the member states into a coherent and effective overall policy.\textsuperscript{73}

The Maastricht Treaty did not establish a global approach, however. Replacing the Lomé Convention in 2000, the Cotonou Agreement continued the association policy. Revised in 2010, it remains, to this day, the most comprehensive agreement on development cooperation between the EU and developing countries.\textsuperscript{74} Although the Cotonou Agreement includes 79 countries from the ACP states, it does not set a common global development aid policy of the EU.

Conclusion

The EC socialist parties took the opportunity of the controversial nature of EC development aid policy to put new issues on the EC agenda in that policy field in the early 1970s. With the agenda-setting strategies of their transnational cooperation, the socialists achieved two key goals with a single stroke. Firstly, by introducing the UN proposals – such as the 0.7 per cent target – for the Second Development Decade to the European level via their transnational party networks, the socialists contributed to the expansion of the international agenda on this topic to the EC agenda. Secondly, the two issues of an implementation of the UN proposals in the EC development aid system and a global concept of EC development aid policy were fused by the socialists into one major issue on the EC agenda. On this basis, the socialists generally framed the question about the future concept of development aid as a highly moral issue that needed to be approached by the EC in a concerted and global manner in order to ensure a fair distribution of resources between the developed and developing countries, that is, between the rich North and the poor South.

Crucially, through their transnational cooperation they coped setting the EC agenda with their policy preferences at strategically determined times, especially near to EC decision-making. One good example of this is the resolution the socialists released via the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC shortly before the EC summit in October 1972, when the EC heads of state and government indeed agreed to invite the EC institutions and member states to progressively adopt a common global EC development aid policy. Moreover, the EC socialists’ agenda-setting strategies such as

\textsuperscript{73} See Dieter Frisch: The European Union’s Development Policy, p. 22f.
\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, Martin Holland/Matthew Doidge: Development Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke 2012, pp. 70ff.
common publications spurred the debate on a new EC development aid policy with a global approach and kept the issue on the EC agenda over a longer period during the first half of the 1970s. Agenda-setting was thus a function of central importance for the EC socialist parties and their transnational cooperation in the EC policy field of development aid.

Against the background of economic stagnation with rising budgets, high inflation and soaring unemployment in the western European countries, however, EC socialists found it hard to justify the high costs of their development aid policy objectives, such as the 0.7 per cent target. In other words, given the structural conditions caused by the economic crisis in the mid-1970s, the margins of distribution for development aid policies and programmes were much smaller than the socialists would have liked. Of course, structural conditions combined with electoral strategies did not allow a one-to-one implementation of the socialist development aid policies. Given the loss of many manufacturing jobs in the western European states, the socialists simply could not win votes with a policy that implied transferring comprehensive financial resources to developing countries far away. For these reasons, on both the national levels and EC level, socialist governments in the EC member states – as seen in particular in the example of the German government led by Schmidt – worked only reluctantly towards the realisation of the development aid policies that the socialist transnational party networks had successfully placed on the EC agenda in the 1970s.

The historical-empirical results of this article thus underline the assumption of the political scientist Guy Peters, who argued that agenda-setting within the (EC)/EU policy-making cycle is the antitheses of the implementation process.75

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